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CONCLUSION ......................................

This Article explores the structure of campaign finance reform, the role
ofpolitical organizations under that system, and the federal tax policy that
affects the income taxation of this form of entrepreneurial activity.
Decades of campaign finance reform have had little impact on the
influence of money in the electoral process. Reform efforts instead have
re-routed the pathways of campaign finance. In part that occurs because
of the evolution of campaign professionals, organized through large
entities, who receive payments from interested contributors in exchange
for influence in the political decisionmaking arena.' While substantial in
1. See MICHAEL J. MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAIs, THE DAY AFTER REFORM: SOBERING
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES

(1998). In the context of state attempts

to regulate campaign finance, Malbin and Gais state,
People who would like to change campaign finance law... are trying to change
the behavior of political professionals, whose need to survive amidst everchanging technologies of communications and campaigning teaches them to adapt
as they pursue their own interests. Any proposal that fails to come to grips, over
the long term, with the way these professionals "exist in reality" will be more
likely to bring about the destruction of the ends the proposal seeks to achieve than
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scope, these large scale organized economic activities are free from federal
income taxation. The trade or business of collecting revenue and
expending it in the acquisition of political influence is favorably treated for
income tax purposes and is treated differently than other forms of business
activity.
This examination of federal income taxation of political campaign
finance and legislative activity begins with a search for overriding policy
objectives. The United States Supreme Court established limitations on
regulatory activity with respect to campaign finance in Buckley v. Valeo.2
The first part of the Article reviews the Constitutional litigation and the
statutory regulation scheme affecting election campaign finance. Readers
who work in this area will recognize this part as familiar territory. The
Supreme Court also has spoken in Cammarano v. United States' with
respect to the relationship between federal income tax provisions and the
First Amendment in the context of political activity. Part II examines the
role of federal income taxation in campaign finance. Analysis of both lines
of authorities provide a policy framework from which to explore
application of federal income tax rules in the campaign realm.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY
REGARDING POLITICAL FINANCE

A. ConstitutionalLimitations on Campaign
Finance Regulation
The starting point of any review of campaign finance must be the First
Amendment limitations on regulatory activity imposed by the Supreme
Court in Buckley.4 Buckley is well-known, much discussed, and highly
vilified by scholars and practitioners of campaign finance reform. The

their fulfillment.
Id. at 2; see also Carroll J. Doherty, OverhaulGridlock on the Hill ContrastsWith Action in States,
CONG. Q., Feb. 28, 1998, at 465 (suggesting that "despite the spate of new state laws, the effort to
drastically change the way elections are financed has run into some formidable obstacles. Indeed,
the lesson from the states is that it is easier to pass tough campaign laws than it is to actually make
them work.").

2. 424 U.S. I (1976).
3. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).

4. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1.
5. See, e.g., Frances R. Hill, CorporatePhilanthropyand Campaign Finance: Exempt
Organizations as Corporate-CandidateConduits, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 881, 895 (1997)
(describing the Court's rationale for distinguishing between the corrupting influence of
contributions and expenditures on behalf of candidates as "conceptual incoherence"); Bradley A.
Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption,EqualityandCampaignFinance,86 GEO. L.J. 45,46-47,
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case, which is the seminal authority with respect to the regulation of
campaign finance,6 outlines the constitutional parameters of legal
limitation on campaign finance activities.7 Organizations engaged in
political activity are formed to act within or without the strictures of the
Federal Election Campaign Act as interpreted through the Buckley
analysis.
Buckley considers the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(FECA), as amended in 1974.9 The 1974 amendment enhanced the FECA
in response to campaign abuses that were disclosed as a result of the
Watergate break-ins during the 1972 presidential campaign. " As described
by the Court in Buckley, the Act had several components: individual
campaign contributions to a candidate were limited to $1,000 for a single
election, with an overall limitation of $25,000 by any contributor;
independent expenditures "relative to a clearly identified candidate" were
limited to $1,000 per year; and spending by candidates and political parties
was subject to proscribed limits." In addition, FECA contained reporting
requirements and provisions for public disclosure and created a system in
the Internal Revenue Code 2 for public funding of presidential
candidates. 3 The Court upheld the constitutional validity of limits on
contributions to individual candidates, the reporting and disclosure
requirements, and public financing ofpresidential campaigns." The Court
declared unconstitutional, as an infringement on First Amendment rights

nn. 9 & 10(1997); Cass R. Sunstein, PoliticalEquality and UnintendedConsequences,94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1390, 1394 (1994).
6. The opinion is more of a law review article than a judicial opinion. The 139 page per
curiamopinion, plus an appendix reprinting the FECA, plus the concurring and dissenting opinions
of Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Marshall, Blackman, and Rehnquist total 294 pages in
the official report. Justice Stevens did not participate in the case. Theper curiam opinion represents
the unqualified views of only Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Powell.
7. See generallyBuckley, 424 U.S. at 1.
8. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1988) (as amended in Pub. L. No. 93-433, 88 Stat. 1263
(1974)).
9. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6.
10. For a history of campaign finance reform efforts, see generally R. GOIDELETAL., MONEY
MATrERS: CONSEQUENCES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM IN THE U.S. HOUSE ELECTIONS, ch. 2

(1999).
11. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7. The FECA is reprinted in an appendix to the Buckley opinion. Id.
at 144-99.
12. Title 26 of the United States Code is referred to as the "Internal Revenue Code" or the
"Code."
13. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7.
14. Id. at 143.
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of free speech, limitations on independent expenditures by individuals and6
groups 5 and expenditure limits on candidates andpolitical organizations.'
The first principle of the Buckley opinion seems to be the Court's
conclusion that, "[a] restriction on the amount of money a person or group
can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached."' 7 Thus, "expenditure limitations... represent substantial rather
than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political
speech."' 8 As a consequence, expenditure limitations on political speech
are tantamount to restraint on political expression, which is afforded the
"broadest protection" of the First Amendment "in order 'to assure [the]
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.""..9 In the words of Justice White's
dissenting opinion, "money talks" and is, therefore, protected speech.20
The Court also rejected arguments that regulation of campaign money
affected non-speech conduct that is subject to a lower level of

15. Id.
at 51.
16. Id.
at 58-59.
17. Id.
at 19. For better or worse, this principle is withstanding the test of time. See, e.g., Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 121 S. Ct. 2351, 2371 (2001).
18. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
19. Id.
at 14 (alteration in original) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,484 (1957)).
The per curiam opinion also concludes that FECA's contribution and expenditure limitations

impinge on the First Amendment freedom of association. Id at 22. Contributions serve to affiliate
a person with a candidate or party and further permit like-minded associates to pool their resources
in furtherance of common political goals. See id. at 25.
20. Id.at 262 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Justice White wrote,
"Proceeding from the maxim that 'money talks,' the Court finds that the expenditure limitations
will seriously curtail political expression by candidates and interfere substantially with their

chances for election." Id Justice White concludes that, "As an initial matter, the argument that
money is speech and that limiting the flow of money to the speaker violates the First Amendment
proves entirely too much." Id. Justice White further argues that,
The record before us no more supports the conclusion that the communicative
efforts of congressional and Presidential candidates will be crippled by the
expenditure limitations than it supports the contrary. The judgment of Congress
was that reasonably effective campaigns could be conducted within the limits

established by the Act and that the communicative efforts of these campaigns
would not seriously suffer.
Id at 262-63 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); see also Frances R. Hill, Softer
Money: Exempt Organizations and Campaign Finance, 32 EXEMPT ORG. L. REV. 27, 29 (2001)
(asserting that "[tlhe Supreme Court's position that money is speech has been distorted by rent-

seeking officeholders into the proposition that payment should be the precondition for the right to
speech in the policy process, a right that should carry no price tag").
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constitutional scrutiny. 21 The consequence of this holding is that any
regulation of campaign money is subject to strict scrutiny and requires a
compelling governmental interest.'
While the Court in Buckley found that the FECA limitations on
campaign expenditures imposed a substantial restraint on the quantity and
diversity of political speech, 23 "a limitation upon the amount that any one
person or group may contribute to a candidate or political committee
entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage
in free communication." 4 In addition, the per curiam opinion concludes
that a compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption in elected officials justifies restrictions on the
amount of campaign contributions from individual sources that a candidate
may accept.2" The opinion states that, "[t]o the extent that large
contributions are given to secure political quidpro quo's from current and
potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative
democracy is undermined., 26 The Court thereby upheld the validity of
FECA's $1,000 contribution limit to a single candidate by separate
21. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.
22. See id. at 25. In the context of restrictions on the First Amendment protected freedom of
association, which is restrained by limitations on campaign contributions, the Court states that,
"Even a significant interference with protected rights of politieal association may be sustained if
the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms." Id.(quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S.
477, 488 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id. at 19.
24. Id. at 20-21. Ironically the Court also observes that,
There is no indication ...that the contribution limitations imposed by the Act
would have any dramatic adverse effect on the funding of campaigns and political
associations. The overall effect of the Act's contribution ceilings is merely to
require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number
of persons and to compel people who would otherwise contribute amounts greater
than the statutory limits to expend such funds on direct political expression, rather
than to reduce the total amount of money potentially available to promote political
expression.
Id. at 21-22. The comment illustrates the Court's naivety about the mainsprings of human conduct.
As discussed below, FECA changed the face of campaign funding.
25. Id. at 25-29. Finding this purpose sufficient to justify the contribution limit, the Court
found it unnecessary to address two additional justifications; the Act was said to limit the voices
of affluent persons and groups thereby equalizing the ability of all citizens to affect the outcome
of elections, and the Act was said to limit the increasing costs of political campaigns. Id. See
generally Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (upholding state limits on
contributions to candidates for state offices).
26. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 (emphasis added). The Court added here that the appearance
of corruption arising from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse is "of almost equal
concern." Id. at 27.
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persons" and the $5,000 contribution limit imposed on political
committees that are registered with the Federal Election Commission.28
The Court also upheld FECA's overall $25,000 limitation on the amount
that a person may contribute within a single calendar year.29
FECA's limitations on direct expenditures by candidates and groups as
well as expenditures by others to benefit an identified candidate did not
fare as well. FECA had attempted to limit expenditures made from
personal funds by an individual who is running for federal office (and his
or her family)," limit the overall level of expenditures by a candidate for
federal office,3 and limit the expenditures of any person on behalf of a
clearly identified candidate to $1,000 per calendar year.32 The Court
concluded that restrictions on expenditures constituted a direct restraint on
the quantity and diversity of political speech.33 In order to avoid a
challenge that the limit on expenditures "relative to a clearly identified
candidate" was unconstitutionally vague, the Court held that the limitation
must be interpreted as only applying to "expenditures for communications
that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate for federal office."34 The Court then concluded that FECA, as
narrowly construed, did not limit independent expenditures promoting a
candidate or the candidate's views as long as the communication did not

27. Id. at 30, 35. The limitation is applied to persons; the term "persons" is defined in 18
U.S.C. § 591(g) to include "an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation or any
other organization or group of persons." Id. at 23 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 591(g) (1976)).
28. Id. at 35-36. To qualify for the $5,000 limit, the FECA requires a group to be registered
with the Federal Election Commission as a political committee for at least six months and to have
received contributions from more than 50 persons. Id. at 13 n.12, 35. Additionally, the political
committee must have contributed to five or more candidates for federal office. Id. Significantly,
although not relevant to the thesis of this Article, the Court rejected arguments that the contribution
limit is overbroad because the perceived harm could be limited by more narrowly focused
provisions, the $1,000 limit is unrealistically low, and the limitation works an invidious
discrimination between incumbents and challengers in federal elections. Id. at 29-35.
29. Id.at 38. Theper curiamopinion refers to this overall limitation as a"moderate restraint'
that "serves to prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation by a person who might
otherwise contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of
unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge
contributions to the candidate's political party." Id. The Court also upheld FECA limitations on
certain expenses incurred by individuals providing volunteer services. Id. at 36.
30. Id. at 51 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1) (1970)).
31. Id. at 54 n.60 and accompanying text.
32. Id. at 39 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (1970)).
33. Id. at 19-20, 39. "It is clear that a primary effect of these expenditure limitations is to
restrict the quantity of campaign speech by individuals, groups, and candidates. The restrictions,
while neutral as to the ideas expressed, limit political expression 'at the core of our electoral
process and of the First Amendment freedoms."' Id. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 32 (1968)).
34. Id. at 23, 44 (emphasis added).
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expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.35
As a consequence, the Court held that the limit on independent
expenditures would not function as a "loophole-closing provision designed
to check corruption."36 In addition, the Court concluded that independent
expenditures favoring a candidate which are not coordinated with the
candidate 7 do not pose the same danger of corruption in the form of the
quidpro quo thatjustified limitations on campaign contributions. 8 Thus,
the direct restriction on political speech imposed by expenditure
limitations was not justified by the requisite compelling governmental
interest.3 9 Similarly, a restriction on a candidate's expenditure of his or her
personal funds directly restricts the candidate's freedom to be an advocate
for the candidate's personal views and does not serve to protect FECA's
primary governmental interest in preventing the actual and apparent
corruption of the political process that is possible when others obtain
undue influence over the candidate through monetary contributions.4" In
addition, FECA's attempt to limit overall campaign expenditures, which
again directly restricted the quantity ofpolitical expression, was not, in the
Court's view, justified by a governmental interest in restraining increasing
campaign expenditures.4"
The distinction in Buckley between contributions to a candidate, which
may be restricted, and expenditures for political activity not coordinated
with a candidate, which are considered unregulated speech, has framed the
subsequent development of campaign organizations. The per curiam
opinion recognized the difficulty inherent in this dichotomy where, in
assessing the claim that the FECA expenditure limitation was vague, 42 the
opinion states that

35. Id. at 45.
36. Id.
37. Expenditures that are coordinated with the candidate are considered to be campaign
contributions to the candidate. Id. at 46 n.53.
38. Id. at 47. "The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the
candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quidpro quo for improper commitments
from the candidate." Id.
39. See id. at 47-48.
40. Id. at 53.
41. Id. at 55. "The interest in alleviating the corrupting influence of large contributions is
served by the Act's contribution limitations and disclosure provisions rather than by section 608
(c)'s campaign expenditure ceilings." Id. The Court also said that, "In the free society ordained by
our Constitution it is not the government, but the people-individually as citizens and candidates
and collectively as associations and political committees-who must retain control over the
quantity and range of debate on public issues in a political campaign." Id. at 57.
42. Id. at 41-42. The limitation was contained in 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (1970), which limited
expenditures relative to a clearly identified candidate to $1,000. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss1/1

8

Simmons: An Essay on Federal Income Taxation and Campaign Finance Reform

Federal Income Taxation and Campaign Finance Reform

the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates
and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often
dissolve in practical application. Candidates, especially
incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues involving
legislative proposals and governmental actions. Not only do
candidates campaign on the basis of their positions onvarious
public issues, but
4 3 campaigns themselves generate issues of
public interest.
Justice White, in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Buckley,
acknowledged the conclusion of theper curiam opinion 4 and stated,
It would make little sense to me, and apparently made none
to Congress, to limit the.amounts an individual may give to
a candidate or spend with his approval but fail to limit the
amounts that could be spent on his behalf.... [A]pparently,
a contributor is to be constitutionally protected in spending
money in support of his chosen
unlimited amounts of 45
candidate or candidates.
Contrasting a $1 million expenditure urging election of a named candidate
in identical words with and without the approval of the candidate, Justice
White observed that "[flor constitutional purposes it is difficult to see the
difference between the two situations. I would take the word of those who
know-that limiting independent expenditures is essential to prevent
transparent and widespread evasion of the contribution limit."'t 6 As Justice
White seems to predict, the distinctions between campaign activity that
expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate or that is
controlled by the candidate, and independent campaign activity not subject
to contribution limits defines the contemporary nature of campaign
organizations and the tax regime under which they operate. The Court
badly underestimated the role that independent expenditures on behalf of
a candidate would come to play in the electoral system. Perhaps the Court
majority was somewhat naYve in its belief that large independent
expenditures on behalf of a candidate have less of a corrupting influence
than direct campaign contributions.
The per curiam opinion of Buckley v. Valeo addressed a second
justification for limiting campaign expenditures that is of some interest in
considering the permissible extent of the tax regime applicable to the

43. Id at 42.
44. Id at 260 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45. Id. at 261 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. Id. at 261-62 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun
agreed with this assessment. Id.at 290. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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business of political influence. The Court considered and rejected an
"ancillary" justification for spending limits that is described as a
"governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and
' The Court asserted that
groups to influence the outcome of elections."47
the concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice
of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which
was designed to secure the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources, and to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about
of political and social changes desired by the people. The
First Amendment's protection against governmental
abridgment of free expression cannot properly be made to
depend on a person's financial ability to engage in public
discussion.48
While government may not restrain the speech of some persons to equalize
the voice of others, the discussion in Part II argues that likewise the
government is not required to favorably subsidize the speech of some
groups over others.
Buckley upheld FECA requirements for disclosure of campaign
contributions and expenditures by candidates, political groups and
independent expenditures.49 Disclosure and reporting requirements were
attacked as infringing freedom of association under NAACP v. Alabama.5"
The Buckley Court recognized the deterrent effect of disclosure on the

47. Id. at 48. Justice Marshall characterized this interest as "promoting the reality and
appearance of equal access to the political arena." Id. at 287 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also ROBERT MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS AND COURTS: THE MAKING
OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 53 (1988) (asserting that the two sides in Buckley raised as
a constitutional matter one ofthe oldest conflicts in Anglo-American political thought, that between
liberty and equality, that between those who want no restrictions on the political use of wealth and
those who want to retard the tendency of unequally distributed wealth to become the basis for a
similarly unequal distribution ofpolitical influence); Lillian R. BeVier, CampaignFinanceReform:
SpeciousArguments, IntractableDilemmas, 94 COLUM.L. REV. 1258, 1267 (1994) ("[R]egulating
campaign expenditures as a means of achieving political equality is ... a simplistic if not a
deliberately misleading strategy for removing disparities of political influence. Regulating
expenditures isolates wealth as the critical variable and controls only for differences in immediately
available financial resources.").
48. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This
language is in response to an argument that equalizing the voice of individuals and groups justified
expenditure limits on individual political activity. Id. at48. Thepercuriamopinion contains similar
expressions regarding this argument with respect to limitations on candidates' expenditures from
personal resources and overall limitations on campaign expenditures. Id. at 54, 56.
49. Id. at 60-61.
50. 337 U.S. 449 (1958); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65.
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exercise of First Amendment rights5 but concluded that the possible
infringement on First Amendment freedoms was outweighed by
governmental interests in providing the electorate with information on the
source of candidates' money, in deterring actual corruption by exposing
large contributions to public scrutiny, and by providing records essential
to enforcing FECA's campaign contribution limits.52 With respect to the
disclosure requirement applicable to independent expenditures advocating
the election or defeat of a candidate, the Court held that the requirement
was justified by a strong governmental interest in "shed[ding] the light of
publicity on spending that is unambiguously campaign related but would
not otherwise be reported because it takes the form of independent
expenditures or of contributions to an individual or group not itself
required to report the names of its contributors."53 However, in order to
avoid a perceived overbreadth problem with respect to disclosure of
independent expenditures, the Court narrowly interpreted the language of
the disclosure requirement to apply to expenditures by individuals or
groups that are not candidates or political committees only, "(1) when they
make contributions earmarked for political purposes or authorized or
requested by a candidate or his agent, to some person other than a
candidate or political committee, [or] (2) when they make expenditures for
communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate."54 In contrast, independent expenditures that may
influence the outcome ofan election, but which do not "expressly advocate
the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate" are not subject to
reporting or disclosure.55 The distinction between these two categories of
advocacy further frames the structure of campaign finance activities by
forcing much campaign advocacy into the realm of independent
expenditures. Buckley also limits disclosure of contributors to a minor
political party that can show a "reasonable probability" that compelled
disclosure5 6will subject the contributors to "threats, harassment, or
reprisals.
Finally, Buckley sustains FECA's establishment of a voluntary system
of public finance for presidential campaigns, which includes expenditure

51.
52.
53.
54.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65.
Id. at 66-68.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 80.

55. See id.
56. Ia at 68-74. The Court indicates that the governmental interest in disclosure is
diminished in the case of a minor party with little chance of winning. Id. at 70; see also Brown v.
Socialist Workers, 74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87,88 (1982) (holding thatthe First Amendment
requires an exemption for the Socialist Workers Party from requirements of an Ohio statute for
disclosure of campaign contributors and expenditures).
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limitations 7for candidates who elect to accept public funding for the
campaign.
B. Statutory Regulation of Campaign Finance
The regulation of campaign finance under FECA is significantly
restrained as a result of its compliance with the First Amendment
limitations of Buckley. The scheme is fraught with difficult interpretative
issues that make the system complex. 8 As is described in Part III of this
Article, entrepreneurial marketers of political influence have been able to
exploit the lacunae in the regulatory scheme using various forms of taxexempt entities to facilitate large investment in political decision making
outside of the regulatory scheme.
59
FECA limits individual contributions to a candidate for federal office,
or to a candidate's authorized.political committee, to $1,000 with respect
to any election. 0 The term "election" separately includes both the primary
and general election, thereby permitting $1,000 contributions to the same
candidate for each part of the election cycle, a total of $2,000 per
candidate." Overall contributions to FECA regulated activities during a

57. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85-86.
58. MALBIN & GAis, supra note 1, at 101. The complexity itself makes it more difficult to
trace the flow of money, makes enforcement more difficult, and favors the use of diverse tactics
by the most sophisticated political entrepreneurs. Id.
59. A candidate is a person who seeks nomination or election to the United States offices of
President, Vice President, Senator, or Representative to Congress and who has received or spent
in excess of $5,000 with respect to the candidacy. 2 U.S.C. § 431(2)-(3) (2001); 11 C.F.R. § 100.3
(a) (2001); see also 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)-(9) (2001) (defining, contributions and expenditures that are
discussed infra note 78 and accompanying text).
60. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (2001). Many commentators assert that the $1,000 limit set in
1971 is too low in terms of current dollars, and further, that increasing the limit to a more
reasonable amount might mitigate abuse. See, e.g., Craig M. Engle et al., Buckley Over Time: A
New Problem with Old ContributionLimits, 24 J. LEGIS. 207-09, 214-16 (1998); Joel Fleischman
& Pope McCorkle, Level-Up Rather Than Level-Down: Toward a New Theory of Campaign
FinanceReform, 1J.L. & POL. 211, 215 (1984); Frank J. Sorauf, Politics,Experience, and the First
Amendment: The Case ofAmerican CampaignFinance, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1348, 1365 (1994).
The McCain-Feingold Bill would have increased the limit for contributions to candidates to $2,000,
and the overall contribution limit to $37,500. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 308(a)-(b) (as passed by the
Senate Apr. 2, 2001).
61. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(l),441a(a)(6) (2001). The contributor may designate in writing to which
election a contribution relates. 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(2)(i) (2001). Otherwise the contribution is
deemed to be made for the next election. 11 C.F.R. § 1 10.1(b)(2)(ii) (2001). A contribution made
after an election may be designated as a contribution for the preceding election, but only to the
extent that the contribution does not exceed debts outstanding from the particular election. I1
C.F.R. § 1 10.1(b)(3)(i) (2001).
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calendar year by an individual may not exceed $25,000.62 Contributions in
the name of another person, which would permit the contributor to evade
the limitations, are expressly prohibited. 63
Subject to the $25,000 overall limitation" applicable to individuals, a
person may contribute up to $20,000 to political committees established
and maintained by a national political party.6 6 Individual contributions to
a political committee other than a candidate committee (i.e.,
multicandidate political committees, which are referred to as political
action committees, or PACs) are limited to $5,000 in a calendar year.67 A
political committee is an entity that has received contributions in excess
of $1,000 or has incurred expenditures in excess of $1,000 with respect to
a candidate for federal office, or a local committee of a political party that
has received contributions or incurred expenditures in excess of $5,000
with respect to a candidate. 6' A multicandidate political committee is in
turn limited to contributing $5,000 to any single candidate or the
candidate's authorized political committees with respect to an election,
$15,000 in the aggregate during a calendar year to a political committee
established by a national party and the House and Senate campaign
committees, and $5,000 during the calendar year to any other political
committee.69 Political committees are required to file reports with the

62. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (2001). For purposes of the $25,000 limitation, contributions to a
candidate with respect to an election in a calendar year other than the election year are treated as
having been made in the calendar year of the election. Id The McCain-Feingold Bill would
increase the overall contribution limit to $37,500. S. 27, 107th Cong. §§ 102(b), 308(b) (2001).
63. 2 U.S.C. § 441f(2001).
64. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (2001).
65. 2 U.S.C. § 431(11) (2001) defines a"person" to include individuals and entities such as
partnerships, corporations, associations, and committees.
66. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(B) (2001). The McCain-Feingold Bill would increase the
contribution limit to a national political party to $25,000. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 308(a)(2)(2001).
67. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (2001). The McCain-Feingold Bill would increase the
contribution limit to $10,000 for contributions to a political committee of a state committee of a
political party. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 102(a)(3) (2001) (adding 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(d)); See also
Cal. Med. Ass'n v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 184 (1981) (upholding the $5,000
contribution limit as applied to an unincorporated association).
68. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A), 4(c) (2001); see also I1 C.F.R. § 100.5(a), (c) (2001). A political
committee is also a committee that has made certain other political expenditures in excess of $5,000
or received in excess of $5,000 of benefits that are outside of the definition of contributions. 2
U.S.C. § 431(4)(c) (2001). A political committee may incorporate for the purpose of securing
limited liability. I I C.F.R. § 114.12(a) (2001).
69. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2) (2001); see also I1 C.F.R. § 110.2 (2001). A multicandidate
political committee is a political committee which is registered with the Federal Election
Commission or the Secretary of the Senate and which has received contributions from more than
50 persons and which has made contributions to five or more federal candidates. I1 C.F.R. §
100.5(e)(3) (2001).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 5:2

Federal Election Commission," which, among other matters, disclose the
identity of individuals who contribute in excess of $200 during a calendar
year and political committees that make contributions to the reporting
committee.7
FECA imposes expenditure limitations on candidates for President and
Vice-President of the United States who accept federal campaign funds.72
The national and state political parties also are limited in the amounts they
can expend on behalf of candidates for President, the House of
Representatives, and the Senate.73 The expenditure limitations on parties
only apply, however, to expenditures that are directly coordinated with
candidates.74 Independent expenditures by a state or local political party
as constitutionally protected speech are not subject to limitation."
70. 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(1) (2001).
71. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A)-(B) (2001). "Identification" of contributors includes the name,
address, occupation, and employer of an individual, and the name and address of any other person.
2 U.S.C. § 431 (13)(A)-(B) (2001). The reporting requirement applies to contributions to the federal
accounts of the reporting committee. 11 C.F.R. § 104.8(a) (2001).
72. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b) (2001). Candidates are limited to expenditures of $10,000,000 to
secure nomination and $20,000,000 for the general campaign. Id. These amounts are adjusted for
increases in the consumer price index beginning in 1976.2 U.S.C. § 441a(c) (2001). Contributions
to candidates running for Vice President are treated as contributions to the candidate for President.
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(C) (2001).
73. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (2001). The national committee of a political party is limited to
expenditures of two cents multiplied by the voting age population of the United States. Id. For
senatorial campaigns and campaigns for representatives in single representative states the two cents
limit is applied to the voting population of the state, with a minimum permissible expenditure of
$20,000. Id. Expenditures on behalf of other candidates for the House of Representatives are
limited to $10,000. Id. These limitations free the political parties from the $5,000 limitation that
is otherwise imposed on multicandidate political committees. Id.
74. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7) (2001). Expenditures coordinated with the candidate are treated as
contributions and are subject to expenditure limitations under the First Amendment standards of
Buckley v. Valeo because coordinated expenditures might otherwise be used to avoid the
constitutionally valid limits on campaign contributions. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1975);
see also 11 C.F.R. § 109.1(c) (2001). Limitations on political party coordinated expenditures were
upheld against constitutional attack in Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican
FederalCampaignCommittee, 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001), reversing213 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the limitation on national political parties' coordinated expenditures is itself an
infringement of the parties' First Amendment rights).
75. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 608
(1996). However, even though overall campaign strategy may be coordinated between the party and
the candidate, expenditures for advertising that attacks the party candidate's opponent that is
undertaken by the party independent of the candidate are treated as independent expenditures that
may not be limited. Id.at 613-14. The Colorado party chairman coordinated campaign strategy with
the candidate, but the particular advertising campaign was developed and reviewed independently.
Id.
Identifying coordinated expenditures is, at best, difficult. See, e.g., James Dao, Bush Approves
New AttackAdMocking Gore, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1,2000, at Al (reporting that the George W. Bush
campaign approved of one Republican National Committee television advertisement attacking Al
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However, since these funds are spent with the purpose of influencing a
federal election, contributions to the party for this purpose are subject to
the $20,000 limit on contributions to a political party.76 Thus, money for
this type of activity must be raised the "hard" way, in FECA limited
increments.
The FECA limitations and the identity of "political committees" to
which limited contributions are made are dependent in part on the
definitions of "contributions" and "expenditures" contained in the Act."
These restricted definitions and narrow interpretation oftheir scope permit
extensive funding of political activity outside of the FECA limitations.
Contributions initially are defined to include "any gift, subscription,
loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made by any
'
person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office."78
Compensation to another for personal services rendered to a political
committee is also treated as a contribution to the political committee.7 9 The
definition of a contribution is restricted, however, by fifteen specific
exclusions.8" For example, voluntary personal service and the use of
property for the benefit of a candidate or political committee are not
contributions." An individual's efforts expended in collecting individual
contributions from several other persons is not itself treated as a
contribution. 2 This exclusion permits an individual or organization to

Gore but blocked another Party-sponsored commercial).
76. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(8)(A)(i), 441a(a)(1)(B), 441a(a)(7) (2001).
77. 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2001).
78. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (2001); see also 11 C.F.R. § 100.7 (2001). The McCain-Feingold
Bill would revise the definition of "contribution" to include any expenditure that is coordinated
with a candidate or the candidate's agents, broadly defined. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 214(a)-(b) (as
passed by the Senate Apr. 2, 2001) (amending 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)); see also S.27, 107th Cong.
§ 202 (2001) (adding a new subsection (C) to 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)).
79. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(ii) (2001).
80. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B) (2001); see also 11 C.F.R. § 100.7(b) (2001).
81. 2 U.S.C. § 43 I(8)(B)(i)-(ii) (2001). The exemption includes the cost of invitations, food,
and beverages provided by an individual in rendering voluntary personal services that does not
exceed $1,000 per election with respect to a single candidate in a single election, and up to $2,000
on behalf of all political committees in a single calendar year. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(ii) (2001)
Likewise, § 43 1(8)(B)(iii) (2001) excludes the sale of food at cost to the extent that the value
provided by avendor does not exceed the same $1,000 and $2,000 limits. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(iii)
(2001); see also 11 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(4)-(7) (2001). In addition, payments by state and local party
committees for campaign materials used by the committee in connection with volunteer activities
are not treated as contributions or expenditures, except that amounts allocable to candidates in
federal elections must be paid from FECA regulated contributions. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(8)(B)(xi),
(9)(B)(viii)(2) (2001); see also 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.7(b)(15)(ii), 100.8(b)(16)(ii) (2001). This
exclusion does not cover expenditures for broadcast or newspaper advertising. 2 U.S.C.
§§ 431(8)(B), (9)(B)(i) (2001); see also 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.7(b)(15)(i), 100.8(b)(16)(i) (2001).
82. See KENNETH NEMTHEFLOWOFMONEYINCONGRESSIONALELECTONS 12-13 (1998)
(describing "bundling").
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incur expenditures "bundling" numerous FECA limited contributions from
others into a single package for presentation to a candidate. 3 The large
combined contribution is thereby attributed by the candidate to the person
who collects the bundle." The exemption for personal services extends to
legal and accounting services rendered by a regular employee of the
person paying for the services to a political committee of a political party
or to the authorized committee of a candidate for the purpose of complying
with the election law."
Expenditures are described as "any purchase, payment, distribution
loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made by any
person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.,1 6 As
is the case with the definition of contributions, identification of an
expenditure is restricted by multiple exclusions, 7 some of which permit
campaign activities of political parties outside of the FECA limitations. 8
The most significant provisions are exceptions that distinguish "party
building" activities from regulated political expenditures. Neither
contributions nor expenditures include the costs incurred for, -or any
benefit provided by, the preparation of "slate cards" or sample ballots by
a state or local committee of a political party as long as the slate endorses
three or more candidates for any public office.89 Contributions and
expenditures allocable to federal candidates must be made from funds
subject to FECA limitations, but the remainder of these party activities
may be financed without limitation by contributions not subject to FECA
limits, "soft money. ' '9O Expenditures by a state or local committee for
general party broadcast and newspaper advertising are not subject to

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(ix) (2001); see also 11 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(13)-(14) (2001). The
amounts must be disclosed in the reports required of the political committee. 2 U.S.C.
§ 431(8)(B)(ix) (2001); see also 11 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(13)-(14) (2001). Expenses incurred for such
activities also are not treated as "expenditures" for political activity. 2 U.S.C. § 43 1(9)(B)(vii)
(2001).
86. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)(i) (2001). Expenditures also include "a written contract, promise,
or agreement to make an expenditure." 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)(ii) (2001).
87. 2 U.S.C. § 431 (9)(B) (2001). Subdivision (i) excludes the publication of news stories and
commentary unless the broadcast station or publication is owned by a political party, committee
or candidate. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (2001).
88. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(viii) (2001).
89. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(v), (9)(B)(iv) (2001).
90. 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.7(b)(9), 100.8(b)(10) (2001). The McCain-Feingold Bill would
eliminate political party soft money in federal election campaigns by requiring that national, state,
and local party solicitations and expenditures for federal candidates involve funds that are subject
to the FECA's limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 101(a)
(as passed by the Senate Apr. 2, 2001).
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FECA regulation.9 Party activities that are not related to the support of
candidates for federal office are completely outside of the FECA
regulatory scheme, although such activity may be subject to individual
state campaign finance regulations.92 Contributions to a national or state
political party for the acquisition of office facilities that are not acquired
for the election of a candidate in a particular election for federal office are
not subject to FECA regulation.93 These party activities are, therefore, also
financed outside of the hard money restrictions on contributions.
Contributions and expenditures also do not include state and local party
voter registration or get-out-the-vote drives,9" including operation of
voluntary phone banks.95 Amounts allocable to federal candidates,
however, must be paid from FECA regulated funds.96
Although FECA does not impose expenditure limits on committees that
are not coordinated with a candidate for federal office,97 independent
expenditures by political committees and individuals are subject to
reporting to the Federal Election Commission.98 Consistent with the
language used in the Buckley opinion,99 independent expenditures are
defined as expenditures by a person "expressly advocating the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate which are made without the
cooperation or consultation with any candidate" or the candidate's political

91. 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.7(b)(9), 100.8(b)(10) (2001).
92. For an analysis of state campaign finance legislation, see MALBIN& GAIS,supranote 1.
93. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(viii) (2001); see also 11 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(12) (2001).
94. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(xii), (9)(B)(ix) (2001). The excluded payments do not include
payments for political advertising and cannot be made from funds earmarked by a contributor for
the benefit of specific candidates. There is an argument that the soft money loophole is important
to increasing the role of parties in national elections and that the party building activities that are
funded with these soft money contributions enhance voter participation. See generally Stephen
Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Soft Money, HardMoney, StrongParties, 100 COLUM. L.
REv. 598 (2000). A contrary view, that parties may be corrupting, is found in Richard Briffault, The
PoliticalPartiesand CampaignFinanceReform, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 620 (2000).
95. 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.7(b)(17)(v), 100.8(b)(18)(v) (2001). All of these activities would
become subject to the FECA rules under the McCain-Feingold Bill. S.27, 107th Cong. § 101(b)
(as passed by the Senate Apr. 2,2001). There is a possibility that the McCain-Feingold Bill's ban
on soft money, if enacted, would increase the flow of money to political action committees.
Goodbye, Soft Money, ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 2001, at 22. The McCain-Feingold Bill might also
increase the role of nonprofit groups. Brave New World (perhaps),ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 2001, at
30.
96. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(xii), (9)(B)(ix) (2001). 11 C.F.R. § 100.8(b)(18)(iv) (2001)
provides that costs are treated as expenditures related to a candidate for the House or Senate if the
materials include references to the candidate. The regulation retracts classification as an
"expenditure" if "the mention of such candidate(s) is merely incidental to theoverall activity." Id.
97. Colo.Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 608
(1996).
98. 2 U.S.C. § 434(c) (2001); see also 11 C.F.R. §§ 104.4(a), 109.2(a) (2001).
99. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976).
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committees."' Expenditures by any person that do not "expressly
advocate" the election or defeat of a candidate are outside of the FECA
provisions. °
The definitional focus on contributions and expenditures that expressly
advocate the election or defeat of a candidate for federal office leaves a
vast expanse of political advocacy beyond the regulatory pale. 0 2 Before
it declared the original FECA independent expenditure limitation
unconstitutional, the Court in Buckley distinguished communications that
address political "issues" from communications that might be subject to
limitation as campaign expenditures.0 3 The Court opined that in order to
preserve the expenditure limitation on vagueness grounds, the limitation
"must be construed to apply only to expenditures for communications that
in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate for federal office."'0 4 The Court added in a footnote that, "This
construction would restrict the application of [the expenditure limitation]
to communications containing express words of advocacy of election or
defeat, such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith
for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject."" 0 5 The Court similarly
interpreted the FECA requirement of 'disclosure of independent
expenditures only as applicable to expenditures that advocate the election

100. 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2001); see also 2 U.S.C. § 431(18) (2001) (defining "clearly
identified candidate").
101. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2001).
102. Issue advocacy is the route by which money unregulated by the FECA enters into the
campaign process. The problem of issue advocacy is the subject of much scholarly writing. For
some good examples, see generally DEBORAH BECK ET AL., ISSUE ADVOCACY DURING THE 1996
CAMPAIGN 3 (Annenberg Pub. Policy. Ctr. Report SeriesNo. 16, 1997) (providing statistics of issue
advocacy advertisement); MALBIN& GAIS, supra note 1, at 11; GLENN MORAMARCO, REGULATING
ELECTIONEERING: DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN "ExPREss ADVOCACY" & "ISSUE ADVOCACY,"
(1998); Lillian R. BeVier, MandatoryDisclosure, "Sham IssueAdvocacy, "andBuckley v. Valeo:
A Response to ProfessorHasen, 48 UCLA L. REV. 285 (2000); Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy:
Redrawingthe Elections/PoliticsLine, 77 TEX. L.REV. 1751 (1999); Richard L. Hasen, Measuring
Overbreadth: UsingEmpiricalEvidence to Determine the Constitutionalityof CampaignFinance
Laws TargetingSham Issue Advocacy, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1773 (2001); Richard L. Hasen, The
SuprisinglyComplex CaseforDisclosureof ContributionsandExpendituresFundingSham Issue
Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265 (2000); Allison R. Hayward, When Does an AdvertisementAbout
Issues Become an "IssuesAd"?, CATH. U. L. REV. 63 (1999).
103. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41-43; see supra note 34 and accompanying text. 18 U.S.C. §
608(e)(2) (1970) would have limited independent expenditures relative to a clearly identified
candidate to $1,000. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. As narrowly construed to apply only to
communications advocating election or defeat of a candidate, the provision was held
unconstitutional under the First Amendment on the ground that the asserted governmental interest
in preventing corruption was inadequate to justify a ceiling on independent expenditures. Id. at 45.
104. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44.
105. Id. at44 n.52.
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or defeat of a clearly identified candidate."°6 Several courts have
interpreted Buckley to mean that advocacy is election advocacy within the
FECA only if the "magic words" of the Buckley footnote are used in the
communication."0 7 This means, for example, that the Organization for
Country, Motherhood, and Apple Pie can collect unlimited contributions
and make unlimited expenditures, without disclosure, in an election eve
campaign advertising that Congress member X opposes a tax credit for
apple pie and this activity should be stopped, as long as the advertisements
do not recommend that the recipient of the communication vote for
Congress Member X's opponent or vote against Congress Member X. The
advertising campaign only comments on the issue of tax credits for apple
0l' the
pie. On the other hand, in FederalElection Commission v. Furgatch
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took the position that express advocacy
may be identified from the substance of the communication rather than the
form of its magic words."0 9 The court concluded that speech may be
express advocacy "when read as a whole, and with limited reference to
external events, [it is] susceptible of no other reasonable interpretation but
'' 0
as an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate."
Nonetheless, advocacy that purports to inform on issues, even when the
communication clearly identifies individuals who are candidates for

106. Id. at 80; see also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
243-44 (1986) (holding that a newsletter urging voters to vote for pro-life candidates and
identifying specific candidates is express advocacy, even though the newsletter did not expressly
direct the reader to vote for a particular candidate).
107. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049 (4th
Cir. 1997); Faucher v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 928 F.2d 468,470 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that a prolife voter guide was not express advocacy); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Cent. Long Island Tax
Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that a bulletin criticizing
the voting record of a local congressman was not express advocacy); Fed. Election Comm'n v.
Nat'l Org. of Women, 713 F. Supp. 428, 433-34 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding that to be express
advocacy a communication must contain an explicit, unambiguous reference to a candidate and a
clear exhortation to vote for or againstthat candidate); see also 11 C.F.R. § 100.22 (2001) (defining
express advocacy in similar terms). The issue was before the Supreme Court in Fed. Election
Comm 'n v. MassachusettsCitizensforLife, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,249 (1986) in which the Court held
that an organization's newsletter that urged readers to vote for pro-life candidates and that
identified candidates with pro-life voting records, but did not recommend a vote for specific
candidates, constituted express advocacy.
108. 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987).
109. Id. at 863-64.
110. Id. at 864. The court's opinion lists three components of this standard: (i) the speech is
express if its message is unmistakable and unambiguous, suggestive of only one plausible meaning;
(ii) the speech is advocacy if it presents a clear plea for action, as opposed to speech that is merely
informative; and (iii) it must be clear that the contemplated action is a vote for or against a
candidate. Id.
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federal office in an upcoming election as being in support or opposition to
the advocate's point of view, is not subject to regulation under FECA. i"
The McCain-Fiengold Bill that passed the Senate in April 2001 would
reduce the scope of permissible issue advocacy on two fronts. Federal
election activity of political parties would be defined to include "a public
communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal
office... and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or
attacks or opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the
communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate).""' 2
"Electioneering communications" subject to disclosure under FECA would
be defined to include any
broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which (I) refers
to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; (II) is
made within... (aa) 60 days before a general, special or run
off election for such Federal office; or (bb) 30 days before a
primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of
a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate,
for such Federal office; and (III) is made to an audience that
includes members of the electorate for such election,
convention, or caucus.... 113

111. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Christian ActionNetwork, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1050
(4th Cir. 1997). In this case the court found the following was not express advocacy:

Bill Clinton's vision for America includes job quotas for homosexuals, giving
homosexuals special civil rights, allowing homosexuals in the armed forces. Al
Gore supports homosexual couples adopting children and becoming foster parents.
Is this your vision for a better America? For more information on traditional
family values, contact the Christian Action Network.
Id. See generally; MORAMARCO, supra note 102; Hayward, supranote 102; Glenn J. Moramarco,
Beyond "Magic Words ": Using Self-Disclosureto Regulate Electioneering,49 CATH.U. L. REV.
107(1999).
112. S.27, 107th Cong. § 101(b) (as passed by the Senate Apr. 2, 2001) (adding 2 U.S.C.
§ 431(20)(A)(iii)).
113. Id. § 201(f)(3)(A)(i) (adding 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)). In the event the primary definition is
declared unconstitutional, the Bill would define an electioneering communication as
any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which promotes or supports a
candidate for that office, or attaches or opposes a candidate for that office
(regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or
against a candidate) and which also is suggestive of no plausible meaning other
than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate.
Id. § 201(f)(3)(A)(ii).
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Corporations and labor unions are prohibited by FECA from making
contributions or expenditures with respect to a candidate in a federal
election." 4 The prohibition on corporate campaign activity survived
scrutiny under the First Amendment on the basis of Congress's compelling
interest in ensuring "that substantial aggregations ofwealth amassed by the
special advantages which go with the corporate form of organization...
not be converted into political 'war chests' which could be used to incur
political debts from legislators who are aided by the contributions."" 5 In
FirstNationalBankofBostonv. Bellotti, 6 however, the Court limited this
rationale to corporate contributions to political candidates.'1 7 The Court
was not willing to find the same compelling interest in broadly protecting
the election process and struck down aMassachusetts
statute that restricted
1
8
campaign.'
initiative
an
in
expenditures
corporate
The FECA limitation on corporate campaign expenditures does not
prevent corporations and unions from participating in elections as active
players. None of the FECA limitations reaches speech that is not "express
advocacy."" 9 Corporations and labor unions are thus unrestrained in their
ability to inform on issues, whether or not the issue is identified with a
114. 2 U.S.C. § 441 b(a) (2001). National banks and corporations organized under the authority
of a law of Congress are prohibited from making contributions or expenditures in any election for
any political office, including state and local elections. 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(a) (2001). Other
corporations and labor unions are prohibited from making contributions and expenditures in
connection with elections of candidates for federal office. Id. § 114.2(b). A labor organization is
an organization, committee, or plan in which employees participate for the purpose of dealing with
employers concerning work conditions; 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(1); 11 C.F.R. § 114.1(d). An
incorporated association of volunteer members is not subject to these limitations. Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 252-55 (1986).
115. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197,207 (1982). For the
Court's description of the early history of restrictions on corporate political contributions, see
UnitedStatesv. Int 7 Union UnitedAutomobile,Aircraft &Agric. Implement Workers ofAm., 352
U.S. 567, 570-584 (1957); see also Mass. CitizensforLife, 479 U.S. at257; Fed.Election Comm "n
v. Nat'l Conservative PoliticalAction Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500-01 (1985); Pipefitters Local
Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 416 (1972). For a discussion of these cases, see
Thomas Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorporating Corporate
GovernanceAnalysis Into FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,79 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 7-24 (2001).
116. 435 U.S. 765 (1977).
117. See generally id
118. Id. at 789-90.
119. See id. at 784.
We thus find no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the decisions
of this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the
protection of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because its source
is a corporation that cannot prove, to the satisfaction of a court, a material effect
on its business property.
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candidate. In addition, the FECA itself expressly provides additional
20
outlets for corporate and labor union participation in elections.1
Corporate and labor union contributions and expenditures subject to
FECA are broadly defined to include any direct or indirect transfers of
money, services, or anything of value to any candidate, campaign
committee, political party or organization in connection with an election. 12'
The definition is substantially modified with exceptions. Forbidden
contributions or expenditures do not include "communications by a
corporation to its stockholders and executive or administrative personnel
and their families" (the "restricted class") on any subject, including
express advocacy for a candidate and election related coordination with
candidates and political committees. 2 2 Similarly, labor unions are
23
permitted communications to members and their families on any subject.'
These communications are subject to reporting to the Federal Election
Commission. 24 Regulations permit communications by corporations and
labor unions to their restricted classes to include candidate endorsements
that may be accompanied by a public announcement of the endorsement
with a press release and press conference. 25 Corporations and labor unions
also are permitted to arrange for meetings at which a candidate may
address stockholders, executive administrative personnel and/or
members.'26 In addition, corporations may undertake "nonpartisan" get-

120. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2001); see also 11 C.F.R. § 114 (2001).
121. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2001); see also 11 C.F.R. § 114.1(a)(1).
122. 11 C.F.R. §§ 114.1(a)(2)(i), I14.3(a)(1). These communications may be made to a
"restricted class" consisting of the stockholders and executive administrative personnel, and their
families, of a corporation and its subsidiaries, branches and divisions. Id. § 114.1(j). Executive and
administrative personnel are salaried employees who have policymaking, managerial, professional,
or supervisory responsibilities. Id. § 114.1(c). A stockholder is a person with a present beneficial
interest in stock who has the power to vote the stock if it is voting stock, and has the right to receive
dividends. Id. § 114.1(h). The communication must reflect the views of the corporation or labor
union and cannot be are-publication of materials prepared by candidates. Id. § I 14.3(c)(1)(ii). The
permitted communications include operation of phone banks to encourage members of the
restricted class to register to vote, to vote for particular candidates, and to register for a particular
party. Id. § 114.3(c)(3).
123. Id. §§ 114.1(a)(2)(i), 114.3(a)(1). The restricted class of a labor union to whom unlimited
communication is permissible includes members, executive and administrative personnel, and their
families. Id. § 114.1(j). A member is a person who has satisfied requirements for membership in
an organization, who has accepted the organization's invitation to become a member, and who has
some significant connection with the organization such as a financial commitment, paying dues,
or who has a significant organizational commitment. Id. § 114.1(e)(2).
124. Id. §§ 100.8(b)(4), 114.3(c).
125. Id. § I 14.4(c)(6). Expenditures for the press release and press conference must be "de
minimis" and may not be coordinated with a candidate. Id.
126. Id. § 114.3(c)(2)(i). The corporation or labor organization is not required to offer the
same opportunity to other candidates in the election. Id. However, if a corporation arranges for a
meeting with employees beyond the restricted class, other candidates for the same office must be
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out-the-vote campaigns aimed at stockholders and executive
administrative personnel, and their families.127 Labor unions also may
undertake nonpartisan get-out-the-vote campaigns focused12on members,
executive and administrative personnel, and their families. 1
The most significant corporate and labor union political activity falls
under the provision allowing corporations and labor unions to maintain a
"separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes."' 29 These
funds are also referred to as political action committees (PACs). 3 ' The
corporation or labor union solicits voluntary contributions from
stockholders, employees, and/or members."' Amounts expended by a
corporation or labor union in the establishment and administration of a
separatesegregated fund, and amounts expended in soliciting contributions
to a fund, are not treated as contributions or political expenditures.1 2 The
separate segregated fund may be controlled by the establishing corporation
or labor union.' A separate segregated fund is a multicandidate political
committee subject to FECA contribution limitations and disclosure

given a similar opportunity if requested. Id. § 114.4(b)(1)(i)-(iii). In addition, the corporation or
labor union must refrain from express advocacy at a meeting that includes persons other than
members of the restricted class. Id. § 114.4(b)(1)(v), (2)(ii).
127. Id. § 114.1(a)(2)(ii). This activity may also include express advocacy. Id. § 114.3(c)(4).
128. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(B) (2001). The regulations permit express advocacy for particular
candidates or parties as part of a get-out-the-vote campaign. 11 C.F.R. § 114.3(c)(4) (2001). Getout-the-vote drives that are aimed at the general public can neither include express advocacy nor
be coordinated with a candidate. Id. § 1 14.4(d)(1)-(2).
Contributions and expenditures by corporations and labor unions also do not include sales
of food and beverages by a corporate vendor at cost if the value provided to a candidate for an
election does not exceed $1,000, or to a party or political committee $2,000 in a calendar year. Id.
§ 114.1 (a)(2)(v). Payments for legal and accounting services for a political committee or party are
not treated as expenditures as long as the services are not attributable to activities that directly
further the election of a designated candidate. Id § 114.1(a)(2)(vi)-(vii). Corporations and labor
unions may also make unlimited contributions to a national or state political party for the purpose
of defraying the costs of construction or purchase of an office facility that is not acquired for the
purpose of influencing the election of any candidate for federal office. Id. § 114.1 (a)(2)(ix). These
contributions are subject to reporting requirements. Id. § 114.1(a)(2)(ix).
129. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2).
130. For an analysis of the development of PACs and their growing influence, see generally
ANTHONYCORRADO, CREATIVE CAMPAIGNING: PACs ANDTHE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS

(1992);

THOMAS GAIS, IMPROPER INFLUENCE: CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW, POLITICAL INTEREST
GROUPS, AND THE PROBLEM OF EQUALITY (1996); FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE:
MYTHS AND REALITIES (1992).

131. See 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(a)(1) for regulations prohibiting reprisals, negative actions, or
threats to induce contributions. No more than two solicitations per year may be made from persons
other than stockholders, executive administrative personnel, and members. 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(b)(4)(B); 11 C.F.R. § 114.6.
132. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(c); 11 C.F.R. § 114.1(a)(2)(iii).
133. 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(d).
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requirements.'34 Such a fund is limited to contributions of $5,000 per
election to a candidate for federal office, $15,000 during the calendar year
in the aggregate to a national party political committee and the House and
Senate campaign committees, and $5,000 during the calendar year to any
other political committee.'35 Individual contributions to a PAC are limited
to $5,000 in a calendar year.136 Trade associations also are permitted to
establish a separate segregated fund based on contributions from the
that
stockholders and executive administrative personnel of1corporations
37
are members of the trade association and their families.
By its terms, the prohibition on corporate political activity applies to
incorporated nonprofit organizations. However, in Federal Election
Commission v. MassachusettsCitizensforLife, Inc., 138 the Supreme Court
held that the prohibition could not be imposed on a voluntary nonprofit
political organization. 139 The Court noted that the limitation on corporate
political expenditure was justified as a restriction on the "corrosive
influence of concentrated corporate wealth" that can be aggregated as a
result of special advantages which go with the corporate form of
organization. 4 ' In the Court's view, the potential unfair deployment of
accumulated corporate capital was not present in the case of a voluntary
nonprofit advocacy organization for which the availability of resources is
dependent upon the popularity of its ideas.'41 The Court stressed the
voluntary nature of the association that permits any individual who
disagrees with its positions to withdraw support without suffering
collateral consequences. 42 At the conclusion of its.majority opinion, the
Court identified three features that distinguish a nonprofit advocacy
organization from a corporation that is constitutionally subject to FECA's
prohibition on political expenditures: (1) the organization is formed for the
purpose of promoting political ideas and cannot engage in business
134. Id. § 114.5(e)-(f).
135. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2).
136. Id. § 441a(a)(1)(C).
137. Id. § 441b(b)(4)(D). A trade association may solicit contributions from the stockholders
and executives of a member corporation only if the corporation approves the solicitation. Id. A
corporation is permitted to approve solicitation by only one trade association in any calendar year.
See 11 C.F.R. § 114.8(c).
138. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
139. Id. at239.
140. Id at 257. The Court indicates that the availability of corporate resources for political
activity are a reflection ofthe corporation's economic success, rather than a reflection ofthe power
of its advocacy, and reflects the economically motivated decisions of investors and customers. Id.
at 258.
141. Id. at 259.
142. Id. at 260-61. This is distinguishable from the case of a for-profit corporation or labor
union in which withdrawal from the organization has consequences beyond disassociation with the
organization's political advocacy. Id. at 260.
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activities," (2) the organization has no shareholders or other persons who
would have a claim on its earnings or assets, and (3) the organization is not
established by a corporation or labor union and cannot, therefore, be used
as a conduit for the type of direct spending that is constitutionally
prohibited.44
The three features of a nonprofit political organization enumerated in
FederalElectionCommission v. MassachusettsCitizensforLife, Inc. were
pivotal inAustin v. Michigan Chamberof Commerce'4 in which the Court
upheld a State of Michigan prohibition on direct campaign expenditure by
an incorporated chamber ofcommerce.'" Unlike the organization involved
in Massachusetts Citizensfor Life, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce
was organized for a variety of purposes in addition to its political goals. 47
Because the members of the Chamber derived benefits from the
association beyond its political goals, withdrawal from the organization in
disagreement with the Chamber's political positions would entail the loss
of non-political benefits.14 1 The Court concluded that the Chamber's
members were thus more similar to corporate shareholders than to the
members of Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc." 9 Finally, the Chamber
5 ° Thus, the Chamber
largely was financed by corporate contributions!"
could serve as a conduit for the political expenditures of corporations that
were otherwise constitutionally subject to limitation.' As a consequence,
unlike incorporated political associations, broader based incorporated
associations such as trade organizations, chambers of commerce, and
others, are limited by FECA in their ability to make direct contributions. 52

143. Id. at 264. The opinion states that, "If political fundraising events are expressly
denominated as requests for contributions that will be used for political purposes, including direct
expenditures, these events cannot be considered business activities." I4
144. Id.
145. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
146. Id.at 657-58. The Michigan statute permitted corporations to make political expenditures
through a separate segregated fund. Id. at 655 (citing MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 169.255(1) (1979)).
147. Id. at 662.
148. Id. at 663.
149. Id
150. Id. at 664.
151. Id
152. See generallyid.But see Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein'sMonster Hits the Campaign Trail:
AnApproach toRegulationofCorporatePoliticalExpenditures,32 WM.&MARYL.REV. 587,589
(1991) (asserting thatAustin v. MichiganChamberofCommerce is an "unjustified departure" from

case law holding that individual and corporate campaign expenditures are protected speech). The
McCain-Feingold Bill would exclude from the definition of campaign expenditures subject to the
prohibition any communication by an organization exempt from tax under sections 501(c)(4) or
527(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code if the communication is paid for from funds provided by
individuals who are United States citizens or lawful permanent residents. S. 27, 107th Cong. §
203(b) (as passed by the Senate Apr. 2, 2001) (adding 2 U.S.C. § 441(c)(2)).
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In summary, the restrictions on the regulation of campaign finance
reflect the Supreme Court's rejection under the First Amendment of
governmental intrusion into the campaign process. Buckley treats
restrictions on expenditures as an unconstitutional restraint on the quantity
of speech that is protected by the First Amendment. Only limitations on
contributions to a candidate or candidate organization may be restricted
under a compelling state interest to prevent corruption or the appearance
of corruption in the electoral process. Independent expenditures of
individuals advocating the election or defeat of a candidate that are not
coordinated with the candidate are not subject to governmental regulation,
although they are subject to disclosure. No public disclosure requirements
apply to communications that do not "expressly" advocate the election or
defeat of an identified candidate.
II.

TAX SUBSIDIES AND REGULATION OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY

A. PermissibleLimitations on FederalIncome Tax
Subsidiesfor PoliticalAdvocacy
The principal cases addressing the role of income taxes in campaign
activity reflect a restraint on governmental participation in election
advocacy that is consistent with limitations on the regulation of campaign
finance, but broader in scope. Cammarano v. United States'53 is the
seminal authority in this area. Cammaranoinvolved the consolidated cases
oftaxpayers who claimed business expense deductions' 4 for contributions
to funds maintained by trade associations for the purpose of defeating
proposed state initiatives.' The taxpayers in both cases were in the
business of selling alcoholic beverages and faced state-wide initiatives that
would have terminated their businesses." 6 In Cammarano,the taxpayers
were partners engaged in the wholesale distribution of beer in the state of
Washington.157 The partnership contributed money to the Washington Beer
Wholesalers Association, which maintained a trust fund for the defeat of
have placed the retail sale of wine and
an initiative measure that would
58
beer in the hands of the State.

153. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
154. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2001) allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses incurred
in the conduct of a trade or business. The deductions in Cammarano were claimed under the
predecessor to section 162 in the 1939 Code, 26 U.S.C. § 23(a)(1)(A). Id. at 501.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 501-02.
157. Id. at 500.
158. Cammarano v. United States, 246 F.2d 751, 751 (9th Cir. 1957).
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59
the companion case, the
In F. Strauss & Son, Inc. v. Commissioner,1
engaged
in
the
wholesale
liquor business in
taxpayer was a corporation
6
Arkansas. ' The taxpayer contributed money to the Arkansas Legal
Control Associates, which was formed for the purpose of defeating an
initiative that would have imposed statewide prohibition of alcoholic
beverages.'61 Both taxpayers claimed the contributions as ordinary and
necessary business expenses incurred to preserve their respective
businesses, which would have been lost had the proposed initiatives been
enacted.62
Treasury regulations in effect for the taxable years at issue in
Cammarano prohibited business expense deductions for expenditures
incurred "for lobbying purposes, the promotion or defeat of legislation,
[or] the exploitation of propaganda."' 6 The Court in Cammarano first
concluded that the regulations applied to deny deductions for expenses
incurred for the purpose of influencing an initiative plan," then addressed
the taxpayers' principal argument that the regulations were invalid because
they contradicted statutory language that allowed deductions for all of the
ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in the course of a trade or
business.' The Court noted that the words "ordinary and necessary"
suffer from sufficient ambiguity to warrant an interpretive regulation.'66
The Court pointed to the regulations as constituting a "sharply defined
national policy" that had acquired the "force of law" by virtue of
Congress's continued re-enactment of the statutory language with the
interpretative gloss of the regulations.' 67 The Court described the public
policy goal ofthe regulations by quoting Justice Learned Hand, who wrote
in Slee v. Commissioner6 8 that "political agitation as such is outside the

159. 251 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1958).
160. Iae
161. Id at 724-25.
162. Id. at 725, 727.
163. Cammarano,358 U.S.at 499-500 (quoting Treas. Reg. §§ 29.23(o)-i, .23 (q)-1 (1954)
(applicable to individuals and corporations respectively)). The same rules currently are found in
section 162(e) ofthe Code. Regulations similarto the Treasury Regulations at issue in Cammarano
had been in place since 1918, Id. at 502-03, 504 n.6.
164. Id. at 504-07.
165. Id. at 507-08.
166. Id. at 508.
167. Id. at 508-12. Several commentators question the existence of a clearly defined public
policy at the time. See, e.g., Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest: Rethinking the
InternalRevenue Code's Treatment ofLegislative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1285 (1993);
Dean E. Sharp, Reflection on the Disallowance of Income Tax Deductions for Lobbying
Expenditures, 39 B.U. L. REV. 365, 379 (1959); George Cooper, The Tax Treatment ofBusiness
GrassrootsLobbying:Defining andAttainingthe PublicPolicy Objectives,68 CoLUM.L.REv. 801,
808-10 (1968).
168. 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
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statute, however innocent the aim.... Controversies of that sort must be
conducted without public subvention; the Treasury stands aside from
them.' ' 169 The Court elaborated its view of that clearly defined policy in its
discussion of the taxpayers' argument that denial of the deduction for their
initiative campaign expenditures violated their First Amendment rights by
restricting their ability to advocate their opinions. 70 The Court's brief
analysis of this assertion speaks volumes about the proper role of federal
income tax rules in the context of campaign finance.
Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because
they engage in constitutionally protected activities, but are
simply being required to pay for those activities "entirely out
of their own pockets, as everyone else engaging in similar
activities is required to do under the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code. Nondiscriminatory denial of deduction from
gross income to sums expended to promote or defeat
legislation is plainly not "aimed at the suppression of
dangerous ideas." Rather it appears to us to express a
determination by Congress that since purchased publicity can
influence the fate of legislation which will affect, directly or
indirectly, all in the community, everyone in the community
should stand on the same footing as regards its purchase
so
71
far as the Treasury of the United States is concerned.1

169. Cammarano,358 U.S. at 512 (quoting Slee, 42 F.2d at 185).
170. Id. at 512-13.
171. Id. at 513 (citation omitted). Justice Douglas's concurring opinion is interesting in this
regard. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas asserted that the First Amendment was
equally applicable to business speech. Id. at 514 (Douglas, J., concurring). "A protest against
government action that affects a business occupies as high a place." Id. Justice Douglas added that,
Deductions are a matter of grace, not of right. To hold that this item of expense
must be allowed as a deduction would be to give impetus to the view favored in
some quarters that First Amendment rights must be protected by tax exemptions.
But that proposition savors of the notion that First Amendment rights are
somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State. Such a notion
runs counter to our decisions, and may indeed conflict with the underlying
premise that a complete hands-off policy on the part of government is at times the
only course consistent with First Amendment rights.
Id. at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citations omitted). In Haswellv. UnitedStates,500 F.2d 1133,
1148 (Ct. Cl. 1974), the court commented on the holding of Cammaranoby pointing out that"[tihe
exercise of the freedom of speech is not free from taxation. Writers, speakers, newspapers, and
similar individuals and organizations whose principal activities frequently directly involve first
amendment rights are all subject to nondiscriminatory taxation on their incomes."
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In Regan v. Taxation with Representation,172 a post-Buckley Supreme
Court addressed the idea expressed in Cammarano that public policy
justifies restrictions on tax benefits that provide a government subsidy to
political activity." Taxation with Representation (TWR) was a charitable
organization exempt from federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code.' 74 Exemption under section 501(c)(3) meant
not only that TWR was exempt from tax on its own income, but also that
contributions to the organization were deductible from the contributor's
income. 75 Part of the price for exemption under section 501(c)(3) is
compliance with the statutory prohibition that no substantial part of the
activities of the organization involve "carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation."' 76 TWR, as a tax-exempt
charity, claimed that the statutory limitation on its lobbying activities
violated its rights to free speech under the First Amendment.'
The Court's rejection ofTWR's First Amendment claim began with the
explicit proposition that, "[b]oth tax exemptions and tax deductibility are
a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system.'17 The
Court explained that a tax exemption is equivalent to a cash grant to the
organization in the amount of tax that the organization would otherwise
pay on its income. 79 A tax deduction is the equivalent of a cash grant of
a portion of the contributor's contributions.' The Court noted the
distinction applied in the application of these subsidies between politically
active public welfare organizations and charitable organizations.' 8 ' Public
welfare organizations that are exempt from tax under section 501 (c)(4) of
the Internal Revenue Code are permitted to lobby.8 2 Contributions to these
organizations are not deductible by the contributor.'83 To claim the

172. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
173. Id. at 546-47.
174. Id. at 543.
175. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2001); see also Regan, 461 U.S. at 543.
176. I.R.C. § 501(h) (2001). This language prohibits activities proposing, supporting, or
opposing legislation. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(c)(3)(ii) (2001). Section 501(h) permits alimited
amount of lobbying and other political activity, but subject to the excise tax of section 4911. See
infra note 320 and accompanying text.
177. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545.

178. Id at 544.
179. Id.
180. Id. Some would argue that these tax benefits are not subsidies because tax exemption or
disallowance of deductions may be provided for reasons of simplicity or because the measurement
of income would otherwise be difficult. See, e.g., Galston, supra note 167, at 1288. However,
whether Congress intends a subsidy or not, eliminating the cost of tax liability on income reduces
the cost of doing business for the exempt taxpayer and thereby provides an important tax benefit.
181. Regan, 461 U.S. at 543.
182. Id.
183. Id
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additional subsidy provided by allowing a deduction of contributions, the
organization must forego participation in political activities, including
lobbying. s4 The Court thus states, "In short, Congress chose not to
subsidize lobbying as extensively as it chose to subsidize other activities
18 5
that nonprofit organizations undertake to promote the public welfare."
Having identified both the tax-exemption and deduction for charitable
contributions as subsidies, the Court in Regan rejected TWR's claim that
denial of the subsidy to contributions because of TWR's exercise of its
86
right to political advocacy infringed TWR's First Amendment rights.
The Court recognized that the government cannot deny a benefit to a
person because of the exercise of a constitutional right.' However, the
Court concluded,
The Code does not deny TWR the right to receive deductible
contributions to support its nonlobbying activity, nor does it
deny TWR any independent benefit on. account of its
intention to lobby. Congress has merely refused to pay for the
lobbying out of public moneys. This Court has never held that
Congress must grant a benefit such as TWR claims here
to a
18 8
person who wishes to exercise a constitutional right.
Referring to Cammarano, the Court expressly rejected the "notion that
First Amendment rights 1are
somehow not fully realized unless they are
89
subsidized by the State.,

Identification ofthe tax provisions as a subsidy also framed the Court's
rejection of TWR's assertion that allowing lobbying by veterans'
184. The term "political activities" is used broadly here. The distinctions between activities
permitted to a tax-exempt charity and prohibited political activity is not clear. See infra note 297
and accompanying text.
185. Regan, 461 U.S. at 544.
186. Id. at 545.
187. Id.; see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (finding that the refusal to
renew a teacher's contract because of speech critical of the college governing board may have
violated a contractual expectation interest in re-employment and may require a hearing); Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958) (holding that denying a property tax exemption to a person
who refused to sign a declaration that he did not advocate the forcible overthrow of the Government
of the United States was an unconstitutional penalty for certain forms of speech).
188. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545.
189. Id. at 546 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498,515 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)); see also supra note 171. Many commentators disagree and suggest that the statutory
restraint on lobbying and intervention in political campaigns denies First Amendment guarantees.
See, e.g., Anne Berrill Carroll, Religion, Politics,and the IRS: Defining the Limits of Tax Law
Controls on PoliticalExpressionby Churches,76 MARQ. L. REV. 217,218-19 (1992); LauraBrown
Chisolm, Politicsand Charity: A ProposalforPeaceful Coexistence, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 308,
327 (1989); Joseph S. Klapach, Note, Thou Shalt Not Politic: A PrincipledApproach to Section
501(c)(3) 'S Prohibitionof PoliticalCampaignActivity, 84 CORNELL L. Rv. 504, 542 (1999).
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organizations, which are tax-exempt charitable organizations to which
deductible contributions may be made, 9 ' while denying the ability to
lobby to other tax-exempt charities, is an unreasonable classification that
violates Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 9 ' The Court noted
the general proposition that statutory classifications are subject to strict
scrutiny if they interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right.'92 The
Court added, however, that "1legislatures have especially broad latitude
in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes."'9 3 The Court
rejected the view that strict scrutiny is required "whenever Congress
subsidizes some speech, but not all speech."' 94 Analogizing tax subsidies
to appropriations,' the Court noted that "Congressional selection of
particular entities or persons for entitlement to this sort of largesse 'is
review
obviously a matter of policy and discretion not open to judicial
96
unless in circumstances which here we are not able to find. "1
The majority opinion in Regan does not distinguish between the tax
subsidy provided by tax exemption and the tax subsidy provided by the
contributors' claim to deduction of contributions to a section 501(c)(3)
organization.' 97 The majority did note, however, that TWR could obtain
tax-deductible contributions for its non-lobbying activity by separating its

190. I.R.C. § 501(c)(19) (2001).
191. Regan, 461 U.S. at 546-47.
192. Ideat 547 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980)).
193. Id. The Court quoted at length from Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940),
which said in part that "in taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest
freedom in classification.... [The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the
most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against
particular persons and classes." Id.
194. Id. at 548. The Court explains that,
Congress could, for example, grant funds to an organization dedicated to
combating teenage drug abuse, but condition the grant by providing that none of
the money received from Congress should be used to lobby state legislatures.
Under Cammarano,such a statute would be valid. Congress might also enact a
statute providing public money for an organization dedicated to combating
teenage alcohol abuse, and impose no condition against using funds obtained from
Congress for lobbying. The existence of the second statute would not make the
first statute subject to strict scrutiny.
Id. at 548-49.
195. Id. at 549. "For purposes ofthese cases appropriations are comparable to tax exemptions
and deductions, which are also 'a matter of grace [that] Congress can, of course, disallow.., as
it chooses."' Id. (quoting Comm'r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958)).
196. Id. at 549 (quoting United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 444 (1896)).
197. Id. at 544.
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political activity into a separate section 501(c)(4) public welfare
organization that is not funded by tax-deductible contributions. 9 '
The opportunity to create a tax-exempt entity under section 501(c)(4)
to undertake political activity was pivotal to the Justices who signed the
concurring opinion.'99 The concurring opinion interprets section 501 (c)(3)
as a denial of a benefit to a person who exercises a constitutional right to
lobby, adding that the provision deprives an otherwise eligible
organization of both its tax exemption and its ability to receive taxdeductible contributions for all of its activities whenever one of its
activities involves lobbying. 0 ° The concurring opinion finds that the defect
is remedied by the presence of section 501 (c)(4) which permits the exempt
organization to form a separate tax-exempt entity for its lobbying
activities.20 ' The concurring Justices find a congressional purpose to
ensure that tax-deductible contributions are not used for lobbying which
is satisfied by the separate accounting required of separate section
501 (c)(3) and section 501 (c)(4) organizations.2 2
The distinction drawn in the concurring opinion is anomalous. As
described in the majority opinion, both the tax exemption and the
contributors' deductions are tax subsidies to a qualified organization.2 3
The concurring opinion does not identify any distinction between the two
subsidies that would support different treatment, but suggests that
Congress has the power to withhold one of the subsidies, but not both.2"
The concurring opinion confuses the benefit of tax subsidies to political
activity with a prohibition on the ability of an organization to exercise its
First Amendment entitlement to free speech. The ability to speak through
a tax-exempt section 501(c)(4) organization, thereby obtaining some tax
subsidy for political activities, ought not to be considered an entitlement
under the First Amendment. There is no prohibition on speech as long as
the tax system does not deprive an exempt organization of an outlet for its
political expression. But, as the majority states in Regan, "[t]his Court has
never held that the court must grant a benefit.., to a person who wishes
to exercise a constitutional right."' 5 The view of the concurring opinion

198. Id.
199. Id. at 551 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This opinion was joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall.
200. Id.at 552 (Blackmun, 3., concurring).
201. Id. at 552-53 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
202. Id. at 553 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). The concurring opinion here cites a footnote ofthe
majority opinion out of context to assert that the majority opinion reflects this sentiment. Id. at 545
n.6. The text of the majority opinion asserts the broader proposition that "Congress has merely
refused to pay for the lobbying out of public moneys." Id. at 545.
203. Id. at 544.
204. Id. at 553 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
205. Id. at 545.
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can be accommodated with recognition of the ability of a tax-exempt
section 501(c)(3) charitable organization to establish a separate entity,
whether taxable or not, outside of section 501 to separate its political
advocacy from tax subsidized activities." 6 In that event, the charitable
organization would not lose its First Amendment entitlement to
unrestricted speech, it simply would be required to undertake its political
activity without a public subsidy in the form of tax exemptions. As
discussed in the next part, however, the Internal Revenue Code provides
for a good deal of tax subsidy to political speech.
B. CampaignFinance OrganizationsUnder the Internal
Revenue Code
One of the facts of life in the commercial world is that the tax law
regulates virtually all forms of doing business. That is no less true with
respect to campaign finance, in which the Internal Revenue Code and
Treasury Regulations influence the organizational structure and activities
of political organizations. The scope of the Internal Revenue Code's
involvement with political expenditure is striking.
This part explores the parameters of various applicable sections of the
Internal Revenue Code, particularly the provisions of section 501 that
contain rules for tax-exempt entities. Part III of the Article explores the
application ofthese provisions in combination with FECA in the operation
of campaign expenditures.
1. Income and Deductions with Respect to Political Activity
Gross income generally includes all economic benefits clearly realized
over which the taxpayer has dominion and control. 0 ' This broad definition
206. See Fed. Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364,

399-400 (1984). The Court held, under the authority of the concurring opinion in Regan, that First
Amendment rights are abridged by a condition on a government subsidy (e.g., support for the
Corporation on Public Broadcasting) that barred speech in the absence of an alternative outlet for
the speech. Id. The statute at issue barred all editorial commentary by radio stations receiving funds
from the federally funded Corporation for Public Broadcasting. Id. at 400. The Court indicated that
under Regan, Congress could enact a valid scheme that would permit the noncommercial radio
stations to create non-subsidized affiliates to make known their views. Id.; see also Fed.Election
Comm 'nv. MassachusettsCitizensforLife, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,252-53 (1986), in which the Court
held that the ability to establish a separate segregated fund did not mitigate the Constitutional
infirmity of 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) as it applied to restrict campaign expenditures of an incorporated
nonprofit organization. Even with a separate, segregated fund, the organization would have been
precluded from using its treasury funds for campaign expenditures. Mass. Citizensfor Life, 479
U.S. at 253. The Court added that the FECA requirements for a separate segregated fund were
burdensome to an organization that made only occasional campaign expenditures. Id. at 252.
207. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426,433 n.l 1(1955). I.R.C. § 61(a) defines
gross income as "all income from whatever source derived." Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 62(a) (1955)).
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would seem to include the economic benefit of a campaign contribution
received by a candidate or political organization that it may direct to its
own benefit to enhance the candidate's or organization's political
aspirations. Clearly there is a benefit, measurable in monetary value, that
the recipient may control to its advantage. The Internal Revenue Service
ruled in Revenue Ruling 68-512,208 however, that political campaign
contributions are not income to the benefited candidate except to the extent
that the candidate diverts contributions to personal use.20 9 Likewise, in
Revenue Ruling 74-2 1210 the Service concluded that an unincorporated
campaign organization, which was treated as a taxable corporation under
rules prevailing at the time,21 was not required to include campaign
contributions in gross income.2" 2 These administrative pronouncements
lack any indication of the reasons for the exclusion from income except
citation to prior administrative positions. 213 However, the Internal Revenue

208. Rev. Rul. 68-512, 1968-2 C.B. 41.
209. Id.; see also Rev. Rul. 71-449, 1971-2 C.B. 77.
210. Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 14.
211. The ruling cited regulations under section 7701 of the Code, which distinguished
corporations from partnerships and trusts on the basis of specific criteria that attempted to
determine whether the organization more nearly resembles a corporation. Treas. Reg.§§ 301.7701 1,301.7701-2 (2001). Current Treasury Regulation § 301.7701-1 and § 301.7701-2 provides for
classification of a "business entity" as a partnership or corporation. A "business entity" is
recognized as a separate entity if there is a "joint venture or other contractual arrangement" under
which "the participants carry on a trade, business, financial operation, or venture and divide the
profits therefrom." Id. § 301.7701-1(a)(2). Revenue Ruling 74-21, under similar language in the
old regulations, stated that the criteria "do not definitively cover" unincorporated not-for-profit
organizations but concluded nonetheless that the organization was to be treated as a separate entity.
Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 14. In lieu of the joint profit motive language of the regulations, the
Ruling described the campaign organization as having "associates and an objective to carry on
jointly, activities in furtherance of the purposes for which the organization was organized." Id.; see
also Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 633 F.2d 512, 516-17 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding thatjoint
production of goods in-kind for division among the participants met the joint profit motive test).
This finding continues to be significant with respect to the current regulations. Under Treasury
Regulation § 301.7701-3(a)-(b) (1967), an unincorporated separate business entity that does not
elect corporate status is treated as a partnership.
212. Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 14.
213. The first published position is I.T. 3276, 1939-1 C.B. 108, which simply states that, "it
is held that a political gift received by an individual or apolitical organization is not taxable income
to the recipient." One plausible theory is that the funds are received subject to restrictions on their
use as campaign expenditures that benefit the interest of the contributor. The receipts may be
viewed as trust funds not includible in the income of the candidate or recipient organization, which
is merely a conduit for the funds. See Ford Dealers Adver. Fund, Inc. v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 761,773
(1971), aff'dper curiam,456 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1972); Dri-Powr Distribs. Ass'n Trust v.Comm'r,
54 T.C. 460, 480 (1970); Angelus Funeral Home v. Comm'r, 47 T.C. 391, 397 (1967), aff'd 407
F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1969). The Internal Revenue Service does not follow this line of cases. Rev. Rul.
74-318, 1974-2 C.B. 14. Legislative history to Public Law 93-625, which enacted section 527 of
the Code, states that the practice presumably "resulted from the belief that virtually all of the
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Service position treats as includible in income campaign contributions that
have been "diverted from the channel of campaign activities and used by
' Diversions requiring
a [political] candidate... for [any] personal use. 214
inclusion in income include accepting payment for specific services,215
failure to demonstrate that contributed funds were in fact used for
campaign expenditures, 21 use of funds for personal expenses, 17 use of
funds for non-campaign political activities, 218 use of funds for political
office expenses, 219 or the direction of campaign funds to a charitable
organization." ° Contribution of excess campaign funds to the federal
government does not trigger inclusion in gross income?22' These rules are
now incorporated in section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code which
exempts a political organization from tax on contributions used to support
the nomination or election of persons to political office.222

receipts of political organizations were from gifts." S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 25 (1974), reprinted
in 1975-1 C.B. 517,531. Butsee Rev. Rul. 75-146, 1975-1 C.B. 23 (stating that contributions from
constituents to a member of Congress to support the member's internship program are not treated
as gifts because the contributors donated the money to obtain a "more efficient public servant");
Rev. Rul. 76-276, 1976-2 C.B. 14 (stating that contributions to a Congress member's travel fund
are not gifts because the payments were made by constituents for the purpose of obtaining more
effective representation). Presumably campaign contributions, at best, are motivated by a desire for
more effective representation, and, at worst, the expectation of a specific quid-pro-quo.
214. Rev. Rul. 54-80, 1954-1 C.B. 11 (modifying I.T. 3276, 1939-1 C.B. 108 by adding the
caveat that "any amount diverted from the channel of campaign activities and used by a candidate
or other individual forpersonal use constitutes taxable income to such candidate or other individual
for the year in which the funds are so diverted"). The inclusion rule of Rev. Rul. 54-80 found
judicial support. See, e.g., United States v. Jett, 352 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1965); O'Dwyer v.
Comm'r, 266 F.2d 575, 586 (4th Cir. 1959); Stratton v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 255, 286 (1970). I.T.
3276 and Revenue Ruling 54-80 were superseded and restated in Revenue Ruling 71-449, 1971-2
C.B. 77, which similarly contained no analysis of the basis for exclusion from income. Revenue
Procedure 68-19, 1968-1 C.B. 810, listed factors to be considered by the Internal Revenue Service
in determining the taxability of political funds based on the rules of I.T. 3276 and Revenue Ruling
54-80. Rev. Proc. 68-19, 1968-1 C.B. 810. In essence, the Internal Revenue Service announced an
administrative rule and then developed a body of internal administrative law interpreting the rule.
See, e.g., Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,809 (May 7, 1974); Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,914 (July 22, 1974);
Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,856 (Sept. 21, 1976).
215. Reichert v. Comm'r, 19 T.C. 1027, 1039 (1953), aft'd214 F.2d 19 (7th Cir. 1954).
216. O'Dwyer, 266 F.2d at 588.
217. Jett, 352 F.2d at 183.
218. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,914 (July 22, 1974).
219. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,809 (May 7, 1974).
220. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,856 (Sept. 21, 1976). The income inclusion may be accompanied
by a deduction for the charitable contribution. Id.
221. Rev. Rul. 74-22, 1974-1 C.B. 16.
222. I.R.C. § 527(e)(2) (2001).
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Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, enacted in 1974, 2' is a
multifaceted provision that both exempts certain receipts from gross
income and provides tax-exempt status to political organizations and
political funds of taxable and tax-exempt organizations. 4 On the income
side, section 527 imposes the income tax at the highest corporate rate on
the taxable income of a political organization. 2 5 Income, however, is
determined by excluding the organization's "exempt function income, ' z 6
which includes contributions, membership dues, and the proceeds from
political entertainment events and sales of campaign materials that are
used for the purpose of "influencing or attempting to influence the
selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any
Federal, State, or local public office or office in a political
organization." 7 As a consequence, only the organization's investment
income and capital gains are subject to tax with an allowance for the
expenses incurred to produce these sources of income.2 28 An individual
candidate's campaign fund is treated as a political organization as long as
the fund is segregated from the individual's other assets.229 Section 527
also clarifies the prior administrative law by providing that income treated
as diverted to a candidate, and thereby includible in the candidate's gross
income, does not include amounts contributed to another section 527
political organization," 0 a public charity, or the United States or state or
local government." Expenditures that personally benefit the candidate
remain includible in the candidate's gross income. 2 However, the
223. H.R. 421, 93d Cong. § 10 (1975). The provision was inserted by the Senate Finance
Committee into an act to amend Tariff Schedules ofthe United States to permit the importation free
of duty of upholstery regulators, upholsterer's regulating needles, and upholsterer's pins. H.R. 421,
93d Cong. (1975).
224. See generally I.R.C. § 527 (2001).
225. Id § 527(b)(1). A political organization designated by a candidate for Congress as the
candidate's principal campaign committee is subject to tax at regular rates instead of the highest
corporate rate. Id. § 527(h)(1).
226. Id. § 527 (c)(1)(B); seesupratext accompanying notes 213-21 (discussing the tax-exempt
status of political organizations).
227. I.R.C. § 527(e)(2).
228. See Treas. Reg. § 1.527-4 (1980); S.REP.NO. 93-1357, at 28 (1974), reprintedin 1975-1
C.B. 517,533. Similarly, section 527(f) imposes a tax on tax-exempt organizations that derive their
exemption from section 501(a) to the extent of expenditures for "exempt function" activities out
of net investment income. I.R.C. § 527(f). The provision is intended to put political expenditures
of other tax-exempt organizations on an equal footing with § 527 organizations. S. REP. No. 931357, at 29.
229. Treas. Reg. § 1.527-2(a), (b)(1) (1980).
230. I.R.C. § 527(g)(1). This provision allows an incumbent to share his or her fund-raising
success with other politicians thereby enhancing the political power of the incumbent. See id.
231. Id. § 527(d); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.527-5(b) (1980).
232. Treas. Reg. § 1.527-5(a). The Internal Revenue Service also ruled that wages paid to the
candidate are exempt function income under section 527 as long as the compensation is reasonable
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legislative history indicates that incidental expenses, such as self
improvement courses "for the primary purpose of benefiting the candidate
directly in connection with his campaign are not to be treated as amounts
diverted for the personal benefit of the candidate." 3' The legislative
history also indicates that payment of the candidate's "transition" expenses
is not gross income to the candidate." In addition, section 527(g) treats
a newsletter fund maintained by an office holder or candidate as a political
organization. 5 This provision permits the office holder or candidate to
maintain a separate vehicle for raising tax-exempt contributions to
communicate to voters and constituents.236 The stated purpose of the
provision is to avoid distortions in an office holder's income that would
increase the person's adjusted gross income for various percentage limits
that affect such things as deductions for medical expenses, casualty losses,
and various phase-out provisions, and to prevent the office holder from
recognizing income in years in which the receipts exceed the cost of
producing the newsletter. 7 Finally, a 1988 amendment to section
527(e)(2) adds that payment by a section 527 political organization of an
office holder's ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in the course of
the office holder's political employment is not includible in the office
holder's gross income. 8 Thus, an exempt political organization may be
used to support the office holder's political operations. 9
While section 527 frees the income of political organizations from the
burden of tax, limitations on deductions for political expenditures by
others insure that money flowing into the political system is derived from

and reported as wages. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-16-006 (Jan. 10, 1995).
233. S.REP. No. 93-1357, at 31; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.527-2(c)(5)(ii)-(iv).

234. S.REP.No. 93-1357, at 31.
235. I.R.C. § 527(g)(1).
236. See ic.

237. S.REP.No. 93-1357, at 31-32.
238. H.R. 4333, 100th Cong. § 1001(b)(3)(B) (1988). The last sentence of section 527(e)(2)
provides that exempt function income "includes the making of expenditures relating to [apolitical]
office... which, if incurred by the individual, would be allowable as a deduction under section
162(a)." I.R.C. § 527(e)(2). The purpose of this provision is to conform the treatment of political
office holders with respect to reimbursements from a political organization with provisions that
allow an employee to disregard business expenses reimbursed by an employer. The provision does
permit a section 527 political organization to make substantial contributions to an office holder for
the maintenance of staff, travel, and other office expenses limited only by the requirement that the
expenses would be deemed to be ordinary and necessary business expenses ofthe office holder. See
I.RC. § 527(e)(2).
239. Rev. Rul. 87-119, 1987-2 C.B. 151 (permitting the use ofcontributions to give an election
night party for campaign workers and to provide reasonable cash awards to campaign workers).
However, before the 1988 amendment to section 527(e)(2), excludible exempt function
expenditures did not include the cost of saldwiches for office staffworking on legislative issues.
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after-tax funds.240 Section 162(e) of the Internal Revenue Code bars
deduction of any expense incurred in connection with influencing
legislation (lobbying), involvement in political campaigns, attempts to
influence the general public with respect to elections, legislation or
political matters, and communications with certain senior officials in the
executive branch.241 Deductions are permitted for expenses incurred in
legislative activities addressed to local governmental entities in the
ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or business.242 Although the current
version of section 162(e) generally is as comprehensive in its limitations
243 section 162(e) originally was
as the regulations at issue in Cammarano,
added to the Code in the Revenue Act of 1962 to expand allowable
deductions by permitting a business expense deduction for legislative
lobbying on matters of interest to the taxpayer's trade or business.244 The
initial legislative history indicates that Congress was concerned with an
anomaly in the regulations that permitted deductions for appearances
before executive and administrative agencies while denying deductions for
appearances before legislative bodies.245 The congressional reports add that
"it also is desirable that taxpayers who have information bearing on the
impact of present laws, or proposed legislation, on their trades or
businesses not be discouraged in making this information available to the
Members of Congress or legislators at other levels of Government. 2 46 The
legislative history also states that expenses incurred by persons who bring
information to Congress for personal reasons are not deductible. 47
Congress thereby registered little concern for the balance cited by the
Court in Cammarano between tax-deductible business lobbying and
legislative activities by individuals with a personal interest funded with
after-tax dollars.248 However, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993 restricted deductions for lobbying both legislative and executive
240. See I.R.C. § 527.
241. Id. § 162(e)(1). Covered executive branch members include the President, Vice President,
officers and employees of the White House Office of the Executive Office of the President, the two
most senior level officers of the agencies in the White House Executive Office of the President,
senior executives in level I of the executive schedule, individuals with Cabinet level status, and the
immediate deputies of such persons. Id. § 162(e)(6).
242. Id. § 162(e)(2)(B).
243. 358 U.S. 498, 503 n.6 (1959). The regulations denied deductions for expenses incurred
for "lobbying purposes, the promotion or defeat of legislation, [and] the exploitation of
propaganda." Id.
244. S. REP.No. 87-1881, at 21 (1967). Regulations promulgated in 1959, following the
government's victory in Cammarano,explicitly disallowed deductions for expenses incurred with
respect to legislative matters and deductions for dues to lobbying organizations. Id. at 21-22.
245. Id. at 22.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 23.
248. See id; see also Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959).
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branches of government with respect to legislation with the current version
of section 162(e).249 The legislative history gives no reason for the change
except for a reference to deficit reduction."'
Section 162(e) restricts deductions for political campaign activity and
lobbying, including grassroots attempts to influence the public with respect
to legislative matters. 2 1 Thus expenditures incurred by an elected office
holder in campaigning for either the first election or re-election are not
deductible. 52 However, at least one case has drawn a distinction between
expenses incurred by an elected official to preserve his business
reputation, which were allowed as deductions, and expenses incurred to
protect the official's reputation as an elected politician.253
Corporate expenditures incurred to educate shareholders and the public
regarding legislation affecting corporate interests are not deductible. 4 On
the other hand, Treasury Regulations permit deductions for "'good will'
advertising" that "keeps the taxpayer's name before the [general] public"
and advertising that encourages contributions to organizations such as the
Red Cross. 5 The regulations also provide for deductible advertising that
"presents views on economic, financial, social, or other subjects of a
249. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13222(a), 83 Stat.
312.
250. H.R. REP. No. 103-11, at 659 (1993). As the reason for change the House Report states
in full: "The committee has determined that, in the context of deficit reduction legislation, it is
appropriate to limit the business deduction for lobbying expenses." Id. It is not clear whether the
deficit reduction is achieved with the disallowance of deductions for lobbying or by the fact that
less lobbying may result in lower expenditures for favored lobbyists.
251. I.R.C. § 162(e)(1)(c) (2001); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(c)(4) (1965) (denying a
deduction for expenditures incurred "in connection with any attemptto influence the general public,
or segments thereof, with respect to legislative matters, elections, or referendums").
252. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(c)(1). '
253. Conti v. Comm'r, T.C.M. 1972-89 (predating enactment of section 162(e)). In Conti the
taxpayer held various elected local and state legislative offices in Illinois. Id.The taxpayer also was
an officer and employee of a savings and loan association. Id. In a transaction that involved some
dubious actions, the taxpayer arranged for transfer of control of the savings and loan association
to a group of buyers who impaired the organizations financial position with questionable loans. Id
The taxpayer incurred expenses to rehabilitate the savings and loan, which he claimed were
deductible business expenses necessary to protect his business reputation. Id. There is also an
indication in the record that the taxpayer recognized that the circumstance of the failed savings and
loan would adversely affect his political career. Id. The Tax Court allowed the deduction, indicating
in part, that the expenditures "were not campaign expenses," the taxpayer was not running for
office at the time of the expenditure, and that there were no "overriding considerations of public
policy involved." Id. The Tax Court opinion also noted that the Commissioner made no claim that
the taxpayer's elective position was "inextricably interwoven with his other business activities."
Id.
254. Rev. Rul. 74-407, 1974-2 C.B. 45; Rev. Rul. 78-111, 1978-1 C.B. 41.
255. Treas. Reg. § 1.1 62-20(a)(2). Presumably this includes non-partial get-out-the-vote and
registration advertising that has been allowed as a deductible expense. See Rev. Rul. 62-156, 19622 C.B. 47.
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general nature" as long as the advertising does not advocate the election
of a candidate or promotion of legislation, including initiatives. 2 6 Thus,
issue advertising intended to educate the public on topics of political
interest not related to the election of a specific candidate nor specific
legislation may survive the limitation of section 162(e). Although not
expressly required by the regulations, qualification under the ordinary and
necessary requirement of section 162(a) should, at a minimum, require
prominent inclusion of the name of the entity funding educational
advertising.2" 7
The reported cases draw a broad line in identifying grassroots lobbying
that is claimed as business oriented public education. In ConsumersPower
Co. v. United States,28 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied
deductions under section 162(e) for contributions by an electric power
company for a national negative advertising campaign against public
power, even though there was no pending legislation involved.259 The
advertisements broadly criticized federal ownership of electric power
production.260 Several of the advertisements directed the public to let their
congressional representatives members know how they felt about
governmental ownership.261 There was no mention of specific legislation,
but the advertisements did criticize a specific use of governmental funds.262
The appellate court observed that several of the advertisements were
"border line cases for deductibility" but felt compelled to defer to the
judgment of the trial court.263 The trial judge indicated that, "A fair reading
of these [advertisements], both individually and collectively, compels the

256. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(a)(2).
257. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (2001).
258. 427 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1970).
259. Id. at 79.
260. Id.
261. Id.; see also Rev. Rul. 78-111, 1978-1 C.B. 41 (stating that the expenses of producing a
pamphlet for shareholders containing the corporate president's remarks in legislative hearings
opposing specific legislation is not deductible even if the material did not include a suggestion that
the shareholders contact their legislators).
262. Consumers Power Co. v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 1180, 1214-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Three of the advertisements are reproduced in the trial court opinion. Id. One television
advertisement concludes, "With your help, congress can-and will-resist those who want a federal
monopoly of electricity. You don't want extravagance. And you don't want the threat of socialism.
Let your congressman know what you think." Id. at 1214. A print add stated, "Since America's
Electric Light and Power Companies are ready, willing and able to provide plenty of power, isn't
it wasteful of tax dollars for government to try to do the same job? The government way leads
straight downhill to a federal electric power monopoly ... and socialism." Id. at 1215. The third
advertisement contains the statement that, "a strange twist in federal law exempts several million
American families and businesses from paying all the taxes in their electric bills that you pay in
yours." Id. at 1216. This last advertisement comes close to advocating specific legislative change.
263. Consumers Power Co. v. United States, 427 F.2d 78, 79 (6th Cir. 1970).
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conclusion that they belong to the nondeductible category within the
purview of 1.162-20.2' The court of appeals raised a concern, however,
that an overly broad application of the regulations' denial of deductions
could be used to bar a deduction for a competitive message directed
against a publicly owned competitor.2 6' Nonetheless, ConsumersPower
recognizes the basic notion that political advertisement intended to
influence legislation can do so without direct reference to specific elected
officials, candidates, or pending legislation.266 In other words, issue
advertisement directed at the political decisionmaking process falls within
the scope of political speech that is not entitled to federal tax subsidy
through the deduction of its cost.
The 1993 legislation strengthened the prohibition on deducting
lobbying expenses with a further limitation on the deduction of dues to
trade associations or other tax-exempt entities that lobby on behalf of their
members.267 In lieu of denying the deduction to members for its dues, an
exempt entity may elect to pay a proxy tax on its lobbying expenditures at
the highest corporate rate.2 68 This scheme was attacked as violating the
First Amendment rights of lobbying groups in American Society of
Association Executives v. United States.269 The taxpayer was a business
league, exempt from tax under section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue
Code, that had elected to pay the excise tax of section 6033(e)(2) of the
Code on its lobbying activities.27 The Association sued for a refund of the
tax, claiming in part that the tax conditioned an otherwise available benefit
27
on the taxpayer's refraining from the exercise of constitutional rights. '
The taxpayer agreed with the Commissioner that the government has no
obligation to subsidize speech, but argued that the flow-through nature of
the proxy tax placed a burden on lobbying. 2" The taxpayer asserted that
the application of section 162(e) denied deductions to members for
264. ConsumersPower Co., 299 F. Supp. at 1183.
265. ConsumersPower Co., 427 F.2d at 79-80.
266. See generally id.
267. I.R.C. § 162(e)(3) (2001). The exempt entity is required to determine the proportion of
its expenditures that are subject to limitation and report the figure to its members. Rules for making
this allocation are found in Treasury Regulation § 1.162-28 (1995).
268. See I.R.C. § 162(e)(3) (denying a deduction for dues paid to a tax-exempt organization
to the extent the organization notifies the payer that dues are attributable to non-deductible political
expenditures, which include lobbying and participation or intervention in a political campaign

under § 162(e)(1)). Under section 6033(e)(2) an organization may elect not to notify (or fail to
notify) members of an allocation of non-deductible political expenditures, in which case the

organization becomes taxable at the highest rate of section 11 (currently 35%) on the aggregate
amount of its political expenditures. Id §§ 11, 6033 (2001).
269. 195 F.3d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
270. Id. at 48.
271. Id.
272. Id at 49.
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business expenses that would be deductible if the business league did not
engage in lobbying activities.2 73 The court found that the taxpayer's
members could avoid any loss of deduction with respect to the portion of
dues attributable to non-political activities, or the association could avoid
the proxy tax on its regular business expenditures, by segregating the
lobbying activity from other activities in separate tax-exempt entities.274
The court noted that deductible (or partially deductible) dues could be paid
to the trade association and lobbying activities could be confined to a
separately incorporated affiliate for which no deduction would be allowed
to members for dues paid. 75 The court observed, "This system achieves
precisely what the [taxpayer] says the Constitution demands: a generally
applicable tax system that, although it does not subsidize lobbying,
imposes no burden on it by comparison with other activities." 276 Given that
possibility, the court concluded that restrictions on the deductibility of
dues with respect to lobbying activity need satisfy only a rational basis test
under Regan.27 With that, the court was satisfied that the denial of
273. Id at 49-50. The taxpayer argued that subjecting its lobbying expenditures to the 35%
rate imposed a direct burden on its exercise of a right to lobby because the tax rate is higher than
the rate that would be imposed on direct lobbying by its members at regular graduated corporate
rates. Id. at 49. The government countered with its calculation that even at the maximum rate, the
tax on expenditures by the trade association was less than the tax that would be imposed directly
on income diverted to lobbying, [(1 + (0.35 X 1))< (1/1-0.35)] at least for taxpayers in tax brackets
greater than 26%. Id. at 49 & n.I. The association also argued that under § 6033(e)(1), if the
taxpayer overestimates its lobbying expense for the year, members lose deductions for otherwise
deductible expenditures. Id. at 49. The association further argued that if the association
underestimates lobbying expenses it becomes subject to the proxy tax, thereby imposing an extra
burden on its exercise of speech in the form of lobbying activities. Id. In addition, the association
asserted that the requirement that lobbying expenses be treated as paid out of dues income before
investment income unduly burdens the exercise of political speech. Id. at 49-50; I.R.C.
§ 6033(e)(1)(C)(i) (2001).
274. Am. Soc'y ofAss'n Execs, 195 F.3d at50.
275. Id.
276. Id.

277. Id.; see also Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547-48 (1983). The
D.C. Circuit seems to misread Regan on this point. In the latter case, the Court concluded that
Congress's decision to deny subsidies to organizations engaged in political activity did not impede
the organization's right to exercise a constitutional right. Id. at 548. Given that conclusion, the
Court had no need to consider whether a restriction on constitutional prerogatives survived either
strict scrutiny or rational basis analysis. See id. at 545-46. In a separate part of its opinion, the
majority in Regan addressed the taxpayer's claim that a provisions permitting tax-exempt veteran's
organizations to lobby with tax-deductible contributions discriminated against the taxpayer's
exercise of the right to lobby. 1d. at 546-47. Here the Court pointed out that strict scrutiny is
required for classifications that interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right such as free
speech, but otherwise classifications are valid if they bear a rational relation to. a legitimate
governmental purpose. Id.at 547. The Court added that "legislatures have especially broad latitude
in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes." Id. The Court further noted its conclusion
that "Congress has not violated TWR's First Amendment rights by declining to subsidize its First
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deductions and the proxy tax bear a rational relation to the governmental
purpose of withholding the tax benefits of a deduction for lobbying
expenses,278 which the parties agreed was a legitimate governmental
purpose.

Regardless of whether the availability of a separate form of exempt
entity for non-tax subsidized political activity is a requirement for
withholding tax subsidies, the court's assumption in American Society of
Association Executives that the option of separating political from nonpolitical activity in separate entities is necessary to avoid constitutional
infirmities raises interesting possibilities. As is described in the next
subsection, under the current structure for exempt entities there is a
mixture of tax-exempt forms of organization that permit differing
approaches and opportunities in the political arena. Consolidating political
activity into a single form of organization is suggested in Part V of this
Article.
Section 170(f)(9) prevents avoidance of the section 162(e) limitation
on deductions by denying a deduction as a charitable contribution of a
payment to a tax-exempt charity that conducts activities that would
otherwise not be deductible under section 162(e) and which are of direct
financial interest to the contributor's trade or business.279 The disallowance
of deductions under section 162(e) also is fortified by limitations in
sections 271 and 276 of the Code.28 ° Section 271 disallows any deduction
for bad debts or worthless securities issued by a political party. 21 This
provision blocks any attempt to disguise a nondeductible contribution as
a loan that later might be deducted as a bad debt.28 2 There is an exception

Amendment activities," and added that "[t]he case would be different if Congress were to
discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to aim[] at the suppression of dangerous
ideas." Id. at 548 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The circuit court in American Society ofAssociation Executives also

confuses the majority opinion with the view of the concurring justices in Regan, for whom the
availability of a separate tax-exempt form of entity was pivotal to their conclusion that the
restrictions on the political activity of a charitable organization were constitutionally permissible.
Am. Soc 'y ofAss'n Execs., 195 F.3d at 51 (stating that the Court in Regan "evidently regards the

dual incorporation option as obviating the need for heightened scrutiny"); see also supra text
accompanying note 163.
278. Am. Soc'y ofAss'n Execs., 195 F.3d at 51.

279. I.R.C. § 170(f)(9) (2001).
280. See id. §§ 271(a), 276(a).
281. Id. § 271(a). Technically section 271(a) bars deductions under sections 166 relating to
bad debts and 165(g) relating to worthless securities. Id. A political party includes a national, state
or local committee of a political party and any committee or other organization that accepts
contributions or makes expenditures for the purpose of influencing the election of a person to
federal, state or local office. Ma §271(b)(1). For a discussion of this definition, see Hill, supranote
5, at 912-14.
282. See S. REP.No. 94-938, at 402 (1976).
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to the proscription of section 271 for receivables accrued into income from
the "sale of goods or services in the ordinary course of... business" by a
taxpayer who accrues more than thirty percent of its receivables in the
taxable year from political parties and who has made continuing efforts to
collect the debt." 3 The exception was enacted to prevent hardship to
political consultants and other businesses who provide goods and services
to political campaigns." 4 Section 276 bars deductions for expenditures for
advertising in a political party's convention program, expenditures for
admission to a dinner or program the proceeds of which inure to the
benefit of a political party or candidate, or expenses incurred to attend an
inaugural event.285 The restriction on deductions for advertising in a
political convention program was enacted as part of 1974 amendments to
the FECA after the majority of funds for the 1968 and 1972 presidential
nominating conventions of the major parties were derived from such
advertising funds.286
In a further attempt to limit the transfer of before-tax value to a
political organization, section 84 of the Code treats a transfer of
appreciated property to a political organization as a sale.' 87 Political
organizations covered by this provision are limited to campaign
organizations described in section 527(e)(1), which includes only
organizations that are engaged in the nomination or election of an
individual for public office."88 The transferor recognizes gain to the extent
of the difference between the transferor's basis in the property and its fair
market value at the time of the transfer. 89 The political organization's
basis is the same as the transferor's basis increased by the gain recognized
by the transferor.29 Section 84 does not provide for recognition of loss on
the transfer of depreciated property to a political organization.29 '

283. I.R.C. § 271(c). The exception only applies to an accrual basis taxpayer. Id. This
language is somewhat redundant because the impact of the section 271 limitation only falls on an
accrual basis taxpayer who has accrued a receivable as income. Id.A cash basis taxpayer with a bad
debt receivable that has not been taken into income has no basis to deduct if the debt should
become worthless. See Id. §§ 165(b), 166(b).
284. See S. REP. No. 93-938, at 401.

285. I.R.C. § 276(a).
286. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 102(c)(1)
88 Stat. 1263, 1269.
287. I.R.C. § 84(a) (2001).
288. Id. §§ 84(c), 527(e)(l)-(2).
289. Id. § 84(a).
290. Id. § 84(b).
291. See id. § 84. Section 84(a) only applies to property where the fair market value exceeds
basis.
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2. Tax-Exempt Entities Engaged in the Political Process
Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code provides an exemption from
tax for twenty-seven specifically described organizations, ranging from
trade associations and employee benefit organizations, to publicly financed
charitable organizations.292 Section 527 ofthe Code provides an exemption
for contributions to a political organization that incurs expenditures to
influence the election of political candidates, an additional form of taxexempt organization. 293 Contributions to tax-exempt organizations are
deductible from the income of the contributor only with respect to
governmental entities and certain non-governmental organizations;
generally organizations with a religious or "charitable" purpose that fulfill
the requirements of section 501(c)(3) of the Code. 94 A number of these
tax-exempt organizations, including charitable organizations, are utilized
for political advocacy.2 95 In addition, contributions by business to trade
associations or other organizations may be deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses, except to the extent limited by section
162(e)(3) with respect to the portion of the organization's expenditures for
political activities.296
i. Charitable Organizations
a. Political Activities
An organization is exempt from tax under section 501(c)(3) if it is
"organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster
national or international amateur sports competition . . .or for the

292. Id § 501.
293. Id. § 527(c)(3).
294. See id §§ 170(c)(2)(D), 501(c)(3). Deductible contributions may be made to
governmental entities, to domestic organizations organized for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational purposes, to foster national or international amateur sports competition, or
to prevent cruelty to children or animals, as long as the organization is not disqualified from tax
exemption under section 501(c)(3) because of political activity. Id Deductible contributions are
allowed to veterans organizations and to fraternal societies if the contribution is to be used
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the

prevention of cruelty to children or animals. Id. § 170(c)(3)-(4).
295. Senator Joseph Lieberman wrote in an introduction to a Catholic University Election Law
symposium that in the 1996 presidential election, "[t]ax-exempt groups paid for millions of dollars
of television ads that clearly endorsed or attached particular candidates although the law barred the
groups from engaging in such extensive partisan electoral activity." Joseph Lieberman, Campaign
Finance,49 CATHoLIC L. REV, 5,6 (1999).
296. See supratext accompanying notes 241 and 267.
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prevention of cruelty to children or animals." '97 Although the statutory
provision requires that the organization be operated exclusively for one or
more of the enumerated purposes, the requirement is interpreted to mean
that the organization must "primarily" engage in activities that promote
one or more exempt purposes.29 Although activities unrelated to an
exempt purpose are allowable, the presence of a substantial non-exempt
purpose will defeat qualification under section 501(c)(3).29 9 "Secondary
benefits which advance a substantial purpose cannot be construed as
incidental to the organization's exempt... purpose. 300 Section 501 (c)(3)
also permits an organization to qualify for its tax exemption only if "no
substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.. .," and the organization
"does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office."O'' Section 170(c)(2)(D)
bolsters the prohibition by allowing a charitable contribution deduction for
a contribution to an organization only if the organization "is not
disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by reason of
attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate. 30 2
Legislative history indicates that,
[t]he prohibition on political campaign activities and the
restrictions on lobbying activities by charities reflect
Congressional policies that the U.S. Treasury should be
neutral in political affairs, and that substantial activities

297. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2001); see alsoTreas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(d)(1) (1960) (enumerating
purposes which allow organizations to claim exempt status under § 501(c)(3)).
298. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-4(c)(1); see alsoid.
§ 1.501 (c)(3)-l (b)(1)(b) (providingthatthe
articles of incorporation may not empower an organization to engage in other activities "otherwise
than as an insubstantial part of its activities").
299. See Better Bus. Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279,283 (1945). The Court looked to
the primary activities of an organization to determine that an organization was not exempt from the
social security tax under 42 U.S.C. section 1011 (b)(8), which contained language virtually identical
to the present I.R.C. section 501(c)(3), where a substantial part of its activities were directed
towards a non-exempt purpose. Id. at 280; see also Housing Pioneers, Inc. v. Comm'r, T.C.M.
(RIA) 1993-120, aff'd58 F.3d 401,404(9th Cir. 1995); Nationalist Movement v. Comm'r, 37 F.3d
216, 219 (5th Cir. 1994).
300. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1078 (1989). The taxpayer was formed
to train campaign workers who participated in campaigns for Republican candidates. Id. at 1055.
The court held that the taxpayer was operated for the private benefit of the non-charitable private
interests of members and candidates of the Republican Party. Id. at 1079.
301. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2001).
302. Id. § 170(c)(2)(D).
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directed to attempts to influence legislation should not be
subsidized through the tax benefits accorded to charitable
organizations and their contributors." 3
The Treasury Regulations provide that "[a]n organization is not
operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes if it is an 'action'
organization." 3' The regulations classify an organization as an "'action'
organization if a substantial part of its activities [are] attempting to
influence legislation by propaganda or otherwise."3 "5 Attempting to
influence legislation includes both advocacy for the adoption or rejection
of specific legislation and grassroots lobbying that urges the public to
contact members of a legislative body for the purpose of supporting or
opposing legislation.3" 6 An organization that participates, directly or
indirectly, in a political campaign in support of or opposition to a
candidate for public office is also classified as an action organization. 7
For this purpose, a "candidate for public office" is broadly defined to
include "an individual who offers himself, or is proposed by others, as a
contestant for an elective public office."3 Finally, an action organization
includes an organization whose primary objective may be attained only by
enactment or defeat of legislation and which advocates or campaigns for
the attainment of its primary objective." 9 Campaigning for legislation to
meet such an organization's objective is distinguished in the regulations
from engaging in "nonpartisan analysis, study, or research and making the
results thereof available to the public."31
There is an important distinction in these provisions between direct or
grassroots lobbying and intervention in a political campaign. Intervention
In contrast, the
in a political campaign is absolutely forbidden.'
restriction on lobbying prohibits the use of a "substantial" part of the

303. Omnibus BudgetReconciliation Act of 1987, H.R. REP.No. 100-391, at 1625, reprinted
in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1205. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 added
provisions affecting political campaign activities and lobbying of section 501(c)(3) organizations,
including statutory clarification that the prohibition on intervention in political campaigns included
activities both in support of and in opposition to a political candidate. Id. at 1621.
304. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(i).

305. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(ii).
306. Id. § 1.501(e)(3)-(e)(3)(ii)(a)-(b).
307. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iii).
308. Id.
309. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iv).
310. Id.
311. Ass'n of the Bar of N. Y. v. Comm'r, 858 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1988); see also
discussion infranote 334; Rev. Rul. 67-71, 1967-1 C.B. 125. An organization that seeks to promote
quality education by endorsing qualified candidates for a school board is not entitled to exemption
under section 501(c)(3). I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2001).
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organization's resources in attempting to influence legislation.312 Some
lobbying activity is permissible as long as it does not represent a
"substantial part" of the organization's activities.313 Thus, in Seasongood
v. Commissioner314 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that devotion
of less than five percent of the organization's resources to lobbying is not
"substantial" and thereby permitted to the tax-exempt charity.315 On the
other hand, in Haswell v. UnitedStates,"6 while noting that a quantitative
test is not determinative,317 the Court of Claims concluded that sixteen to
seventeen percent of resources devoted to lobbying is substantial."
The strict prohibitions of sections 501(c)(3) and 170(c)(2)(D) are
mitigated by section 501 (h), which allows an electing organization to incur
a defined amount of expenditures for lobbying and grassroots activities to
influence legislation.3 9 Lobbying and grassroots activities in support of
legislation do not include participation in the election of a candidate.32
Organizations are allowed to spend up to 150% of a "lobbying ceiling,"
which varies from five to twenty percent of the organization's
expenditures for exempt purposes, without jeopardizing their status as an
exempt charity under section 501(c)(3). 321 The price of the election is a

312. I.R.C. §§ 501(a), 502 (2001).
313. Id. § 501(c)(3).
314. 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
315. Id. at 912. The organization involved was a civic league formed "to provide an
opportunity for discussion of matters of civic importance and to advance good government." Iii
at 909. On occasion the league endorsed legislation or candidates (the case predated the current
language of section 501(c)(3) prohibiting intervention in acampaign) as recommended by its study
committees. Id.The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that indirect, substantial efforts to promote
legislation for the common good (protecting animals) preclude tax exemption under section
501(c)(3). Rev. Rul. 67-293, 1967-2 C.B. 185.
316. 500 F.2d 1133 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
317. Id.at 1145; see alsoChristian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849,
855 (10th Cir. 1972) ("The political activities of an organization must be balanced in the context
of the objectives and circumstances of the organization to determine whether a substantialpart of
its activities was to influence or attempt to influence legislation.").
318. Haswell, 500 F.2d at 1146. The court added that although the dollar amounts involved
were miniscule when compared to the legislative budgets of other organizations, "[flor an
organization that operates on as small a total budget as NARP to devote so much of its total
resources to legislative activities, it fairly can be concluded that its purposes no longer accord with
conceptions traditionally associated with a common-law charity." Id. at 1146-47. On a qualitative
basis, the court also noted that "[tihe legislative program was a primary objective in NARP's total
operations for preservation of railroad passenger service and is on an equal footing with its
educational and litigative efforts." Id. at 1147.
319. I.R.C. § 501(h) (2001).
320. Id. § 4911(c)(1)-(4), (d) (defining lobbying and grassroots activities); Treas. Reg.
§ 56.491 -1l(b)(1)(ii), (2)(ii) (1990) (requiring that direct lobbying and grassroots lobbying refer
to specific legislation and reflect a view on the legislation).
321. I.R.C. § 491 1(c). If the exempt organization's expenditures for its exempt purposes are
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twenty-five percent excise tax under section 4911 for lobbying
expenditures in excess of the lobbying ceiling. 3" Thus, although taxexempt charities are permitted some engagement in the legislative process,
the activity comes with the partial loss of the dual subsidy of tax
deductible contributions and organizational tax-exemption provided to
section 501(c)(3) organizations.
Blatant disregard of the restrictions of section 501(c)(3) and the
Treasury Regulations can result in revocation of tax exempt status. In
1992, Branch Ministries, a tax exempt church, published full page
advertisements in two newspapers that urged Christians not to vote for
then presidential candidate Bill Clinton. 3 At the bottom the

advertisements stated, "Tax-deductible donations for this advertisement

gladly accepted" with a mailing address for contributions. 324 The
advertisements produced "hundreds of contributions to the Church from
across the country. 3 25 The Internal Revenue Service revoked the Church's
tax exemption indicating that the advertisements were prohibited
intervention in a political campaign. 326 The revocation was upheld in an
action for declaratory judgment filed in the D.C. District Court by the
Church to overrule the Commissioner's revocation.327 Affirming the

not over $500,000, it may spend up to 20% of its exempt purpose expenditures for lobbying. Id.
Exempt purpose expenditures between $500,000 and $1 million permit lobbying expenditures of
$100,000 plus 15% of exempt purpose expenditures over $100,000. Id. Exempt purpose
expenditures between $1 million and $1.5 million permit lobbying expenditures of $175,000 plus
10% of exempt purpose expenditures over $1 million. d Exempt purpose expenditures over $1.5
million permit lobbying expenditures of $225,000 plus 5% of the excess of exempt purpose
expenditures over $1.5 million. Id. The maximum allowed expenditures before the excise tax is
imposed is $1 million. Id.
322. Id. §4911(a)(1).
323. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
324. Id. at 140.
325. Id
326. Id.; see Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(ii) (1960). Butsee Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,267
(Feb. 20, 1970) (concluding that editorials in amagazine published by an exempt organization that
questioned whether John F. Kennedy's adherence to the Catholic religion would affect his fitness
to be President of the United States were intervention in a political campaign but of such a de
minimis nature that the activity did not require revocation of the organization's charitable status,
although suggesting that the activity came next to the "absolute limit permissible of activity in the
political area").
327. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15,27 (D.D.C. 1999). Section 7428 of the
Internal Revenue Code provides for a declaratory action in the Tax Court, Claims Court, or the
District Court for the District of Columbia. I.R.C. § 7428(c) (2001). Under section 7428(c),
contributions to a charitable organization described in section 170(c)(2) continue to be deductible
until judgment is entered by the court. Id The Internal Revenue Service began its investigation of
Branch Ministries in November 1992. BranchMinistries,40 F. Supp. at 17-18. The district court
judgment was filed on March 30, 1999. Id at 15. Thus, contributions to the Branch Ministries
remained deductible for almost seven years following the Church's political advertising.
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district court, the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the Church's
argument that the Commissioner lacked authority to revoke a church's tax
exemption under section 501(c)(3) because a church is independently
exempt under the Code which does not specifically impose tax on the
income of a church.328 More importantly, the court held that neither the
First Amendment nor the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993329
prevent the Commissioner from revoking the tax exemption of a church in
appropriate circumstances. 330 The court pointed out that Branch Ministries
did not argue that withdrawal from political activity would violate its
religious beliefs.33 ' The court added, "The sole effect of the loss of the tax
exemption will be to decrease the amount of money available to the
Church for its religious practices," noting that the Supreme Court has
described such a result as "not constitutionally significant., 332 This
conclusion is consistent with the holding of Taxation With Representation
v. Regan333 that Congress's refusal to provide a tax subsidy to particular
forms of speech is not a denial of First Amendment protections.
In.Associationofthe Bar ofNew Yorkv. Commissioner334 amore subtle
form of political intervention than the political advertisements in Branch
Ministries also was held to preclude tax exemption under section
501(c)(3).335 The New York City Bar Association rated judicial candidates
as qualified or not qualified for appointed and elected positions. 336 The

328. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 141 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("We find this
argument more creative than persuasive.").
329. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2001).
330. BranchMinistries, 211 F.3d at 139.
331. Id. at 142.
332. Id. (quoting Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. ofEqualization ofCal., 493 U.S. 378,391
(1990) (internal citations omitted); see also Jimmy SwaggartMinistries,493 U.S. at 391 ("As the
Court made clear in Hernandez,however, to the extent that imposition of a generally applicable tax
merely decreases the amount of money [a church] has to spend on its religious activities, any such
burden is not constitutionally significant."); Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 700 (1989).
The result in Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
illustrates the impotence of revocation as a sanction for political intervention by a section 501(c)(3)
organization. The Branch Ministries court described revocation as "more symbolic than
substantial." Branch Ministries,211 F.3d at 142. The court noted that the Church could hold itself
out as a section 501(c)(3) organization and receive all the benefits of that status, losing only
advance assurance to contributors that their contributions would be deductible. Id. at 142-43. The
court also pointed out that there is nothing to prevent the Church from reapplying for section
501(c)(3) status. Id.; see also Frances R. Hill, Newt Gringrich and Oliver Twist: Charitable
ContributionsandCampaignFinance,66 TAXNOTS 237,246 (1995) (asserting that ifacharitable
organization loses its status under section 501(c)(3), the organizers can dissolve and transfer the
assets to a new section 501(c)(3) organization).
333. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
334. 858 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1988).
335. Id. at 877.
336. Id.
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Commissioner denied tax exempt status to the Bar Association under
section 501(c)(3) because the ratings of judicial candidates for elective
office constituted participation in a political campaign.337 The Tax Court
overruled the Commissioner's determination, finding that the Bar
Association's "ratings do not support or oppose the candidacy of any
particular individual or recommend that the public vote for or against a
specific candidate., 338 The court of appeals reversed. 339 The Tax Court
found that the judicial ratings were intended to, and did in fact, influence
the voter,34 and the Bar Association conceded that the purpose of the
judicial ratings was to attempt to ensure that unqualified persons were not
elected to the bench.341' Noting those findings, the court of appeals took a
broad view of the prohibition against indirect participation in a campaign
to conclude that the Bar Association's activities represented intervention
in a campaign on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate for public office
as described in the Treasury Regulations.342 The court of appeals pointed
out that "expressions of 'professional opinion' concerning the candidates'
qualifications" represented more than the mere collection and
dissemination of objective data.343 The court also indicated that,
one may be a candidate without running an organized
political campaign. "[A] campaign for a public office in a
public election merely and simply means running for office,
or candidacy for office, as the word is used in common
parlance and as it is understood by the man in the street."344
In General Counsel Memorandum (GCM) 39,81 1,345 the Internal
Revenue Service concluded that an exempt organization may be
intervening in a political campaign even if no actual candidate is
specifically identified.346 Under the facts of the GCM, a section 501 (c)(3)
organization with a distinct political agenda urged its members to run for
337. d at 878. The organization already qualified for exempt status under section 501(c)(6)
but wanted the additional benefit of tax deductible contributions. Id. at 877.
338. Ass'n of the Bar of N.Y. v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 599, 609-10 (1987).
339. Ass'n ofthe Bar ofN.Y., 858 F.2d at 877.
340. Id. at 879.
341. Id at 881.
342. Id.; see Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (1960); see also Rev. Rul. 67-71, 1967-1
C.B. 125 (stating that a nonprofit organization, dedicated to improving education, that endorsed
candidates in a school board election in order to improve the quality of local education engaged in
prohibited intervention in a campaign).
343. Ass'n ofthe Bar ofN. Y., 858 F.2d at 880.
344. Id. (quoting Norris v. United States, 86 F.2d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1936), rev'd on other
grounds, 300 U.S. 564 (1937)).
345. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,811 (Feb. 9, 1990).

346. Id. at 15.
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office as precinct committeemen, a partisan political office, for both
national political parties.347 Citing Association of the Bar of New York v.
Commissioner,the GCM states,
The effort, and not the effect, constituted intervention in a
political campaign. Therefore, whether anyone heeded the
call to run for precinct committeeman, whether that
individual was elected, and if so, what he or she subsequently
did, are all immaterial. To require the identification of
particular candidates would undermine the clear prohibition
against "any" participation contained in the regulations."'
The prohibitions on intervention in a campaign of sections
170(c)(2)(D) and 501 (c)(3) are enforced by section 4955,349 which imposes
a ten percent excise tax on "political expenditures" by any organization
that is described in section 501 (c)(3). 350 A separate two percent excise tax
separately applies to an organization manager who knowingly and
" ' There is an additional excise
willfully authorizes apolitical expenditure.35
tax of 100% of the amount of a political expenditure imposed on the
organization, and 50% on the managers, if the expenditure is not corrected
within a specified period by the establishment of safeguards to prevent
future political expenditures and recovery of the political expenditure, to
the extent possible.352 Political expenditures that trigger the excise tax

347. Id.
348. Id at 15-16.
349. Section 4955 was enacted with the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, § 10712, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 100 Stat. 1330-465.
For a detailed legislative history, see Laura Brown Chisholm, Sinking thf Think Tanks Upstream:
The Use and Misuse of Tax Exemption Law to Address the Use and Misuse of Tax-Exempt
Organizationsby Politicians,51 U. PITT L. REV. 577, 611 nn. 133-34 (1990).
350. I.R.C. § 4955(a)(1) (2001). Section 4955(f)(1) applies the excise tax to any organization
that is described in section 501 (c)(3) without regard to its political expenditures. Id. § 4955(f)(1).
Thus disqualification as a section 501(c)(3) organization because ofpolitical expenditures does not
avoid application of section 4955. See id. Before 1987 the excise tax was only imposed on private
foundations. See id.
351. Id. § 4955(a)(2). A manager for this purpose is an officer or director of the organization,
or similar position, who has authority or responsibility with respect to the political expenditure. Id.
§ 4955(0(2); see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4955-1(b)(2) (1995). The excise tax on managers is limited
to $5,000 with respect to each political expenditure. I.R.C. § 4955(c)(2). The excise tax on
managers may not be paid by the organization. Managers are jointly and severally liable for the
excise tax imposed on managers. Id. § 4955(c)(1).
352. I.R.C. § 4955(b), (0(3). This second level tax is imposed on managers who refuse to
agree to the correction and is limited to $10,000. Id. § 4955(b)(2), (c)(2). The period for correction
begins on the date of the political expenditures and runs to the date for mailing a notice of
deficiency under section 6212 or, if earlier, the date on which the section 4955 excise tax is
assessed. Id. § 4955(0(4).
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include any amounts expended on intervention or participation in a
political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate. 3 The
regulations embellish the statutory definition of political expenditure by
adding that any expenditure that would cause an organization to be
classified as an action organization under Treasury Regulations section
1.501(c)(3)-I(c)(3)(iii)354 is treated as apolitical expenditure subject to the
section 4955 excise tax. 3 " Thus, any expenditure by a section 501(c)(3)
organization in support or opposition to an individual who is a candidate
for public office, or who is offered as a candidate, is subject to the excise
tax of section 4955.
Legislative history suggests Congress's belief that the excise tax would
function as an effective remedy where revocation of exempt status is
ineffective as a penalty or deterrent, "particularly if the organization ceases
operations after it has diverted all its assets to improper purposes. 35 6
Without the excise tax, an organization that lost its exemption simply
could transfer its assets to a new kindred exempt organization that may
continue the political activity. The Ways and Means Committee report also
notes that the Internal Revenue Service might hesitate to revoke the
exempt status of an organization where that penalty seems
disproportionate to the degree of political activity.5 7 The legislative
history indicates, however, that adoption of the excise tax does not modify
existing law prohibitions on political activity as3 a prerequisite for
qualification for exemption under section 501(c)(3). 11
In a 1995 Technical Advice Memorandum (TAM), 359 the Internal
Revenue Service suggested a broad interpretation of the term "political
expenditure" and the prohibited intervention in a political campaign for
purposes both of the excise tax of section 4955 and qualification under
section 501(c)(3).36 The TAM held that fund-raising letters mailed by a
"non partisan" section 501(c)(3) organization that was engaged in voter

353. Id. § 4955(d)(1).
354. See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
355. Treas. Reg. § 53.4955-1(c)(1) (1995).
356. H. REP.No. 100-391, pt.2, at 1624 (1987).
357. Id. at 1623. The legislative history also states that the Internal Revenue Service is to
strengthen its enforcement of the prohibitions on political activity by exempt charitable

organizations. Id. at 1627. Another part of the legislation added section 7409, which gives the
Internal Revenue Service authority to seek to enjoin a charitable organization from making political
expenditures, and section 6852, which provides for an immediate assessment of tax in the case of
an organization that makes political expenditures that are a "flagrant violation" of the prohibition.
OmnibusBudget ReconciliationActof1987, § 10713, Pub. L.No. 100-203, 100 Stat. 1330-468-69.
358. H.R. REP.No. 100-391, pt.2, at 1624.
359. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-09-007 (Dec. 6, 1995).
360. Id. at 13, 16.
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registration activities constituted intervention in a political campaign.3 6 '
The fund-raising letters were addressed to individuals on one side of the
political spectrum and cited the close election or defeat of named
candidates adhering to a particular political philosophy as the reason for
contributing to the organization's voter registration activities.362 The bulk
of the organization's fund-raising letters was mailed to persons outside of
districts in which the named candidates were running who, therefore, were
not in a position to vote for or against the candidates described in the fundraising letters.363 The Internal Revenue Service took the position in the
TAM that "intervention in a political campaign may be subtle or blatant.
It may seem to be justified by the press of events. It may even be
inadvertent. The law prohibits
all forms of participation or intervention in
'any' political campaign."3 " The TAM thus takes the position that express
advocacy for the election or defeat of a named candidate is not a necessary
component of advocacy that represents prohibited intervention in a
political campaign.3 65 The scope of this ruling, issued shortly before the
1996 presidential campaign cycle, signaled to exempt organizations that
the Internal Revenue Service was serious about restricting the participation
of section 501(c)(3) organizations in political campaigns.3 66
Similarly, in a 2000 Technical Advice Memorandum the Service
concluded that a fund-raising letter soliciting contributions to an exempt
organization that was signed by a nationally prominent political candidate
constituted intervention in a political campaign.3 67 The letter was printed
on the candidate's letterhead.368 The candidate allowed the use of his
signature and letterhead in exchange for a one-time use of the
3 69
organization's mailing list of persons who responded to the solicitation.

361. Id. at 16-17.
362. Id. at 17.
363. Id. at 32.
364. Id. at 16-17.
365. See id.; see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-36-002 (May 24, 1989) ("We are not convinced that
the Supreme Court's 'express advocacy' standard is controlling in interpreting section 501(c)(3)
of the Code which provides for an absolute bar against intervening in any political campaign on
behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.").
366. See Ryan J. Donmoyer, IRS to Exempts: Politicking Will Cost You, 71 TAX NOTES 25,
25 (1996).
367. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-44-038 (July 24, 2000). The exempt organization in the ruling has
been identified as The Heritage Foundation. Carolyn D. Wright, EO's Grapple with Emerging
Issues at ALI-ABA Gathering, 89 TAX NOTES 1361, 1364 (2000). The letter was signed by
presidential candidate Senator Bob Dole. Id. at 1364-65. The letter ruling describes the
organization as having been granted an exemption "on the basis of an educational purpose to
conduct and sponsor research on the social and economic forces in the country and the
governmental interaction with these forces." Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-44-038.
368. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-44-038.
369. Id. The ruling states that the candidate intermingled the mailing list with his campaign
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The use of prominent political figures as signatories to its fund-raising
solicitations was a common practice of the organization.37 The letter
ruling also indicates that the technique was common to several fundraising efforts37 1 and the use of the particular politician's signature was a
"hot" prospect.3" The TAM concludes that the organization's use of the
candidate's letter was intervention in the campaign under both sections
501(c)(3) and 4955 because the contents of the letter, which coincided
with the candidate's election campaign, included affirmative statements
about the candidate's positions on various issues and negative statements
about the candidate's opponent, all of which were "very much like [the
' The TAM
candidate's] campaign statements, positions, and rhetoric."373
states that the presence of prohibited political intervention under section
501(c)(3) "does not hinge on whether the communication constitutes
'express advocacy' for Federal election law purposes. Rather for purposes
of section 501(c)(3), one looks to the effect of the communication as a
whole, including whether support for, or opposition to, a candidate for
public office is express or implied. 374 Thus, although the organization's
letter signed by the candidate neither expressly advocated election of the
candidate nor defeat of the candidate's opponent, the fact that the
candidate was a highly visible candidate for elective office led to a
conclusion in the TAM that
recipients of the . . . letter would naturally associate the
statements of the letter as indistinguishable from [the
candidate's] election effort .... By featuring the [candidate's]
signature and using the first person with a text in the letter
sounding very much like campaign rhetoric, the fund raising
letter is
inextricably tied to the election ofthe signatory ofthe
3
letter. "5
In reaching this conclusion, the Service adopts a standard to identify
campaign activity that is close to the standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit

mailing list. Id. Subsequently the organization adopted a "seeding" technique to identify a second
use of its mailing list. IL The organization was compensated for the candidate's serial use of the
mailing list by a transfer of 35,000 names of donors to the candidate's campaign for the purpose
of a one-time use by the organization in a fund-raising solicitation. Id.
370. Id. at 37.
371. Id. at 38. The letter ruling stated that "the sale or exchange of lists between exempt

organizations for fund-raising purposes is not an uncommon practice." Id.
372.
373.
374.
375.

See id. at 13.
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 26.
Id. at30-31.
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Court of Appeals in FECv. Furgatch:37s that campaign advocacy may be
identified from the substance of the communication rather than the form
of its magic words.377
Although the 2000 TAM incorporates a fairly broad view of prohibited
campaign intervention, the TAM leaves open the door for interrelated
fund-raising between a candidate and an exempt organization. The TAM
stresses that it is the content and the timing of the letters signed by the
candidate that constitute political intervention.378 The TAM indicates that
the organization's providing the candidate with its mailing list in exchange
for the candidates signature on a fund-raising letter was a "legitimate
business transaction."379 The TAM does not specify whether the timing of
the mailing in connection with a campaign in which the signer was a
candidate alone, in the absence of partisan content, would be sufficient to
classify the mailing as intervention in the political campaign. The mailing
of the letter signed by the candidate to the organization's supporters, who
by the nature of the organization likely would be favorably disposed
towards the candidate in contrast to his opponent, is by its nature an
indirect statement of support for the candidate. Nonetheless, the TAM
seems to approve of the relationship. 8

376.
377.
378.
379.

807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987).
See id. at 864.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-44-038 (July 24, 2000), 2000 PRL LEXIS 1431, at *35.
Id. at *38. The ruling states:
[B]ut the fact remains that A's campaign received the donor list in consideration
for A's signature. It did not receive the list as a gift but as bargained for
consideration for the use of A's name and signature. If X had paid A cash
consideration for his signature on the prospect mailings and the house file
mailings, A's campaign could have used the cash to pay costs of developing a list
of supporters. X's list transferred to A's campaign for use was originally for a
limited one time use. Additional consideration was paid by A's campaign for the
excessive use of the lists in violation of the contract between the parties. If the
various exchanges were all at fair market value, A's campaign has gained no
advantage by virtue of its transaction with X.

Id. at *39-40.
380. See id.at *40-41. The TAM also exonerates the organization's managers from liability
for the 21/% excise tax of section 4955(a)(2) because the managers had received advice of counsel
that the expenditure was permissible. Id. at *46-51; see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4955-1(b)(7) (1995)
(declaring that when a manager reasonably relies on the advice of counsel expressed in a reassured
written legal opinion, the manager's agreement to an expenditure is not considered a knowing or
willful political expenditure).
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b. Educational Activities
Organizations qualify for exempt status under section 501 (c)(3) if their
purpose is educational.3 1 Educational activities include "the instruction of
the public on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the
community. 38 2 Instruction of the public may include discussion of
contemporary political issues, which also may reflect the views of
particular political candidates. 3 Thus, Treasury Regulations provide that
"[a]n organization may be educational even though it advocates a
particular position or viewpoint so long as it presents a sufficiently full and
fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the public
to form an independent opinion or conclusion. 384 In Revenue Ruling 78248385 the Service acknowledged that voter education about candidates and
political office holders "conducted in a non-partisan manner" is not
prohibited political activity. 386 The ruling attempted the impossible task of
distinguishing permissible from impermissible educational activity with
a description of four varied factual situations. 7 Publication of voting
records of members of Congress on a wide variety of subjects, or
publishing the results of responses to questionnaires on a wide range of
topics, in a widely distributed voters' guide, is not treated as intervention
in a political campaign.388 However, the Ruling indicates that if the
publication of voting records or the solicitation of position statements is
limited to issues of particular interest to the organization, or the nature of
questions demonstrates a bias with respect to issues, the activity is
interference in a political campaign.3 9 The Ruling states that "[w]hile the
guide may provide the voting public with useful information, its emphasis

381. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2001).
382. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i)(b) (as amended in 1990); see also Rev. Rul. 78-305,

1978 C.B. 172 (homosexual education); Rev. Rul. 75-285, 1975 C.B. 203 (discrimination
education); Rev. Rul. 72-560, 1972-2 C.B. 248 (employment education for minorities); Rev. Rul.
68-15, 1968-1 C.B. 244 (community tension, discrimination, physical detention, and juvenile
delinquency education); Rev. Rul. 66-256, 1966-2 C.B. 210 (social, political, and international
education).
383. See CorporatePhilanthropy,supra note 5, at 928-30.

384. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (as amended in 1990). The regulation adds that "an
organization is not educational if its principal function is the mere presentation of unsupported
opinion." Ial For a discussion of the constitutional infirmities in the regulation, see infra text
accompanying notes 405-14.
385. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154.
386. Id. at 154.
387. Id. at 154-55.

388. Id
389. Id. at 155.
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on one area of concern indicates that its purpose is not nonpartisan voter
'
education."39
In Revenue Ruling 80-282"9' the Service permitted publication of
incumbents' voting records on issues of interest to a section 501(c)(3)
organization.392 The ruling stresses that whether an education program
intervenes in a political campaign is a question of the facts and
circumstances in each case.39 3 Revenue Ruling 80-282 c6nsidered an
organization's newsletter, which published the voting records of
incumbents whether or not running for re-election, that was distributed to
a relatively small membership base.394 The newsletter's reports focused on
voting records on issues of importance to the organization and described
the organization's viewpoint along with the voting records, but had a
narrow distribution that was not targeted to a larger audience in areas
where elections were taking place.395 That permitted a finding that
publication of the voting records did not constitute intervention in a
political campaign.396
The distinction between non-partisan education on a broad range of
issues, and biased education intended to influence the outcome of an
election is anything but clear. In Revenue Procedure 86-4339' the Service
again attempted to clarify the distinctions between educational and
prohibited political advocacy. The Service recognized that advocacy of
particular viewpoints may be educational, even if the viewpoint is
unpopular or not generally accepted. 39' The Revenue Procedure indicates
that the Service will not render judgment as to the particular viewpoint or

390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

Id.
Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178.
Id. at 178.
Id.
Id. at 179.
Id.
See id. The ruling also points out that
the voting records of all incumbents will be presented, candidates for reelection
will not be identified, no comment will be made on an individual's overall
qualifications for public office, no statements expressly or impliedly endorsing or
rejecting any incumbent as a candidate for public office will be offered, no
comparison of incumbents with other candidates will be made, and the
organization will point out the inherent limitations ofjudging the qualifications
of an incumbent on the basis of certain selected votes by stating the need to
consider such unrecorded matters as performance on subcommittees and
constituent service.

Id.
397. Rev. Proc. 8643, 1986-2 C.B. 729.
398. Id. at 729.
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position, but will instead examine the method used by the organization to
present its views.399
The method used by the organization will not be considered
educational if it fails to provide a factual foundation for the
viewpoint or position being advocated, or if it fails to provide
a development from the relevant facts that would
materially
400
process.
learning
a
in
reader
or
listener
a
aid
The Revenue Procedure also lists four factors that indicate that the
advocacy is not educational:
1. The presentation of viewpoints or positions unsupported by
facts is a significant portion of the organization's
communications.
2. The facts that purport to support the viewpoints or
positions are distorted.
3. The organization's presentations make substantial use of
inflammatory and disparaging terms and express conclusions
more on the basis of strong emotional feelings than on
objective evaluations.
4. The approach used in the organization's presentations is
not aimed at developing an understanding on the part of the
intended audience or readership because it does not consider
their background or training in the subject matter.40 '
The Revenue Procedure also indicates that the Service will look to all
the facts and circumstances, even in the presence of one of the listed
negative factors, to determine whether an organization may be considered
to be educational.40 The Revenue Procedure adds that even if an
organization is deemed to be educational under the listed criteria, the
organization also must meet other requirements of section 501(c)(3),
including restrictions on attempting to influence legislation and
intervention in a political campaign. 4 3 Thus, although the Revenue
Procedure adopts an approach focused on the method of advocacy, there
remains room to deny exemption to an organization whose educational
activity is undertaken with a purpose to support or oppose a candidate or
specific legislation.4°
The import of the Internal Revenue Service's methodology test is
illustrated by two cases decided by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals prior
399. Id.
400. Id at 729-30.
401.
402.
403.
404.

Id at 730.
Id
Id.
Hill, supranote 332, at 239-40.
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to the promulgation of Revenue Procedure 86-43. In Big Mama Rag, Inc.
v. United States," 5 the Service refused to grant charitable organization
status under section 501(c)(3) to a feminist oriented organization whose
primary activity was to publish a newspaper on issues of interest to
women.0 6 The Service denied charitable organization status to Big Mama
Rag on the grounds that the newspaper was a commercial enterprise, it
contained political and legislative commentary throughout, and it
contained articles, lectures, and editorials, promoting lesbianism.0 7 The
district court rejected the Commissioner's argument that the enterprise was
not entitled to tax-exemption because of its commercial nature, but agreed
with the Commissioner that the organization did not meet the definitions
of "educational" and "charitable" of Treasury Regulations section
1.501 (c)(3)-1(d)(2) and (3).408 The court of appeals reversed and remanded
the case for further consideration concluding that the regulations were
unconstitutionally vague.4"9 Both the district court and the court of appeals
agreed that the regulatory test for educational activities based on whether
an organization provides "instruction of the public on subjects useful to the
individual and beneficial to the community"41 is "too subjective in its
application to pass constitutional muster. ' 4 The reviewing court parted
company with the trial court, however, over the provision of the
regulations that permits advocacy of a "particular position or viewpoint so
long as it presents a sufficiently full andfair exposition of the pertinent
facts as to permit an individual or the public to form an independent

405. 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
406. Id at 1032.
407. Id. at 1033. The Internal Revenue Service District Director argued:

The organization in publishing the newspaper is not operated exclusively for
educational purposes as required by Code section 501(c)(3) as the content of the
publication is not educational, the preparation of the material does not follow
methods educational in nature, the distribution of the material is not valuable in
achieving an educational purpose and/or the manner in which the distribution is
accomplished is not distinguishable from ordinary commercial publishing
practices.
Id. at 1033 n.4. Contrast this with Revenue Ruling 78-305, which recognizes section 501(c)(3)
exempt status for an organization to educate the public about homosexuality through seminars,
forums and discussion groups in order to foster understanding and tolerance. Rev. Rul. 78-305,
1978-2 C.B. 172.
408. Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d at 1033. The taxpayer brought an action for declaratory
judgment under Internal Revenue Code section 7428, which provides an action for declaratory
relief in the case of a denial of tax-exempt status. Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 494 F.
Supp. 473, 474 (D.D.C. 1979).
409. Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d at 1039-40.
410. Id. at 1035-36 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3)(i)(b) (1959)).
411. Id. (quoting Big Mama Rag, 494 F. Supp. at 479 n.6).
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opinion or conclusion."'"2 The circuit court concluded that whether the full
and fair exposition test applied only to advocacy organizations or to all
organizations was unclear and therefore unconstitutionally vague, and
further that the ambiguity resulted in selective application of the
standard.413 The court further opined that the test "is expressly based on an
individualistic-and therefore necessarily varying and
unascertanable-standard.' 414
Three years after Big Mama Rag, the D.C. Circuit resurrected the
15
regulations, at least somewhat, in National Alliance v. United States."
National Alliance was a white supremacist organization that published a
newspaper, a membership bulletin, and organized lectures and meetings."1 6
The Internal Revenue Service denied National Alliance's application for
exemption under section 501(c)(3) on the ground that the organization's
activities were not educational under the same regulations declared invalid
by the court in Big Mama Rag.1 In this instance, however, the Service
also relied on its four-part "methodology test" as a gloss on the "full and
fair exposition" test of the regulations.418 The court of appeals first

412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

Id. at 1037 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)) (italics added).
Id.
Id.
710 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 869. The court described National Alliance's publications as follows:
Attack! is the organization's principal publication; it contains stories, pictures,
feature articles and editorials in a form resembling a newspaper. The general
theme of the newsletter is that "non-whites"--principally blacks-are inferior to
white Americans of European ancestry ('WAEA"), and are aggressively brutal
and dangerous; Jews control the media and through that means-as well as
through political and financial positions and other means--cause the policy of the
United States to be harmful to the interests of WAEA. A subsidiary proposition
is that communists have persuaded "neo-liberals" of equality among human
beings, the desirability of racial integration, and the evil of discrimination on
racial grounds. In support of these themes, each newsletter contains one or two
news stories reporting incidents of murder or other violence by black persons, and
identifying as Jews persons holding important media or other positions. Reports
of black violence are presented as brief factual accounts--though usually without
reference to source-accompanied by assertions of a media coverup and the
inborn savagery of blacks. Identifications as Jews of individuals holding
significant positions are accompanied by assertions of resulting Jewish
manipulation of American society. Other articles and editorials attribute political
and social events deemed detrimental to WAEA to the integration of non-whites
into society or to Jewish manipulation of society.

Id. at 871-72 (footnotes omitted).
417. Id. at 873-75.
418. Id. at 870. The four-point methodology test utilized by the Service is essentially the same
as the methodology test of Revenue Procedure 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729. See supra note 397 and
accompanying text.
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concluded that National Alliance's publications could not be considered
educational under any definition of the term.419 In discussing the court's
opinion in Big Mama Rag, the court in NationalAlliance pointed out that
while First Amendment activities need not be subsidized, discriminatory
denial of tax exemptions for engaging in particular speech is
constitutionally impermissible.42 ° The court also stated that the defect in
the regulations in Big Mama Rag was their vagueness, which might permit
the Internal Revenue Service to deny tax-exemption on the basis of
acceptance or rejection of the ideas expressed by an organization.42 ' That
standard, however, does not preclude denial of an exemption "on criteria
neutral with regard to viewpoint.""22 The court also observed in National
Alliance that the methodology test reduces the vagueness found in Big
Mama Rag as the four criteria "tend toward ensuring that the educational
exemption be restricted to material which substantially helps a reader or
listener in a learning process. ' " 23 The court declined, however, to indicate
whether application of the methodology test is sufficient to cure the
vagueness that it found in the regulations in Big Mama Rag.424
Nonetheless, in Revenue Procedure 86-43 the Internal Revenue Service
apparently viewed the opinion in National Alliance as a green light to
apply the methodology test as the standard in all cases "where the
educational purposes of an organization that advocates a particular
viewpoint or position are in question."425
A 1998 Technical Advice Memorandum illustrates the border, as
perceived by the Internal Revenue Service, between an exempt
organization's educational activity and intervention in apolitical campaign
and lobbying.426 The exempt organization was engaged in publishing
newsletters and producing radio commentaries by the organization's
president concerning public policy issues.427 The organization's president

419. National Alliance, 710 F.2d at 873. The court states that "in order to be deemed
'educational' and enjoy tax exemption some degree of intellectually appealing development of or
foundation for the views advocated would be required." Id. In other words, as the court points out
is required by Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c)(3)-I (d)(3), the organization must "present a sufficiently full
and fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the public to form an
independent opinion or conclusion," and an organization is not educational if its principal function
is the mere presentation of unsupported opinion. Id. at 869-70.
420. Id. at 875 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958)).
421. Id.
422. Id.

423. Id.
424. Id. at 876.
425. Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729, 729.
426. Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 1999-07-021 (May 20, 1998), 1998 PLR LEXIS 2073, at *51-61. The
organization involved in the ruling has been identified as the Freedom Alliance, a conservative
nonprofit organization headed by Oliver North who ran as acandidate for the United States Senate.
Fred Stokeld, GroupFoundedBy OliverNorthGets Its Exemption Back, 85TAXNOTES 1140, 1140

(1999).
427. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-07-021, 1998 PRL LEXIS 2073, at *8.
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was directly engaged in political campaign activities on his own behalf as
a potential candidate.42 The TAM addressed several different
communications by the organization, all but one of which were found to
be educational.429 Shortly before congressional elections the organization
published a communication indicating that it was "fed up" with Congress
and urging its members to let Congress know how they felt by voting and
urging others to vote.430 However, the communication did not identify any
specific candidates for Congress nor support or oppose an identifiable
group of candidates.431 Thus, the communication did not constitute
intervention in a political campaign.432 The TAM indicated that, "This
communication could be viewed as focusing attention on the perceived
abuses of the Congress or as a way to send a message of disgust to
members of Congress." '33 In June of the following year, almost one and
one-half years in advance of the next congressional election, the
organization produced commentary criticizing named members of the
Congress and Senate for their votes against a particular resolution.434
Although that series of commentary expressly disapproved of the political
positions of named office holders, there was no indication that the named
office holders were candidates for election when the statements were
distributed.435 As a consequence, the TAM again concluded that the
statements did not constitute intervention in a political campaign.43 6 On the
other hand, in a radio commentary, the organization's president criticized
an announced candidate for the presidential nomination of a particular
political party by describing the candidate's political/economic ideology
as a failed ideology.437 The organization claimed that the commentary was
educational as criticism of economic issues raised by the candidate.4 The
TAM did not question the educational content of the broadcast and noted
that the commentary may have been in response to the candidate's attack
onnational economic policies.3 The TAMpointed out that the prohibition
against campaign activity on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate for
political office "refers not to the motive of the participant but the

428.
429.
430.
431.

Id
Id at *69.
Id. at*11-12.
Id. at *32.

432. Id. at*33.
433. Id. at *32.
434. Id. at *33.

435. Id. at *34.
436. Id. at *33-36. Although this activity might be considered to be lobbying on behalf of
pending legislation, the TAM concluded that the organization's lobbying activity was not
"substantial" nor outside of the organization's permitted expenditures under its section 501(h)
election.
437.
438.
439.

Id. at *50.
Id. at*13.
Id. at *38.
Id.
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reasonable consequences of his or her activities." ' The commentary,
which occurred in the context of an active campaign and included material
that explicitly favored or opposed the views of a named candidate
"violate[d] the proscription against political campaign intervention.""' On
the broad question of whether the organization's political commentary was
"educational" within the meaning of section 501 (c)(3), the TAM reads as
follows:
While nearly all of X's articles discuss various public policy
issues from a particular ideological perspective, the articles
to some extent set forth the opposition's positions. Despite
the perception that X's articles present facts that shed an
unfavorable light on opposing ideological perspectives, we
cannot say that newsletter articles or X's other informational
communications are based upon unsupported opinion. X, on
a regular basis, has cited independent sources that support the
facts contained in the articles. The communications of an
organization such as X are educational, even though they
maintain clear and definite positions on public policy issues
that are discussed and addressed in the legislative and
political realms, because they use an educational
methodology.442
The statutory, regulatory, and administrative positions barring
intervention in political campaigns portray a regime that contains strict
limitations on participation in political campaigns by tax-exempt
charitable organizations. The authorities describing educational activity,
however, illustrate that the proscription against direct political activity by
charitable organizations leaves significant space for advocative association
with political issues and candidates who share the ideology, or in some
cases manage, charitable organizations.443 The statutory prohibitions on

440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id. at *68-69.
443. For example, shortly before the 2000 presidential election atax-exempt section 501 (c)(3)
organization called "Voice of the Environment" ran an advertisement in the New York Times
headed, "It's Time We Stopped Allowing the Democratic and Republican Parties to Tear our
Country Apart!" The ad urged "the 100 million Americans who have 'dropped out' in
disillusionment and frustration" to vote. N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2000, at C21. The ad can be found
on the Web at http://www.voteaction.org (last visited July 26, 2001). Editorials on the Web site
recommend Ralph Nader, the alternative Green Party candidate for President. The advertisement
solicits "tax deductible" contributions to the organization.
A Sierra Club advertisement published in the New York Times was headed, "George
Bush's Answer to High Energy Prices? Replace Polar Bears with Oil Derricks." N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
4, 2000, at B14. After quoting speeches by the candidates the ad concluded by saying, "Think
there's no difference when it comes to Al Gore and George W. Bush? Think again, if you care
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participating in the election of a candidate and the limited permission for
lobbying leave unbarred a wide avenue for participation in political
activity by section 501(c)(3) organizations. Part III of this Article will
explore the methods used by some advocative organizations to exploit
these pathways.
ii. Social Welfare Organizations
As noted by the Supreme Court in Regan v. Taxation with
4 an organization whose advocacy is constrained by the
Representation,"
prohibitions of section 501(c)(3) can forgo the governmental subsidy for
deductible contributions445 and engage in tax-exempt political advocacy.
Section 501(c)(4) of the Code exempts from tax civic organizations and
nonprofit organizations "operated exclusively for the promotion of social
welfare." ' 6 The only statutory restriction in the Internal Revenue Code on
the activities of a "social welfare" organization is a proscription on the use
organization for the benefit of any private
of the net earnings of the
447
individual or shareholder.
A social welfare organization satisfies the Treasury Regulations'
requirement that it be operated exclusively for the required exempt
purpose "if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common
good and general welfare of the people of the community." ' 8 An
organization may qualify as a social welfare organization even though it
would be described as an "action organization" because of lobbying
activities and attempts to influence legislation." 9 The regulations add,
however, that the "promotion of social welfare does not include direct or

about the environment and national treasures like the Arctic Refuge." The ad did not mention
voting, but the import of the advocacy is quite clear. The Sierra club has both section 501 (c)(3) and
section 501(c)(4) organizations within its integrated structure.
444. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
445. I.R.C. § 6113 requires tax-exempt organizations, other than organizations described in
section 170(c), to which deductible contributions are permitted, to disclose in all fund-raising
solicitations the fact that contributions are not deductible. There is still some possibility that a

mistaken belief that contributions are deductible helps a section 501(c)(4) organization in its
fundraising. See Brent Coverdale, A New Look at Campaign Finance Reform: Regulation of
Nonprofit OrganizationsThrough the Tax Code, 46 KAN. L. REV. 155, 161 (1997).
446. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2001). Section 501(c)(4) also exempts associations of employees

of a designated employer in a particular municipality. Id
447. Id. § 501(c)(4)(B). Incorporated social welfare organizations might be subject to the
proscription of theFECA on corporate political expenditures. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2001). However,
under FEC v. MassachusettsCitizensfor Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986), discussed supra at note
139, the limitation cannot constitutionally be applied to voluntary nonprofit organizations that are

not engaged in business. Id at 263-64.
448. Treas. Reg. § 1.504(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990).

449. Id. §§ 1.504(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(ii), 1.504(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii).
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indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or
in opposition to any candidate for public office."45 ° Nonetheless, unlike the
case with respect to a section 501 (c)(3) organization, Revenue Ruling 8195451 holds that as long as an organization that is exempt from tax under
section 501 (c)(4) is "primarily engaged in activities [that] promote social
welfare,, 452 lawful participation45 3 inpolitical campaigns is permitted. The
ruling based its conclusion, in part, on legislative history to the 1975
enactment of section 527 of the Code that suggests that section 501(c)(4)
organizations may engage in political activities.454 Citing Revenue Ruling
67-368, 45 Revenue Ruling 81-95 also indicated that an organization that
is primarily engaged in political campaign activity is not a social welfare
organization.456 Thus, an organization exempt from tax under section
501 (c)(4) may intervene in political campaigns, as long as those activities
are not its "primary" activity. In addition, a social welfare organization
may undertake its campaign activity through a segregated fund that is itself
exempt from tax under section 527 of the Code.457
The absence of statutory prohibitions on political activity by a taxexempt social welfare organization also makes the tax-exemption of
section 501(c)(4) available for organizations that intervene in state
initiative campaigns. An organization may justify advocacy for such issues
as gun control, power company regulation or deregulation, pro- or antiaffirmative action, etc. as advocacy for the promotion of social welfare
The regulatory
within the meaning of the Treasury Regulations.
permission for social welfare organizations to participate in influencing

450. Id. § 1.504(c)(4)-I(a)(2)(ii).
451. Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332.
452. Id.
453. General Counsel Memorandum 38,264 (Jan. 30, 1980) raises a question under the FECA
whether it is lawful for an incorporated exempt organization to make political contributions or
political expenditures. See 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970 & Supp. IV); 11 C.F.R. § 114.7 (2000). The
General Counsel Memorandum states that "[i]llegal activities are the antithesis of activities that
promote social welfare. Stated otherwise, the common good and general welfare of the people of
a community is the cornerstone of the social welfare concept and illegal activities cannot be said
to benefit the community." Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,264 (Jan. 30, 1980).
454. S.REP.No. 93-1357, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 29 (1974), reprintedin 1975-1 C.B. 517, 533.
Section 527 is discussed infra beginning at note 479.
455. Rev. Rul. 67-368, 1967-2 C.B. 194. A bipartisan organization formed for the purpose of
rating candidates for local public office cannot qualify as a social welfare organization under
section 501(c)(4) notwithstanding a public purpose to acquaint voters with the candidates. The
ruling states that "[c]omparative rating of candidates, even though on a nonpartisan basis, is
participation or intervention on behalfof those candidates favorably rated and in opposition to those
less favorably rated." Id. at 194.
456. Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332, 333.
457. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996), 1996 PRL LEXIS 1885.
458. See Treas. Reg. § 1.504(c)(4)-I(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990).
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legislation45 9 would seem to apply to legislation enacted through the
initiative process and related grassroots campaigning. Further, if the
primary mission of such an organization is the promotion of social welfare
through sponsorship of initiative campaigns, the organization may also
lend its support to political candidates whose views are consistent with the
organization's initiative positions as long as that activity is subsidiary to
the primary mission.
A section 501(c)(3) organization is required to establish its section
501(c)(4) affiliate before it imperils its tax exemption under section
501(c)(3) with political advocacy.460 Section 504 provides that an
organization that loses its exemption under section 501(c)(3) because of
political activity is not thereafter allowed to qualify as a section 501 (c)(4)
organization. Ironically, there is no prohibition on reforming a new section
501(c)(3) organization to accept the assets and continue the charitable
activity of the disqualified organization.46!
iii. Other-Tax Exempt Organizations
In addition to charities and social welfare organizations, section 501
exempts from tax certain organizations such as business leagues, 462 labor
,organizations, 463 social organizations, 41 fraternal organizations, 46 and
others that are organized around common interests of the members. The
principal regulatory issues with respect to this type of exempt organization
appear to be concerns that the organization does not cross a line into
commercial activity that dominates its exempt functions and that the
organization is not operated for the personal benefit of particular
individuals.466 With respect to political activity, the Internal Revenue

459. Treas. Reg. § 1.504(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990); Treas. Reg. § 1.504(c)(3)-

l(c)(3)(ii).

460. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(i).
461. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.504-2(b)(5)(ii). In general, Treasury Regulation section 1.504-2
contains rules threatening the tax-exempt status of a commonly controlled transferee organization
that receives a transfer from an organization that has lost its section 501 (c)(3) exemption because
it is a political action organization.

462. I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (2001).
463. Id. § 501(c)(5). Section 501(c)(5) also exempts agricultural and horticultural organizations. Id.
464. Id. § 501(c)(7).

465. Id. § 501(c)(8).
466. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (as amended in 1960) (providing that an exempt
business league must be organized for the purpose of improving one or more lines of business); id.
§ 1.501(c)(7)-1 (b) (providing that the exemption applies only to clubs organized and operated for
pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes); Thomas J. McGee Regular Democratic
Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, I T.C.M. (CCII) 18 (1942) (holding that a club-operated restaurant and bar
was not exempt since it could be used to make a profit).
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Service concluded in Revenue Ruling 61-17767 that an otherwise qualified
business league whose primary activity was promoting legislation
favorable to its members in a particular line of business was eligible for
tax exemption under section 501(c)(6).46 While this ruling may not be
directly applicable to an organization organized for social or other interest
group purposes,4 69 the conclusion of the ruling-that in the absence of
specific statutory prohibitions on political activity the political intervention
is permissible to a tax-exempt organization-is significant to all exempt
organizations other than charitable organizations.470
Incorporated organizations that are exempt under sections 501(c)(6),
(c)(7), or (c)(8) may be subject to FECA's prohibition on corporate
campaign expenditures. Under Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce47' multipurpose corporations, particularly trade unions and
organizations with corporate funding, constitutionally may be held subject
to the limitations in political expenditures from treasury funds.47 Such
organizations are permitted to engage in political advocacy only through
the device of a separate segregated fund.473
The Internal Revenue Service suggests in General Counsel
Memorandum 34,233414 that a distinction can be drawn between legislative
activities in support of specific positions that are identified with the
interests of an organization and its involvement in support of a political
candidate.47 In the latter case, the organization becomes identified with
the full range of the candidate's positions whether or not they are germane
to the interests around which the organization is formed.4 76 Thus, an

467. Rev. Rul. 61-177, 1961-2 C.B. 117.
468. Id.The deduction for dues and other fees to such an organization is constrained by section
162(e). See supra note 241. Thus the tax subsidy to lobbying by such an organization is limited.
While the exempt organization pays no tax on receipts for its lobbying services, the expenditures
are subject to at least one level of tax as after-tax money from the contributors.
469. But see General Counsel Memorandum 34,233 which holds that the same principle
applies to a labor organization exempt from tax under section 501(c)(5) of the Code thereby
allowing tax exemption to an organization whose primary function is seeking legislation for the
benefit of labor. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233 (Dec. 30, 1969), 1969 IRS GCM LEXIS 12. This logic
would seem to apply to permit tax-exemption under section 501(c)(7) to an organization primarily
engaged in lobbying for legislation that protects the recreational interests of its members.
470. Revenue Ruling 61-177 states: "There is no requirement, by statute or regulations, that
a business league, chamber of commerce, etc., in order to be considered exempt as such, must
refrain from carrying on propaganda or influencing legislation." Rev. Rul. 61-177,1961-2 C.B. 117
(1961).
471. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
472. Id. at 654-55.
473. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2001).
474. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233 (Dec. 30, 1969), 1969 IRS GCM LEXIS 12.
475. Id. at *7.
476. Id. at*8.
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exempt organization formed for the exclusive benefit of promoting the
interests of its members may not be directly promoting those interests if
it is primarily engaged in the support of candidates for elective office. The
General Counsel Memorandum adds, however, that if the primary activity
of an organization qualifies it for tax exemption, incidental involvement
with political candidates will not jeopardize the exemption. 477 Thus, the
G.C.M. concludes that an organization primarily involved with legislation
in support of the interests of its members may also engage in activities in
support of political candidates. As a consequence, a wide range of political
activity remains open to tax-exempt labor, business, fraternal, and social
organizations that may make political contributions or otherwise advocate
election of candidates who support its interests. The House Committee on
Ways and Means reported that in 1994, nearly 1,300 section 501(c)(4),
section 501(c)(5), and section 501(c)(6) organizations reported a total of
over $29 million in political expenditures on their Form 990s.47
iv. Section 527 Organizations: Political Organizations and
Segregated Funds of Exempt Organizations
The door to political campaign activities by tax-exempt organizations
is further opened by section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section
527 excludes from income amounts received by a "political organization"
that are expended to influence the nomination, election, or appointment of
an individual to any federal, state, or local public office.4 79 These items are
referred to in the Code as "exempt function income."4 "° Section 527
477. Id. See also Revenue Ruling 68-266, 1968-1 C.B. 270, which holds that an organization
whose membership consists of the members of a particular political party and persons who are
interested in the affairs of the party may qualify as a tax-exempt social club under section 501 (c)(7).

Id. The organization invited speeches from political candidates, which was described as an
insubstantial part of its activities. Id. The organization neither raised funds for candidates nor
participated in political campaigns. Id.
478. H.R. REP. No. 106-702, at 13 (2000). The Form 990 requires a report of political
expenditures which encompasses only expenses incurred to influence the selection, nomination or

election of a person to political office. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 2000

INSTRUCTIONS FOR

FoRM 990 AND FORM 990EZ, at 26-27. This does not include expenditures by a separate segregated
fund of the exempt organization. Presumably the figure also does not include voter education and
issue advocacy expenditures that an organization does not deem to be "political expenditures."
Thus, the $29 million figure understates the true degree of political activity by tax-exempt
organizations.
479. I.R.C. § 527(d) (2001).
480. Id. § 527(c)(I)(A), (c)(3), (e)(2). Section 527(e)(2) defines the "exempt function" of a
political organization as,
the function of influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination,
election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or local public
office or office in a political organization, or the election of Presidential or Vice-
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shields from taxation two different but related types of "political
organization," the activities of a pure political campaign organization,48 '
and the campaign activities of a separate political fund of a tax-exempt
organization.4" 2 A "political organization" is generally defined as any
organization that is "organized and operated primarily for the purpose of
directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures, or
both," for the purpose of influencing the election or appointment of
candidates to public office.483 The term political organization also includes
a "separate segregated fund" of an organization that is exempt from tax by
virtue of section 501 (c).484 This latter provision allows a tax-exempt labor
union or trade association, for example, to segregate campaign
contributions raised by its employees into a separate fund that is treated as
a political organization separate from the otherwise tax-exempt
organization.485 Contributions thus raised by atax-exempt organization and
contributed to its separate segregated fund are not treated as contributions
by the exempt organization.486 An organization exempt from tax by virtue
of section 501(c), which under Revenue Ruling 81-95487 may engage in
campaign activities as long as that is not its "primary" activity, is expected
by Congress to segregate its campaign activities into a separate fund that
is thus treated as a separate political organization.488 In addition, there

Presidential electors, whether or not such individual or electors are selected,
nominated, elected, or appointed. Such term includes the making of expenditures
relating to an office described in the preceding sentence which, if incurred by the
individual, would be allowable as a deduction under section 162(a)
Id. § 527(e)(2).
481. Id. § 527 (c).
482. Id. § 527(f). Section 527 does not itself sanction participation in campaign activities by
an organization that is an exempt charity or similar organization under section 501(c)(3). Treas.
Reg. § 1.527-6(g) (1980).
483. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1) (2001). A political organization is one that receives contributions or
makes expenditures for an "exempt function." Id.
484. Id. § 527(e).
485. S. REP.No. 93-1357, at 30 (1974), reprintedin 1975-1 C.B. 517, 534; see also Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-25-036 (Mar. 24, 1997), discussed infra in the text
beginning at note 500. A separate segregated fund is defined in Treasury Regulation section 1.5272(b)(1) as a fund maintained by an organization or individual that is separate from the assets of the
organization or individual. Treas. Reg. § 1.527-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1985). The amounts in the
fund must be dedicated for use in exempt functions; to wit, the election or appointment of
candidates to office. Id. A savings or checking account used for exempt function contributions and
expenditures may qualify as a segregated fund as long as no more than an "insubstantial amount"
is expended from the fund for activities that are not exempt function activities under section 527.
Id.
486. S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 30 (1974), reprintedin 1975-1 C.B. 517, 534.
487. Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332.
488. S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 30 (1975), reprintedin 1975-1 C.B. 517, 534.
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appears to be nothing that restricts a section 501(c)(3) charitable
organization from forming a section 501 (c)(4) social welfare organization
that in turn maintains a separate segregated fund for the support of
candidates favored by the tax-exempt charity, as long as tax-deductible
contributions to the tax-exempt charity are not used for political
campaigns. 419 Indeed, the boundaries between the tax-exempt charity, the
tax-exempt social welfare organization, and the tax-exempt political
organization may be nothing more than lines on an organization chart and
separate accounting documents.
Section 527 was enacted to clarify the status of political organizations
and campaign contributions after a series of rulings by the Internal
Revenue Service that required political organizations to file tax returns
including investment income in taxable gross income.490 The Committee
on Ways and Means asserted that political activity and the financing of
political campaigns do not fit the description of a trade or business that is
appropriately subject to tax.49 ' Thus the Committee's report indicates that
political organizations should be treated as tax exempt.492 The Committee
investment income of such
did conclude, however, that the net
493
tax.
to
subject
be
should
organizations
Section 527(c)(3) excludes from income, only contributions,
membership dues or fees, proceeds derived from political fund-raising and
other events, proceeds from the sale of political campaign materials, and
the proceeds of the operation of a bingo game.494 Other income derived by
a political organization, less expenses incurred in producing such income,
is taxable to a political organization at the highest corporate tax rate.495
Generally this provision refers to investment income, 496 although it also

489. See Reganv. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540,544 (1983). Direct expenditure
of charitable contributions by a charity should be treated as intervention in a political campaign.
See Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,912 (Aug. 15, 1968), 1968 IRS GCM LEXIS 169, which concludes that
political activities of abusiness subsidiary ofan incorporated section 501(c)(3) organization cannot
be attributed to the charitable organization. Id. Revenue Ruling 68-489 indicates that a section
501(c)(3) organization can transfer funds to non-exempt organizations provided that it maintains
control to ensure that the funds are used for section 501(c)(3) exempt purposes. Rev. Rul. 68-489,
1968-2 C.B. 210,210.
490. S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 25-26 (1975), reprintedin 1975-1 C.B. 517, 531-32. The
reference is to Announcement 73-84, 1973-33 I.R.B. 18. See alsoRev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 15;
Rev. Rul. 74-23, 1974-1 C.B. 17.
491. S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 26, reprintedin 1975-1 C.B. 517, 532.

492. Id.
493. Id.
494. I.R.C. § 527(c)(3) (2001).
495. Id. § 527(b). A principal campaign committee, as designated by a candidate under the
FECA, is subjectto tax on its taxable income computed underthe rate structure ofsection 11, rather
than the highest rate. Id. § 527(h).
496. Id. § 527(h).
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encompasses income from a trade or business other than influencing the
outcome of an election or nomination. To prevent avoidance of the tax by
a tax-exempt organization that might use investment income to directly
fund campaign activity, section 527(f) provides that a tax-exempt
organization is subject to tax under section 527(b) at the highest corporate
rate on exempt function campaign expenditures to the extent of its
investment income.497 The Treasury Regulations clarify that transfers of
campaign contributions by an exempt organization to a separate segregated
fund maintained under section 527(f)(3) will not subject the exempt
organization to tax.49
As is evidenced by a favorable series of private letter rulings from the
Internal Revenue Service, political operatives have created a convenient
pathway around the disclosure and regulatory scheme of the FECA that
leads through tax exemption for political campaign activities under section
527. 4 11 Private Letter Ruling 96-52-026500 is illustrative ofthe organization

497. S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 29 (1975), reprintedin 1975-1 C.B. 517, 533-34.
498. Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(f) (1980).
499. The details of this device are discussed in Frances R. Hill, Probingthe Limits ofSection
527 to Design a New Campaign Finance Vehicle, 86 TAXNOTES 387, 387 (2000).
500. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996), 1996 PRL LEXIS 1885, at *7. See also Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 97-25-036 (Mar. 24, 1997), 1997 PLR LEXIS 404, which appears to involve the same fund,
but with slightly different description of some of the fund's activities. The second ruling appears
to have resulted from a subsequent correspondence from the taxpayer's representative. Both rulings
were in response to concerns that a contribution to the section 501(c)(4) organization's political
advocacy program would be subject to gift tax. The taxpayer in Private Letter Ruling 96-52-026
made a loan to the organization that would be forgiven by the taxpayer if the Internal Revenue
Service ruled that disbursements by the separate segregated fund to which the loan proceeds were
directed are treated as exempt function expenditures. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026, at *41-42. Previous
Revenue Rulings caused the taxpayer concern. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-355, 1972-2 C.B. 532, 532
(holding that gifts to a political campaign are subject to the gift tax). But see Stem v. United States,
436 F.2d 1327, 1327 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that amounts expended to elect candidates are not
gifts under the gift tax provisions). The Internal Revenue Service announced that it would not
follow Stern except in the Fifth Circuit. Rev. Rul. 72-583, 1972-2 C.B. 534,534; see also Rev. Rul.
82-216, 1982-2 C.B. 220, 220, stating that
the Service continues to maintain that gratuitous transfers to persons other than
organizations described in section 527(e) of the Code are subject to the gift tax
absent any specific statute to the contrary, even though the transfers may be
motivated by a desire to advance the donor's own social, political or charitable
goals.
The Internal Revenue Code expressly provides that the gift tax does not apply to contributions to
organizations that qualify as political organizations under section 527(e)(1). I.R.C. § 2501(a)(5)
(2001). Professor Hill states that the development of the section 527 political organization as a
vehicle for voter education activities arose out of concerns that contributions in excess of the
$10,000 exemption for political activities of a section 501(c)(4) organization would be subject to
gift tax. Hill, supra note 499, at 391.
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and operation of one form of this device. The Internal Revenue Service
concluded in the ruling that exempt function activities under section 527(e)
include candidate advocacy that is not "express advocacy" by a separate
segregated fund of an organization exempt from tax under section
501 (c)(4).5"' The fund engaged in a voter education program to raise public
consciousness on issues that are important to the fund's parent section
501 (c)(4) organization and to educate voters on the positions of incumbent
elected officials and candidates for office on those issues °2 The letter
ruling describes the purpose of the fund as being "to expressly advocate
the election or defeat of certain federal candidates for public office."5 3
The fund's governing documents stated, however, that "[n]o expenditures
or activities prohibited by or reportable under the Federal Election
Campaign Act shall be paid for from the Fund."5°4 The fund accomplishes
this result by engaging in voter education and registration activities that
are outside of the definition of campaign expenditures under the FECA,
issue advocacy without "express advocacy."50 5 This statement is an ironic
admission that voter education and other issue advocacy is in fact
advocacy for the election or defeat of candidates, but without the magic
words directly soliciting votes for or against a candidate. 0 6
The Internal Revenue Service's analysis in Private Letter Ruling 96-52026 of exempt function income under section 527(e)(2) is significant. The
letter ruling uses the converse of the factors considered in Revenue
Rulings 78-248507 and 80-2825o8 as indicators of the presence of exempt
function expenditures under section 527(e)(2).5"9 Revenue Ruling 78-248
focused on the distinction between nonpartisan voter education through
publication of voting records and position statements on a broad array of
topics versus publication of voting records and positions on issues that
reflect the interests and viewpoint of the organization.510 Revenue Ruling
80-282 held that publication of voting records on a narrow list of issues
that were significant to a tax-exempt charitable organization was not
prohibited intervention in political campaigns in which the fund's
activities were neither aimed at the general public nor timed to coincide

501. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996), 1996 PRL LEXIS 1885, at *41.

502. Id. at *4-5.
503. Id. at *9.
504. Id.
505. 11 C.F.R. § 114.4(c)(4), (5) (2000). See discussion supra note 102.
506. The Private Letter Ruling does not address the status ofthe fund's expenditures under the
FECA. A conclusion that the campaign activities are outside of the FECA regulatory scheme is not
clear. See Hill, supra note 499, at 394-95.
507. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154.
508. Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178.
509. For a detailed discussion, see Hill, supra note 499, at 391.
510. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154.
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with elections in targeted geographical areas. 1 In Private Letter Ruling
96-52-026 the fund's activities consisted of the creation of voter education
materials and voter guides that identified candidates' positions on specific
issues. 2 The ruling described the fund as attempting to influence the
public through education that links candidates to issues advocated by the
fund's parent social welfare organization. 1 As described in the letter
ruling,
X's Board resolution creating the Fund states that it was
formed "for the purpose of supporting X's efforts to educate
the public ... so that people can make judgments about
the.., positions and qualifications of their elected officials
and candidates during the 1996 election season." This
purpose is equivalent to accepting and expending funds not
to expressly advocate for or against candidates, but to
promote a program of issue advocacy designed to influence
the public to give more importance to... issues when they
decide among the candidates. 4
The fund's voter education program is thus designed to "identify
candidates for public office whose philosophy about [selected issues] is 51in5
harmony with [the social welfare organization's] own stance.
Distributions of the fund's materials were to be geared to the timing of
elections. 16 The distributions were to be made to the general public and
not limited to members of the fund's parent organization.517 The letter
ruling contrasts the organization's viewpoint oriented voter education with
the nonpartisan voter education allowed to section 501 (c)(3) organizations
by Revenue Ruling 78-248."' In addition, the letter ruling points to the
timing of the fund's voter education activities. 9 Whereas, under Revenue
Ruling 80-282, information regarding voting records ofincumbents related
to an organization's interests that is directed to a limited group of members
and not timed to coincide with an election is permissible educational
activity for a tax-exempt charitable organization, voter education targeted
to an election is treated as an exempt function campaign activity under

511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.

Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178, 179.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996), 1996 PRL LEXIS 1885, at *6.
Id. at *35.
Id. at *33-34 (alterations in original).
Id. at *36.
Id. at *4.
Id. at*12.
Id. at *38-39.
Id. at*39.
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section 527(e)(2)."' The letter ruling thus implies that voter education that
is barred to a tax-exempt charity under section 501(c)(3) as political
activity qualifies as exempt function expenditure under section 527(e).
One of the consequences of this conclusion is that a tax-exempt charitable
organization is directed to funnel its political campaign activity through a
separate segregated fund maintained by an affiliated section 501(c)(4)
activity, which is consistent with suggestions in legislative history of
section 527.21 This ruling allows an integrated organization with an
exempt charitable arm, a social welfare organization, and a separate
political organization, to marshal its tax-exempt funds into a variety of
political activities focused on the election of favored candidates using a
combination of double and single subsidized funds.522
Private Letter Ruling 98-08-037" applies the same analysis to the
voter education and issue advocacy activities of a stand-alone incorporated
political organization that is not related to a tax-exempt entity. The letter
ruling describes the organization's activities as, "a public education
program to raise public consciousness about the importance of social and
economic values that it favors and about the positions of incumbent public
officials at all levels of government and candidates on those values,
without engaging in express advocacy for or against any identified
524
' Again, the organization's disavowal of "express advocacy"
candidates."
was an attempt to qualify its political expenditures as "issue advocacy"
that is outside the reach of the contribution limits and disclosure
requirements ofthe FECA.12' The organization's education program linked
the records and positions of various incumbent office holders and
candidates to issues of importance to the organization.526 The organization
would distribute information on incumbents' voting records, timed to
coincide with federal, state and local elections.127 The organization's
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.

Id. at *40.
See S. REP.No. 93-1357, at30 (1974), reprintedin 1975-1 C.B. 517, 534.
Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178, 179.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-08-037 (Nov. 21, 1997), 1997 PRL LEXIS 1964.
Id. at *4 (italics added).
The letter ruling further states:
No expenditures or activities prohibited by or reportable under the Federal
Election Campaign Act shall be paid for by the Fund. The Fund's materials,
including voter guides and voting records, shall be prepared and distributed by the
Fund's staff without cooperation or coordination with any candidate, candidate's
campaign or agent regarding the candidate's plans, projects, or needs in
accordance with the Federal Election Commission's regulations.

Id. at *5-6.
526. Id. at *6.
527. Id. at *7.
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distributions "may indicate how identified legislators stand on particular
legislation and, by strong implication, how those legislators stand on issues
important to the Fund. 5 28 The organization's materials would also provide
information about the views of certain candidates and how those
individuals may act on issues of interest to the organization.129 As in
Private Letter Ruling 96-52-026, the Service based its conclusion that the
organization's expenditures qualified it for tax exemption as exempt
function activities on an analysis of authorities identifying permissible
non-partisan voter education activities of charitable organizations under
section 501(c)(3).53 In support of its holding that the organization's
expenditures were for exempt function activities, the ruling states that
[t]he repeated public presentation of the importance of
selected issues, targeted to geographical areas and timed to
coincide with the election, together with legislators' positions
on those issues as compared with the Fund's views, is
intended to have an effect on how the public will judge the
positions of the incumbents and their challengers in
November. The link between these issues and the various
candidates will be reinforced through the voting records and
the voter guides.53 '
Again in Private Letter Ruling 1999-25-05 1532 the Internal Revenue
Service turned to an analysis of voter education that is permitted to a taxexempt charity to find that the voter education activities of an incorporated
section 527 political.organization qualified as exempt function activities
under section 527(e)(2). 3 The ruling describes the organization's
advocacy program as including "development and distribution of voter
guides and voting records, mass media advertisements, grassroots
lobbying, direct mail campaigns, and the active use of ballot measures,
referenda, initiatives, and other public opinion campaigns, all linked to the
primary purpose of influencing the political process in [five] states." '34
Unlike the organizations in Private Letter Rulings 96-52-026 and 98-08037, the organization in Letter Ruling 1999-25-051 indicated that as a

528. Id. at *8.
529. Id. at *9.
530. Id. at *25-26.
531. Id. at*42.
532. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-25-051 (Mar. 29, 1999), 1999 PLR LEXIS 500, at *1. The official
release does not include the full text of the letter. The full text that was released to Tax Analysts
may be found in TAX NOTES TODAY. PoliticalOrganization Receives FavorableLetter Ruling,

1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 83-22.
533. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-25-051 (Mar. 29, 1999), 1999 PRL LEXIS 500, at *1.
534. Id.
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minor part of its program some of its activities would include direct
expenditures and expenditures expressly advocating the election or defeat
of identified candidates that would be reportable under the FECA. 35 The
organization in Private Letter Ruling 1999-25-051 also undertook voter
registration activities and participated in state initiative campaigns.5 36 Both
of these activities were found to qualify as exempt function activities. 37
With respect to the voter registration, the organization convinced the
Internal Revenue Service that the voter registration was a partisan
activity. 38 The ruling states, "[w]hile these activities may not be
specifically identified with a candidate or party in every case, they are
partisan in the sense that you intend to use these techniques to increase the
election prospects of pro-issue candidates as a group." '39 Similarly, the
organization participated in ballot measures related to its issues by
identifying ballot measures with candidates who supported or opposed the
organization's issue positions.54 The organization's activities with respect
to ballot measures included identification of ballot measures with
particular candidates, selection of ballot measures by which voters could
hold office holders accountable on measures affecting the organization's
issues, developing resources such as donor lists and making those
resources available to selected candidates or redirecting resources to
candidates, and coordination of ballot measure campaigns with the
campaigns of candidates.5 4 ' The letter ruling indicates that the
organization's activities with respect to ballot measures were
distinguishable from the type of activities commonly undertaken by either
public charities or social welfare organizations.542 Although participation
in initiative campaigns normally is not the type of activity that qualifies as
an exempt function for a section 527 organization, the letter ruling
indicates that
a political organization may support or oppose ballot
measures provided that such activities are not its primary
activity. Furthermore, such expenditures will be considered

535. Id.
536. Id.
537. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-49-002 (June 30,1992) (holding that an organization that promotes
referenda as part of an overall electoral strategy to elect candidates supportive of the organization's
goals qualifies as a political organization under section 527). But cf Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-44-003
(Apr. 15, 1992) (holding that an organization formed to promote a municipal referendum without
any relation to electing candidates is not a section 527 political organization).
538. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-25-051.
539. PoliticalOrganizationReceives FavorableLetter Ruling, supra note 532.
540. Id.
541. Id.

542. Id.
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for an exempt function where it can be demonstrated that
such expenditures were part of a deliberate and integrated
political campaign strategy to influence the election for state
and local officials by making active use of ballot measures,
referenda, and initiative campaigns. You have indicated that
your participation in such campaigns is for the purpose of
linking candidates, in the minds of voters, to positions on
certain issues within your identified area of interest, and
encouraging voters to give greater weight to these issues
when making judgments about candidates. 43
The organization also convinced the Internal Revenue Service that its
litigation program directed at influencing the selection of candidates who
favored its issues constituted an exempt function activity."' The
organization in Private Letter Ruling 1999-25-051 thus convinced the
Internal Revenue Service to allow an expansive interpretation of exempt
function activities to provide a tax exemption for a broad program of
political activity at several levels.
The expansion of section 527 political organizations and their use to
avoid the FECA limitations, particularly disclosure of the identity of
contributors, ultimately proved to be too much for Congress. In the
summer of 2000, Congress enacted section 527(i) and section 527(j),
which require registration of section 527 political organizations and
disclosure of contributions and expenditures. 45 In its report of a similar,
but broader bill that would have included the political activities of other
tax-exempt organizations in the disclosure requirements, the majority of
the House Committee on Ways and Means opined that the activities of
section 527 organizations were being designed to avoid engaging in
express advocacy reportable under the federal election laws and that the
organizations were "being used to exploit the lack ofinformation reporting
' The Committee
and disclosure under the present-law Federal tax rules."546
described the "use of tax-exempt organizations generally to engage in

543. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 93-1357, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1974), reprintedin 1975-1
C.B. 517, 532 ("a qualified organization could support the enactment or defeat of a ballot
proposition, as well as support or oppose a candidate, ifthe latter activity was its primary activity").
544. PoliticalOrganizationReceives FavorableLetter Ruling, supra note 532.
545. 26 U.S.C. § 527(i), (0)(2001).
546. H.R. REP. 106-702, at 12 (2000), reporting on H.R. 4717. The bill reported by the Ways
and Means Committee would have required registration and disclosure of contributors by section
501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) organizations that engaged in political expenditures in addition to
section 527 organizations. The minority Democratic members of the committee complained that
inclusion of social welfare and labor organizations to the disclosure requirements was a "poison
pill" designed to kill the legislation. Id. at 40. The Democratic minority asserted that any
expansions beyond section 527 organizations should apply fairly to all entities-taxable and taxexempt. Id.
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'
The Committee
political activities [as] substantial and increasing."547
report refers to the requirements that section 501(c) organizations file
information returns with the Internal Revenue Service that are available to
the public and which disclose political expenditures. 48 Prior to the 2000
amendments, section 527 political organizations were required to file a tax
return only if political expenditures were made from net investment
income in excess of $100."' These returns were not public documents.55
The Committee on Ways and Means concluded that disclosure of political
activities and contributors by both section 527 organizations and section
501(c)(4) through section 501(c)(6) organizations that are engaged in
political activity was warranted.55 ' The Committee report states:

The Committee believes that enhancing the information
reported to the IRS with respect to section 527 organizations
and section 501(c)(4), section 501(c)(5), and section
501(c)(6) organizations would enable the IRS to better
monitor whether such organizations are complying with the
present-law rules requiring the organizations to pay tax on the
net investment income used to engage in political activities.
Furthermore, requiring additional reporting of activities that
appear to be political in nature would assist the IRS in its
efforts to ensure that organizations are not impermissibly
characterizing certain activities as educational, rather than
political.552
The Committee report also states that, given the tax benefits provided
to political organizations and organizations exempt from tax under section
501(c)(4), (c)(5) and (c)(6), "the public interest is served by greater public
disclosure of information relating to the political activities of such
organizations, including a detailed listing of expenditures for political
activities and the source of funds (i.e., contributions) used for this
purpose.""' The report further justifies disclosure with the statement that

547. Id. at 13.
548. Id. at 11; see also I.R.C. §§ 6033(a), 6104(d) (2001). The information return, Form 990,
must disclose the identity of persons who contributed $5,000 or more to the organization. Treas.

Reg. § 1.6033-2(a)(2)(ii)(f) (as amended in 1995). The Form 990 also requires reporting ofpolitical
campaign expenditures. See supra note 478.
549. H. REP. 106-702 at 11 (2000). See I.R.C. § 6012(a)(6) as in effect prior to amendment
by Pub. Law 106-230, effective after June 30, 2000. Tax-exempt organizations that make exempt
function expenditures and political organizations with investment income are required to file form
1120-POL to report taxable income. See I.R.C. § 527(b), (f), discussed supra note 495.
550. H. REP. 106-702, at 12.
551. Id. at 14.
552. Id. at 14-15.
553. Id. at 14.
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"[p]ublic disclosure of information enables the general public to provide
oversight of the political activities of these organizations." 5' 4
Notwithstanding the lofty aspirations expressed by the majority report
in the House Committee on Ways and Means, Public Law 106-230 only
requires disclosure by political organizations. 55 Section 527(i) ofthe Code
requires written and electronic notice to the Internal Revenue Service
within twenty-four hours after formation by any organization that intends
to be treated as a political organization under section 527.56 The
requirement applies to any organization that anticipates gross receipts of
$25,000 or more for any taxable year. 7 Registration requires
identification of the organization,5 8 a description of its purpose, 59
identification of the officers, directors and highly compensated
employees, 6 ' and identification of related organizations.5 6 ' The
registration forms are collected by the Internal Revenue Service which
makes them available for public inspection on the Internal Revenue
Service website 62 An organization that fails to file the required notice
becomes taxable on its exempt function income, which would include
political contributions. 63
Section 5270) of the Code requires reporting of expenditures and
contributions by a political organization that anticipates gross receipts of
$25,000 or more during a taxable year." Section 5270) applies to a
political organization that is not otherwise required to report political
expenditures and contributions under the FECA as a political committee

554.
555.
556.
557.
558.
559.

Id.
Id.
I.R.C. § 527(i) (2001).
Id. § 527(i)(5)(B).
Id. § 527(i)(3)(A).
Id. § 527(i)(2)(B).

560. Id. § 527(i)(3)(c) "Highly compensated employees" are defined as the five highest paid
employees who are likely to have compensation in excess of $50,000. Internal Revenue Service,
Form 8871, at 4 (2000).
561. I.R.C. § 527(i)(3)(D) (2001). "Related organization" is defined by reference to I.R.C.
section 168(h)(4) in part as related governmental entities, entities that have significant common
purposes or membership, or are directly or indirectly under substantial common direction or
control, and entities connected through 50% ownership of capital or profits. I.R.C. § 168(h)(4)
(2001).
562. I.R.C. § 6104(a)(3). Copies of the Form 8871, filed by political organizations to give
notice of exempt status under section 527, are available at http:/www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/
forms.html. Section 6104(a)(1)(A) also requires the Internal Revenue Service to provide for public
inspection at the national office documents submitted in an application for exempt status as a
political organization. I.R.C. § 6104(a)(1)(A) (2001).
563. I.R.C. § 527(i)(4) (2001).
564. See id. § 527(j)(5)(C).
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or State committee of a political party.565 A covered organization is
required to identify the recipient of political expenditures of $500 or more,
including the occupation and employer of individuals to whom payment
is made.566 The organization also is required to disclose the name and
address of contributors of $200 or more along with the occupation and
employer of individual contributors. 67 In an election year, reports are
required to be filed quarterly with an additional pre-election report due no
later than the twelfth day before an election in which the organization
makes a contribution or expenditure, and a post-election report due thirty
days after the general election. 56 In a non-election year, biannual reports
are due on July 31 for the period January 1 through June 30, and on
January 31 for the period between July 1 and December 31 of the
preceding year. 69 Alternatively, a political organization may file monthly
reports with pre-general election and post-general election reports for
November and December of any election year.57 These reports, filed on
Form 8872, are also available for public inspection on the Internal
Revenue Service website 7l
The disclosure requirements imposed on section 527 organizations
might lead political entrepreneurs to return to the section 501 (c)(4) social
welfare organizations and section 501(c)(3) charities as their conduits of
choice for political activity.
C. Summary Conclusions
The Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence regarding
political finance leaves us with two fairly clear propositions. First,
restrictions on campaign expenditures and contributions to campaign
activities restrain speech that is protected by the First Amendment.572

565. Id. § 527(j)(5)(A), (B). For definitions of political committees, see the text supra at note

68.
566. I.R.C. § 527(j)(3)(A) (2001).
567. Id. § 5270)(3)(B).
568. Id. § 527(j)(2)(A)(i). The quarterly reports are due by the fifteenth day after the last day
of the quarter, except that the year end report is due by the following January 31. Id.
§ 527(j)(2)(A)(i)(I). Pre-election reports submitted by registered or certified mail must be posted
by the fifteenth day preceding the election. Id. § 527(j)(2)(A)(i)(II). The post-election report must
be complete as of the twentieth day following a general election. Id. § 527(j)(2)(A)(i)(III).
"Elections" for these purposes include a general, special, primary or runoff election for federal
office, conventions or caucuses ofpolitical parties with authority to nominate candidates for federal
office, primary elections for the selection of delegates to a nominating convention, and primary
elections for nomination of individuals to the office of President. Id. § 5270)(6).
569. Id. § 527(j)(2)(A)(ii).
570. Id. § 527(j)(2)(B).
571. See supra note 562.
572. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1975).
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Limitations on campaign finance are thus subject to strict scrutiny." 3 The
Court is willing to find the necessary compelling governmental interest
only in efforts that "limit the actuality and appearance of corruption
resulting from large individual financial contributions."574 Second, while
Congress cannot act to restrict campaign contributions and expenditures,
except on a narrowly defined compelling state interest, Congress has broad
discretion to create or withhold tax subsidies for a range of activities that
include content-neutral choices regarding advocacy protected by the First
Amendment. 75 Indeed, as suggested by the Court in Cammaranov. United
States, 6 withholding a tax subsidy for the political activity of certain
organizations may "express a determination by Congress that since
purchased publicity can influence the fate of legislation which will affect,
directly or indirectly, all in the community, everyone in the community
should stand on the same footing as regards its purchase so far as the
' Cammarano thus accepts
-Treasury of the United States is concerned."577
the proposition, later rejected in Buckley, that there is a governmental
interest in maintaining an equal footing at the doorstep of democracy. It
may remain the case, however, that not only can Congress act to provide
or withhold subsidies, but a tax subsidy to particular political activity may
infringe on the First Amendment interests of others on a level playing
field.57 While Congress has the discretion to provide tax subsidies to some
interests over others,579 as a matter of good policy such distinctions might
be avoided.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Regan, federal tax subsidies to
political organizations take two forms.5 11 Congress has eliminated one
form of subsidy by enacting provisions to ensure that political activity is
funded with after-tax money by disallowing deductions for contributions
to political activity. However, the Code continues to provide the second
form of subsidy with tax exemption for the receipts of numerous
organizations that are engaged in political activity. Indeed, the application
of this subsidy through the labyrinth of the exempt organization rules of
sections 501(c) and 527 of the Code directs the organizational form and

573. Id. at 25.
574. Id. at 26.
575. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544-45 (1983).
576. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
577. Id. at 513.
578. Recognize, of course, that Buckley rejected the idea that leveling the playing field is a
sufficient governmental interest to support restrictions on campaign expenditure. Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 48-49. However, restricting the speech of one group in order to enhance the influence of another
is distinguishable from the validity of a governmental subsidy to one group of speakers over
another. See id.
579. Regan, 461 U.S. at 544-45.
580. Id. at 544.
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activities of the various entrepreneurs of political influence. Political
entrepreneurs have designed the activities of section 527 political
organizations to represent advocacy for the election or defeat of named
candidates without qualifying the advocacy as direct election expenditures
subject to the regulations and limitations of the FECA. Whether this form
of governmental subsidy comports with public policy in the campaign
finance area requires an examination of public policy as reflected in
existing restrictions on campaign finance activities under the FECA and
the application of that policy in connection with organizational structures
of tax-exempt entities.
III. THE USE AND ABUSE OF THE REGULATORY REGIME AND
SUBSIDIES OR THE FLOW OF TAX-SUBSIDIZED

MONEY INTO THE POLITICAL PROCESS

As the preceding discussion illustrates, there are numerous routes to the
purchase of political influence by individuals and organizations. Some are
limited by FECA, but the ways around the FECA limitations provide other
avenues for political expression by moneyed interests. Many are
subsidized with combinations of tax exemption and deduction. While
public policy against federal tax subsidy is expressed in legislation,
legislative history, and judicial opinions, tax-exempt entities, including
charitable organizations, are active players in the business of influencing
electoral choice. Coupled with the campaign regulatory regime hobbled by
" ' the tax subsidies encourage large institutional influence in the
Buckley,58
electoral process directed through tax-exempt business of marketing and
exercising political influence.582
The diversity of access for money into the political system through the
pathways of regulated and unregulated channels offers political
entrepreneurs the opportunity to structure political investment in a fashion
that is one step ahead of the regulators in the Federal Election Commission
and Internal Revenue Service. 583 Restraint imposed on one part of the

581. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1.
582. Hill, supra note 5, at 923 (describing the benefit of the tax exemption).
The absence of an entity-level tax is a fundamental benefit in making any type of
an exempt organization a more attractive conduit than other taxable entities or
individuals. If the essence of a pure conduit is that earmarked money simply flows
through it, then imposing a tax on the transfer from the contributor to the conduit
reduces the economic efficiency of the transaction. The tax becomes a cost of
doing political business.
Id.
583. See MALBIN & GAIS, supra note 1,at 101. They point out that "complexity makes it
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system simply directs political money into another route. This section
examines multiple opportunities for political influence in the context of a
hypothetical pair of individuals with a specific agenda." 4 Opportunities to
acquire political influence through campaign contributions fit within three
broad categories: direct campaign contributions subject to limitation and
disclosure, unlimited contributions to political parties that are also subject
to disclosure, and unlimited contributions through exempt organizations
that are free from disclosure. Professor Hill describes these categories as
hard money, soft money, and softer money. 5
Imagine A and B, two unrelated individuals, who are the major
shareholders of Environmental Safe Drilling, Inc., ("ESD"), which owns
geologic maps that detail a vast natural gas reserve underneath Yosemite
National Park. ESD believes that it can drill wells and install pipelines
without doing significant harm to the Yosemite environment, other than
disturbing a few bears, other creatures, and a plant or two. ESD requires
federal legislation for permission to invade the park and drill. Thus, ESD
needs to elect and maintain access to friendly members of Congress,
particularly from the regions of California that are adjacent to Yosemite
National Park. The relevant congressional districts have elected
California's two
representatives from both major political parties.

harder for observers to determine who is getting support from whom, let alone why." Id The
complexity makes enforcement more difficult and favors the use of tactics that favor the most
sophisticated and adaptable of groups. They add that,
No matter how well thought out the strategy, excessively ambitious goals will be
defeated by the First Amendment-and by human ingenuity. Organizations
affected by new laws will adapt and use constitutionally protected end runs to
pursue their own purposes, obeying the letter of the law but not
accepting-because they have no reason to accept--the reformers' goals as their
own.
Id.at 164.
584. The taxonomy ofcontributions used here in part is from Weine, supra note 82. He writes:
Until the 1970's, federal campaign money was raised in unlimited amounts, and
most funds ended up in the accounts of candidates.... Today, individuals can
inject money into electoral politics through at least nine outlets, some ofwhich are
also open to corporations and unions, and candidates can benefit from at least six
pipelines of political funds.
Id. at 10. Weine describes the six "pipelines" for political money as candidate committee money,
political party coordinated expenditures, political party independent expenditures, political party
soft money, non-party independent expenditures, and issue advocacy money. Id. at 12-18.
585. Hill, supranote 20, at 27.
586. Arguably, members from the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eleventh, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and
Twentieth Congressional Districts (before reapportionment in 2001), all of which have some
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Senators will be important to any proposed legislation. A, B and ESD are
also concerned with the re-election of key members of Congress from
outside of California who deal with both energy policy and national parks.
In addition, ESD would benefit from the election of a president who is
sympathetic to the development of new energy sources, and that
president's appointment of sympathetic heads of administrative agencies.
A's and B's goals require not only the election of sympathetic politicians,
but public education to both reduce opposition to ESD's planned drilling
activities and to convince individuals to vote for candidates who are
sympathetic to the drilling plans. A's, B's, and ESD's available resources
for the achievement of its political ends are unlimited given the potential
wealth for the company available from exploiting the Yosemite gas
reserve. In addition, ESD's unionized employees would benefit from the
creation of additional jobs in the development of the Yosemite gas field.
Thus, the Gasdrillers United Labor Union, which represents ESD's
employees and employees in other companies that may benefit from the
drilling operation, also has an interest in supporting sympathetic federal
candidates and incumbents. There are political risks associated with public
knowledge of A's and B's self-interested role in coordinating a major
political effort on behalf of particular candidates. Thus, funneling
contributions through multiple conduits has great political advantage to
A's and B's efforts. At the same time, it is important to A and B that their
political beneficiaries understand the source of A's and B's largesse.
A. Contributionsto Candidatesand Parties
1. Direct Contributions to Candidates
A and B's direct political activity is primarily limited by the annual
overall $25,000 contribution limit on direct political contributions." 7 If A
or B are married, their spouses, and children if any, may also make
contributions ofup to $25,000, subject to the provision that no person shall
make a contribution in the name of another person. 8
A and B may each contribute $1,000 for the primary and $1,000 for the
general election to candidates in each congressional, senatorial and
presidential race in which they are interested.589 In addition, A and B may
collect contributions from ESD employees, shareholders, officers,

relation to the Sierra Nevada mountain range, and which are in an economic sphere that would be
affected by the hypothetical energy development, would be interested in the ESD project. In the
107th Congress, those districts are represented by four Republicans and three Democrats.
587. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (2001).

588. Id. § 441f.
589. Id. § 441a(a)(l)(A).
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shareholders and employees of ESD's suppliers and customers, as well as
just plain friends of ESD's development plans, and present the bundle of
contributions to favored candidates.5 9 ' A's and B's solicitation of checks
and bundling of the contributions is not itself considered as a campaign
contribution. 1 Instead, the contributions are treated as coming from each
individual check writer. 592 Nonetheless, if A and B each manage to collect
$2,000 for a candidate from each of ten contributors, the candidate will
take appropriate notice of A and B's presentation of $20,000 to the
candidate's election effort. 3 While each of these contributions is subject
to disclosure by the political committee receiving the contribution,594 the
bundled contributions will not be identified as related to A and B, but
attributed to each individual contributor. 5 Thus, A's and B's broader
participation in the campaign is shielded.
Although ESD cannot itself contribute directly to candidates, 596 ESD
can establish a political action committee to solicit contributions from
shareholders, management personnel, and their families. 7 The political
action committees are separate segregated funds exempt from tax under
section 527 of the Code. 98 Individuals are permitted in each calendar year
to contribute $5,000 each to the ESD PAC. 9 The ESD PAC can in turn
contribute $5,000 to candidates for each election cycle, a total of $10,000
for the primary and general elections. 0°0 Gasdrillers United can also form
a PAC, solicit contributions of up to $5,000 from each of its members, and
contribute $5,000 in each election cycle to each candidate whose position
the Union believes is favorable to its interests.
The ban on corporate contributions does not prevent either ESD or
Gasdrillers United from indirectly aiding favored candidates in campaigns
for the House or Senate. Both organizations can communicate to their own

590. Id.
591. Id. § 431(8)(B(i). Personal services provided to a candidate are excluded from the
definition of "contribution." Id. As an alternative to actually bundling the contributions, A and B
could send a letter soliciting others to directly send contributions to the favored candidate. See
MALBIN & GAIS, supra note 1, at 87.
592. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8).
593. See Weine, supra note 82, at 12. A and B now have a list of willing contributors. In a
variation of the bundling theme, A and B may be called upon to respond in critical elections by
energizing this network to make contributions in support of their issues. See MALBIN & GAIS, supra
note 1, at 86.
594. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3) (2001).
595. Id.
596. Id. § 441b(a).
597. Id. § 441b(b)(4) (1997). Expenditures by ESD in forming and operating its PAC are not
treated as campaign contributions. Id. § 441b(b)(2).
598. I.R.C. § 527(f)(3) (2001).

599. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (2001).
600. Id. § 441a(a)(2)(A).
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shareholders, management personnel of ESD, or members of Gasdrillers,
on any topic, including express advocacy for the election of favored
candidates, including communication that is coordinated with the
candidate.6 ' Both ESD and Gasdrillers can arrange meetings for
shareholders and management, or members, with favored candidates." 2
ESD may offer to fly candidates in its company jet to the West Coast,
which of course presents an opportunity for A and B to have uninterrupted
conversations with favored candidates on the importance of their drilling
plans.60 3 At election time, ESD and Gasdrillers may undertake voter
registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns focused on shareholders,
executive personnel, members, and their families, which includes express
advocacy for favored candidates.6 ° The corporation and the union can also
engage in public oriented voter registration and get-out-the-vote
campaigns, but these must be undertaken on a non-partisan basis without
advocacy on behalf of a candidate.60 5
In combination, A and B along with ESD and the Union are able to
direct $24,000 to each favored candidate, along with the amount that A
and B are able to collect as bundled contributions to candidates. This is not
a large amount of money in the scheme of campaign finance, but perhaps
enough to permit A and B to bring the Yosemite gas drilling project to the
candidate's attention. But clearly more is required to achieve sufficient
access to the political process to move the issue forward.
2. Contributions to Political Parties for
Coordinated Campaign Expenditures
A and B are not limited to direct contributions to candidates. Again
subject to the $25,000 overall calendar year limitation, they each can
contribute $20,000 to political party campaign accounts, or the House and
Senate campaign committees that are coordinated with the parties'
candidates.60 6 ESD PAC and Gasdrillers United PAC can each contribute
601. 11 C.F.R. §§ 114.1(a)(2)(i), I14.3(a)(1) (2001).
602. Id. § I14.3(c)(2)(i).
603. Laura Brown Chisolm, Sinking the Think Tanks Upstream: The Use and Misuse of Tax
Exemption Law to Address the Use andMisuse of Tax-Exempt Organizationsby Politicians,51 U.
PiTT. L. REv. 577, 624 (1990); Thomas J. Schwarz et al., CorporatePoliticalActivity Providing
TransportationandRelatedTravel Expenses to Members ofCongress, 41 Bus. LAW 15, 16 (1985).
As an example, Greg Gordon and Kristin Gustafson report that Vice Presidential Candidate and
Senator Joe Lieberman had "flown on Pfizer Inc.'s corporatejet, spoken before the pharmaceutical
industry's trade association and accepted more than $161,000 in campaign donations from
prescription drug makers since 1993." Greg Gordon & Kristin Gustafson, Big Money is Drug
Lobby's Rxfor D.C. Challenges, SACRAMENTo BEE, Aug. 27, 2000, at A5.
604. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(B).

605. 11 C.F.R. § 114.4(d)(1) (2001).
606. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(B).
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$15,000 to these national party organizations." 7 The problem with these
contributions is that the contributors cannot direct the parties to expend the
contributions on specific candidates, although one can imagine that the
parties would take the interests of contributors into account in deciding on
how to spend these funds.6 8 Also note that there are expenditure
limitations on the national parties' use of these coordinated funds.60 9
3. Unlimited Contributions to Parties/"Soft Money"
Unlimited contributions for "party building" activities provide a
broader avenue for A, B, ESD, and Gasdrillers United to curry favor in the
political process. These contributions cannot be used for express advocacy
of the election of candidates. 10 The funds are available to the state and
local parties for distribution of slate cards, voter registration and get-outthe-vote drives. 61' More importantly, the parties use this soft money for
issue advocacy that mentions the names of candidates without using the
"magic words" of express advocacy.612 Thus, these contributions can be
used to fund advertisements that describe the favored candidates' views on
the importance of a sound energy policy based on environmentally sound
drilling practices employed in Yosemite National Park and the importance
of the issue to the political party, but without exhortation to vote for or
against a particular candidate. The national political parties are required to
allocate party building and issue advocacy expenditures among FECA
regulated funds devoted to the election of federal candidates and
unregulated money, which is a significant limitation on the use of party
building contributions. 613 These party building contributions are also
subject to reporting requirements that identify the contributor and the
expenditures. 6 4 Thus, A, B, ESD, and Gasdrillers run the risk of tooclosely identifying candidates and parties with their self-interested
campaign activities.
B. Independent CampaignActivities
Our hypothetical campaign to elect federal candidates who are friendly
to the Yosemite gas drilling project has encountered three impediments:
607. Id. § 441a(a)(2)(B).
608. WEINE, supra note 82, at 13. Contributions that are earmarked for a specific candidate
as are treated as contributions to the candidate. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8) (2001).
609. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d).
610. WEINE, supra note 82, at 16.
611. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(xii).
612. WEINE, supra note 82, at 16-17; F.E.C. Advisory Opinion 1995-25, Republican National
Committee (F.E.C. advisory opinions are available on the Web at http://www.fec.gov).
613. 11 C.F.R. § 106.5 (2001); see Hill, supra note 20, at 41-42.
614. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(2)(A), (C), (3) (2001).
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the FECA limitations on the amount of contributions, disclosure
requirements, and lack of direct control of funds contributed to parties.
Fear not. Wider opportunities for the purchase of political influence are
available outside of the FECA-regulated political environment."'
1. Independent Expenditures
A and B may each purchase advertising and otherwise individually
campaign for favored candidates, as long as their activities are not
coordinated with any candidate. 616 Their independent campaign
expenditures are not considered to be contributions to the candidates and
regulation of independent campaign advocacy is not permitted under
Buckley.617 Independent expenditures are subject to the FECA's disclosure
requirements, however. 18 Also, A and B must each act independently.
Collective activity would classify the effort as a "political committee"
subject to additional FECA regulation.619 Short ofexpressly advocating the
election or defeat of identified candidates, A and B may also undertake
unlimited campaigns to educate the public on the issues of gas drilling in
Yosemite, with discussion of the positions taken by individual
candidates. 2 While this campaign would be free from the restriction of
the FECA, there are more effective collective activities available to A and
B.
The ESD PAC and the Gasdrillers United PAC are also permitted to
make unlimited expenditures on express advocacy for the election or
defeat of candidates, but contributions to the PACs are limited to $5,000
from each contributor. 21 Thus, the PACs are limited to the expenditure of
"hard" money. The hard money aspect of this device, plus the availability

615. The experience of Los Angeles in the recent mayoral election is instructive. The City of
Los Angeles enacted a voluntary public finance of elections provision that would limit campaign
expenditures of recipients, and imposed contribution limitations. As a consequence, unrestricted
spending by political parties, individuals, and businesses increased from $323,203 in 1993 to more
than $2.5 million in the past election. Jeffrey L. Rabin, Spending in L.A. Elections Defied Limits:
Huge Amounts ofMoney PouredThrough Loopholesin Laws Intendedto RestrictCampaignCash,
L.A. TIMES, June 10, 2001, at Al, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/state/20010610/

t000048.
616. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976).
617. Id.; seealso Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S.

604, 614-18 (1996).
618. 2 U.S.C. § 434(c) (2001); 11 C.F.R. § 109.2 (2001); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 81.

619. WEINE, supra note 82, at 17; see also 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(a) (2001). Contributions to a
political committee are thereby limited to $5,000 from a single individual. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C)
(2001).
620. See supra,text accompanying notes 102-13.
621. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C).
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of less restrictive outlets for "issue advocacy" that accomplish the same
result, reduces the incentives for this approach.6 22
2. The Environmentally Sensitive Oil and Gas
Drillers Trade Association
ESD may form a trade association to promote the interests of
environmentally sound methods of drilling for gas in sensitive areas.623
ESD will solicit membership contributions to the association from all of
its suppliers and other interested parties. The association will be exempt
from tax under section 501(C)(6). 624 In addition, contributions to the
association will be deductible by its members, except to the extent that the
association incurs expenditures to lobby specific legislation or intervene
in a political campaign.6 2 Thus, the association's activities are funded with
before-tax money to the extent not limited by section 162(e). 626 The trade
association can qualify for tax exemption under section 501(c)(6) if its
primary activity is the passage of legislation favorable to the interests of
its members, 627 and is permitted to engage in political campaign activities
that support its legislative goals.628
The trade association may engage in a broad public education program
that serves the interests of its members by advising the public of the
general need for energy development and the environmentally sound
methodology of its members. The costs of this progran may stay on the
deductible side of section 163(e) of the Internal Revenue Code if the
education campaign is not conducted around pending or proposed
legislation and the organization refrains from asking people to contact
legislators regarding pending legislation.629 The education program must
also refrain from advocating for or against governmental action.630 On the

622. WEqNE, supra note 82, at 18. It has been argued that the $5,000 limit on contributions to
PAC's "is rendered meaningless when individuals contribute sums substantially in excess of that
amount in order to fund multi-million dollar advertising campaigns that attempt to influence the
outcome of specific electoral races." Glenn Moramarco, RegulatingElectioneering:Distinguishing
Between "Express Advocacy" & "Issue Advocacy," in CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM SERIES 10
(Brennan Center for Justice 1998).
623. For an example of the value of industry association lobbying, see Martin A. Sullivan,
Congress Quietly Slips Life Insurersa $645 Million Windfall, 89 TAX NOTES 842 (2000).
624. I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (2001).
625. Id. § 162(e) (2001); see also supra text accompanying notes 241-56.
626. See I.R.C. § 162(e).
627. Rev. Rul. 61-177, 1961-2 C.B. 117, 117.
628. See Gen. Coun. Mem. 34,233 (Dec. 30, 1969), 1969 IRS GCM LEXIS 12.
629. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(c)(4) (as amended in 1995); see also, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-114,
1978-1 C.B. 44 (holding that communications to members urging them to contact legislators on
pending legislation is not grassroots lobbying).
630. Consumers Power Co. v. United States, 427 F.2d 78, 80 (6th Cir. 1970).
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other hand, the education activities can include publication of papers and
speeches of elected officials or funding "town meetings" featuring elected
officials and others to discuss energy needs and drilling on
environmentally sensitive lands, without constituting contributions to
those officials or campaign expenditures under the FECA.631 Similarly,
under the methodology test of Revenue Procedure 86-43,632 the trade
association may construct an advocacy program for its drilling activities
that features the views of political figures without intervention in a
political campaign.633
Of course, the trade association may undertake a lobbying campaign in
support of legislation permitting its gas drilling in Yosemite, and may
undertake advocacy for candidates whose election would promote the
interests of its members, as long as campaign advocacy is not its primary
purpose. 634 The cost of more direct advocacy is the loss of business
expense deductions for contributions by the members to the extent of the
association's expenditures for political activities. 635 Thus, amounts
expended for the association's political activities are subject to one level
of tax, as income not offset by deductions to the members. In addition, the
trade association may form a separate segregated fund, exempt from tax
under section 527, to engage in independent election advocacy without
running afoul of the FECA limitation on corporate contributions.636 The
trade association can fund the administrative and operational costs of its
political action committee as long as the contributions from the trade
association are segregated into a "soft" money account that is dedicated to
operational expenses.637 Contributions to candidates and independent

631. See, e.g., F.E.C. Advisory Opinion 1980-25 (Apr. 20, 1980) (letterwritten byacandidate
expressing a position on issues that does not advocate election or defeat of a candidate is not
campaign advocacy that requires disclosure of funding source under 2 U.S.C. § 441d (1997));
F.E.C. Advisory Opinion 1980-22 (Apr. 15, 1980) (town meetings to discuss issues facing the steel
industry funded by a trade association are not contributions). These opinions are discussed in
Chisolm, supranote 603, at 607-08 (stating thatthe"F.E.C. has determined that, absent solicitation
of contributions or express advocacy of the election or defeat of any candidate, neither the
publication and distribution of a candidate's views on a public policy issue nor the republication
and sale of articles written previously by acandidate implicate 'contributions' or 'expenditures."').
Id.
632. Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729, 729.
633. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-07-021, 1998 PLR LEXIS 2073 (May 20, 1998).
634. Rev. Rul. 61-177,1961-2 C.B. 117; Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233 (Dec. 30, 1969), 1969 IRS
GCM LEXIS 1.
635. I.R.C. § 162(e)(3) (2001).
636. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), (b)(2) (2001).
637. See Private Letter Ruling 85-16-001, 1984 PRL LEXIS 44 (Oct. 22, 1984), holding that
a contribution made by a trade association to its PAC was earmarked for the PAC's "soft money"
account, (rather than for its general account) to be used for operating and administrative expenses
and thus was not subject 'othe tax provided by section 527 of Code as a "directly related exempt
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campaign expenditures must be funded with contributions from others
subject to the FECA's $5,000 limit on contributions to a PAC.3 8
3. The Institute for the Promotion of Governmental Action for
Environmentally Sound Energy Independence
A and B, with help from their friends and associates, can also invest in
the formation of an unincorporated 63 9 tax-exempt social welfare
organization. The organization will be formed for the purpose of bringing
about energy independence through environmentally sound drilling
practices. A and B can fund this organization with unlimited contributions
that are not subject to disclosure, and with contributions solicited from
friends, business associates, employees, etc. The organization may
maintain its tax exemption under section 501(c)(4) even if its primary
purpose is promoting legislation." 0 Because contributions to this
organization are not deductible, its contributions will come from income
taxed to the contributors when earned and thus its expenditures are funded
with money that has been subject to one level of tax. Individual
contributions may be limited to $10,000 per person by the potential for gift
tax liability on contributions in excess of that amount."4
The Institute's program can include grassroots lobbying and education
programs that prominently feature the positions of favored elected
legislators and potential candidates. Under the Internal Revenue Service's
published and private rulings, an educational program that satisfies the
methodology test of Revenue Procedure 86-43642 might not be classified
as the exempt function activity of a political organization for purposes of
section 527 of the Code if the institute's materials present both sides of the
issue. In fact, the Institute may assist A's and B's overall political
aspirations by presenting the views of candidates and elected officials who
disagree with the institute's positions, especially if the presentation casts
these individuals in a negative light. While disparaging advocacy may
convert the education program into campaigning that becomes "exempt
function income" under section 527 of the Code, 64' undoubtedly the

function" expenditure.
638. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (2001).
639. Incorporation may subject the institute to the limitation of 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2001 on
corporate contributions. Alternatively, if incorporated, the institute may be funded only with
contributions from individuals, which is workable because corporate contributions to the overall
effort may be focused through the trade association described in the preceding section. See Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
640. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(ii), 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1990).
641. I.R.C. §§ 2501(a), 2503(b) (2001).
642. Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729.
643. The consequence is the imposition of tax at the highest corporate rates on the Institute's
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institute can retain sufficiently skilled writers to craft its position in
language that more appropriately educates the public towards the "correct
point of view." The Institute's education program, in which the views of
named proponents are discussed, will be most useful, and least vulnerable
to treatment as intervention in a campaign, if it is undertaken during the
period preceding the congressional election. 6 " In addition, the Institute
must take care to establish that its overall purpose is education on its
important issue, rather than electing particular candidates.
The Institute's more direct campaign advocacy that is aimed at electing
candidates can be channeled through a separate segregated fund that is tax
exempt under section 527 of the Code." The political fund's advocacy
may be limited to issue advocacy-advocacy for a clearly identified
candidate that does not expressly urge any person to vote for or against an
individual or make contributions to a candidate-so as not to constitute the
organization as a political committee under the FECA." 6 The fund will be
required to register with the Internal Revenue Service as a political
organization and provide a list of its contributors and expenditures.647
Private Letter Rulings 96-52-026, 98-08-037, and 1999-25-051 " provide
a roadmap ofthe activities that the segregated fund might pursue. First, the
fund should substantiate the political impact of its activities by consulting
experts, collecting data from opinion polls, focus groups, and similar kinds
of research, which is brought together in planning sessions to develop
effective partisan methodologies." 9 The Institute can prepare and circulate
voter guides that compare candidate's views on the institute's positions on
energy independence through environmentally sound drilling practices.65 °
Information on incumbents' voting records on the issue may be targeted
to the public, or selected members of the public, around the time of critical
elections.Y The message may call for legislative action and by implication
raise public awareness as to the identity of candidates and incumbents who
are likely to support the appropriate positions. 6 2 All of this is done without
expressly advocating the election or defeat of named candidates. Although
the primary purpose of the parent social welfare organization is to promote
its energy independence program and not elect candidates, one can
exempt function expenditures, but only to the extent of the Institute's investment income. I.R.C.

§ 527(0 (2001).
644. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1990-07-021 (May 20, 1998), 1998 PLR LEXIS 2073.
645. I.R.C. § 527(f)(3)(2001).
646. Id. § 527(e)(1).
647. Id. § 527(i), (j) (2001).
648. See supra text accompanying notes 499-544.
649. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-25-051 (Mar. 29, 1999), 1999 PRL LEXIS 500, at *4-6.
650. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996), 1996 PRL LEXIS 1885, at *26.
651. Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178.
652. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-25-051, 1999 PRL LEXIS 500, at *17-18.
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imagine that careful professional political entrepreneurs can effectively
coordinate the timing and content ofthe educational activities of the social
welfare organization with the candidate-oriented issue advocacy of the
section 527 organization.
4. The Environmentally Sound Energy Independence
Educational Foundation
Education is the principal activity of the tax-exempt educational
organization created by A and B for the purpose of enlightening the public
on the national need for natural gas recovered through environmentally
sound drilling techniques, wherever applied. As an exempt organization
under section 501 (c)(3) of the Code, the Foundation will neither advocate
legislation (or at least no substantial part of its resources will be so used)
nor intervene in a political campaign. Nonetheless, the Foundation's
educational activities might be concentrated on the most significant
recipients of its information: potential voters in key districts. Also, as long
as it presents information using methodologies that incorporate assertions
based on facts, avoids distortions and inflammatory language, and aims its
information to the development of an understanding of the issues, the
education program can be aimed towards the Foundation's particular
position on its issues. The Foundation may present educational programs
and debates featuring incumbent politicians. 54 Indeed, close sponsorship
relationships with politicians will help the Foundation achieve its
educational goals with maximum impact."' The Foundation might also
undertake "nonpartisan" get-out-the-vote and voter registration drives in
selected districts.65 6 The Foundation might also direct some of its funds to
the Institute for the Promotion of Governmental Action for
Environmentally Sound Energy Independence to be used in the Institute's
educational activities.6" 7 All of these educational activities can be focused
on the years leading up to elections in order to shield the Foundation from
claims that it is intervening in political campaigns, leaving the more direct
activity to other parts of the structure. The advantage of the Foundation to
A and B and their friends is the tax deductibility of contributions, thereby
funding the Foundation's activities with before-tax funds.658

653. Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729.
654. Id. at § 3.
655. Chisolm, supra note 603, at 608-09.
656. See the description of the activities of Vote Now 96 in Robert Paul Meier, The Darker
Side ofNonprofits: When Charities andSocial Welfare GroupsBecome PoliticalSlush Funds, 147
U. PA. L. REV. 971, 976-78 (1999).
657. See Hill, supra note 20, at 30.
658. For examples of the use of charitable organizations by the major political parties, see
Meier, supra note 656.
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A and B will of course serve in significant decisionmaking roles in all
of these activities. Savvy incumbents and potential candidates will be
aware of the combined political influence of the collective enterprise and
its potential benefits to their electoral success. The combination is likely
to serve A and B well, at least in terms of direct access to the players in the
political process.
As a corollary to A and B creating an educational foundation,
incumbent legislators and potential candidates each may create an exempt
charitable organization to promote a cause with which the candidate is
closely associated.659 As an example, a congressional member may create
a foundation for environmentally sound energy independence.
Alternatively, the member may promote the creation of a think tank
devoted to positions on a wide variety of issues that are consistent with the
member's political philosophy. The member may thereafter travel around
the country to participate
in seminars and lectures on the need for energy
610
independence. In addition, the foundation would broadly distribute the
Congress member's views on the subject. To ensure that these
organizations are appropriately oriented, they are operated by the
legislator's current and former staff members. For the member who walks
too close the line of campaign and legislative regulation, the creation of a
legal defense fund provides an additional vehicle for donors to curry favor
outside of the FECA regulatory scheme.66'
IV. A DIFFERENT TAX REGIME: DowN WITH
SUBSIDIES IF You FIND THEM

The campaign finance regulatory scheme and federal income taxation
are inextricably linked with multiple pathways under section 501 of the
Code to direct money into the political arena in forms that avoid the
restrictions on campaign finance of the Federal Elections and Campaign
Act. The question for this section is whether this system creates tax
subsidies for political activity that are contrary to the public policy
reflected in the FECA, or broader notions of public policy in general. If
undesirable tax subsidies are believed to exist, then the final question is

659. This device is extensively discussed in Chisolm, supranote 603. See also Lee Sheppard,
Does Gingrich'sAdmission Mean He Owes Taxes, 74 TAXNOTES 9,9 (1997); Carolyn D. Wright,
DidIRSDo Its Job in ProgressandFreedomFoundationAudit, 86 TAXNOTES 1678, 1678 (2000)
(describing the method by which a tax-exempt charitable organization assisted Newt Gingrich's
"education" program).
660. Charitable organizations reportedly have been used to pay travel, housing and throw a
party for the benefit of California Governor Grey Davis. Dan Morain, Firms Seeking State Favor
FinanceDavis Foundations,L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000, at Al.
661. Kathleen Clark, Payingthe Pricefor HeightenedEthicsScrutiny: Legal Defense Funds
and Other Ways that Government Officials Pay Their Lawyers, 50 STAN. L. REv. 65, 69 (1997).
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whether there are workable revisions to the tax-exempt organization
regime that are worthy of consideration.
A- Are There Tax Subsidiesfor PoliticalExpenditures?
As discussed in Part II, the Court in Regan v. Taxation with
66 2 identified two potential subsidies to political activity;
Representation
exemption from tax, which is equivalent to a cash grant in the amount the
organization would otherwise pay on its income, and a tax deduction for
contributions to the organization, which is the equivalent of a cash grant
of a portion of the contributor's contributions.663 The subsidy is evident in
the case of a charitable organization that is exempt from tax under section
501(c)(3). The donor claims a deduction for contributions," thereby
providing untaxed dollars to the organization, which also is exempt from
tax on its income. Thus, to the extent that the charitable organization is
engaged in political activity, the funding comes from money that is-not
subject to taxation at any level. As a participant in the political process, the
tax-exempt charity is thereby allowed to purchase its political influence
with funds derived at a lower cost than a competing participant who is
allowed the use of only money that is derived after tax."' This is the form
of subsidy condemned by the Supreme Court in Cammarano v. United
States666 when it upheld Treasury Regulations denying a deduction for
grassroots lobbying expenditures.667
The same level of subsidy exists to the extent that a business entity is
permitted a deduction for contributions and payments to a tax-exempt
trade association or social welfare organization that is able to undertake
education-oriented political activity not classified as lobbying or
intervention in apolitical campaign. Again the political activity is financed
with money that is not subject to tax.
Identifying a subsidy is more difficult with respect to political activity
by a trade association that receives contributions that are not deductible
under section 162(e), or by a social welfare organization that does not
receive deductible contributions. Here the political activity is funded with
money that has been subject to at least one level of income tax: the tax
imposed on income earned by the contributor and transferred to the entity.
The political expenditures in this category are perhaps on the same footing
662. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
663. Id. at 544.
664. I.R.C. § 170(a) (2001).
665. See Hill, supra note 5, at 923. "The absence of an entity-level tax is a fundamental benefit
in making any type of an exempt organization a more attractive conduit than other taxable entities
or individuals." Id.
666. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
667. Id. at 505.
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as an individual's independent political expenditure, the cost of the
expenditure is measured in terms of before-tax earnings less tax payable.66
A subsidy is present only if a political organization is viewed as a
separate taxable entity that receives income subject to tax that is not offset
or eliminated by deductions for its political expenditures. Political
organizations in the form of a social welfare organization, trade
organization, or section 527 political organization, are associations of likeminded individuals and business enterprises who fund the activity with a
view to producing the benefit of a political result. The entity status of the
organization enhances the benefit to individual members. The Supreme
Court has recognized in the context of its First Amendment jurisprudence
that individuals contribute their money in order to enable others to speak
for them in the political arena because the collective effort enhances their
individual influence.669 In the hypothetical cases described in the preceding
section, the political result is favorable to the contributors' perceived
economic interests. On the other side of the issue, there are strong
environmental groups to which individuals contribute for more altruistic
reasons.67 In either case, the organizations produce a "benefit" to the
contributor in the form of collective political influence. Although these
enterprises do not operate with a profit motive in a dollar sense, the court
recognized in Madison Gas & Electric Co. v. Commissioner,67 ' that an
entity formed for the joint production of a product, albeit a tangible
product, and its division in-kind, may be viewed as an activity engaged in
for joint-profit.672 Similarly, an entity formed for the development of

668. This is the equivalent of the expenditure multiplied by 1/(1-the tax rate). Thus, a $100
expenditure by an individual in a 36% tax bracket require $156.25 of before-tax earnings.

669. The Court states in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), that "[ejffective
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably
enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the
close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly." See also Bradley A. Smith, Money

Talks: Speech, Corruption,Equality and CampaignFinance,86 GEO. L.J. 45, 57 (1997).
670. See David A. Strauss, Corruption,Equality, andCampaignFinanceReform, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1369, 1378 (1994),
Compare... civil rights groups and, say, the lobby for agricultural subsidies....
One side's chief examples of narrow and self-interested groups will be the other
side's examples of groups that pursue the public interest. If campaign finance
reform is intended to restrict the power of supposedly narrow and pernicious
interest groups, while not disadvantaging supposedly public-interested interest
groups, then reform necessarily takes on an extremely partisan cast.
Id. This highlights the importance of removing the government entirely from the business of
providing subsidies to particular groups.
671. 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980).
672. Id. at 513.
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political influence for the benefit of its contributors may be viewed as a
venture formed for producing a product in-kind for the mutual profit of its
benefactors.673 Contributions to a political entity do not produce a property
interest in the entity in the sense of a shareholder's interest received in
exchange for a capital contribution or a partner's interest in a partnership,
but rather the benefit of collective political influence for the benefit of
contributors. Rather than capital investments, the contributions represent
payment for the services, rendered by the entity in its attempts to mould
public opinion.
Although the Internal Revenue Service historically has treated
campaign contributions as not constituting income under section 61 of the
Code, the Service as never made a case for the exemption.674 Contributions
are not gifts under the most commonly accepted definition of non-taxable
gifts-payments motivated by disinterested generosity without any
expectation of a quid-pro-quo.675 In contrast, contributors to political
organizations do so with an expectation that the organization will pursue
the contributors' political interests.676 A contributor's expectation that the
organization will use funds in a specified fashion may mean that the
organization receives the funds as a conduit subject to a "trust" that limits
the organization's receipt of income that it can direct to its own purposes.
As a consequence, the contributions are not includable in the
organization's gross income." However, in most cases political
organizations are not restricted by their contributors in the use of the
contributions as long as the contributor is convinced that the organization
is providing the expected political benefit.678 The political organization
generally is not required to spend its funds entirely for specified purposes,
other than accomplishment of the organization's broad goals.679 The
absence of shareholders or others with a financial stake in a tax-exempt
673. See Technical Advice Memorandum 9130008 (9/14/1978), holding that an
unincorporated organization formed to promote passage of a municipal referendum, which is not
a political organization because it did not support candidates for election, was an association
taxable as a corporation that had associates and an objective to carry on activities in furtherance of
the purpose for which it was formed.
674. See supra text accompanying notes 207-21.
675. Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
676. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-146, 1975-1 C.B. 23,25; Rev. Rul. 76-276, 1976-2 C.B. 14, 14.
677. See Ford Dealers Adver. Fund v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 761,771 (1971), aff'dpercuriam,456
F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1972); Dri-Powr Distribs. Ass'n Trust v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 460, 477 (1970);
Angelus Funeral Home v. Comm'r, 47 T.C. 391, 397 (1967), aff'd 407 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1969).
678. In the context of the FECA prohibition on corporate contributions to candidates, the
contributor's ability to withdraw from a voluntary organization was recognized as the contributor's
recourse if the contributor is dissatisfied with the work of the organization. Fed. Election Comm'n
v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 260-61 (1986); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com.,
494 U.S. 652, 663 (1990).
679. 479 U.S. at 260-61.
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organization means that contributions to the organization are received
subject to the dominion and control of the entity without any obligation to
return capital to contributors on a liquidation and without obligation to
share in financial reward. In fact, contributions are received from persons
who desire to implement the results promised by the organization, the
furtherance of the organization's exempt purpose. Where the intent of the
contributor is to maximize political influence through association with
other like-minded contributors, the collective influence exercised with the
benefit of a separate identifiable entity facilitates the organization's
creation of political benefit, its product, to the contributors. The
organization thereby receives compensation for its services that could be
recognized as gross income.
If a political organization is required to include contributions in gross
income, tax exemption does not provide a subsidy if the organization
expends its receipts in a tax-deductible fashion that eliminates taxable
income. The political organization's expenses for its education program,
lobbying expenses, and political contributions may be viewed as the
deductible, ordinary and necessary expenses of its business of producing
political influence.
There are a couple of major limitations on the deductibility of these
expenses, however. First, as discussed above,68 section 162(e) bars
deductions for expenditures incurred to influence legislation and
elections.68 ' The provision has been interpreted to include expenditures
incurred to influence the public on issues of legislative interest such as
expenditures that are part of aprogram to achieve a legislative result.682 On
the other hand, section 162(e)(5)(A) allows deductions to organizations
that are in the trade or business of incurring political expenditures "directly
' This provision is intended to prevent a
on behalf of another person."683
"cascading" of the limitation on deductions so that loss of the deduction
only applies at one level. 6" Legislative history clarifies that the limitation
only applies to a direct, one-on-one relationship between the lobbying

680. See supratext accompanying note 241.
681. I.R.C. § 162(e)(1)(A), (B) (2001).
682. See Consumers Power Co. v. United States, 427 F.2d 78,79-80 (6th Cir. 1970); Rev. Rul.
74-407, 1974-2 C.B. 45,45; Rev. Rul. 78-111, 1978-1 C.B. 41,41-42. In Gearyv. Commissioner,
235 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2000), the court disallowed deductions for the expense of gathering
signatures for a successful initiative campaign by a San Francisco police officer to qualify a ballot
measure permitting the officer to continue patrolling with a puppet named Officer O'Smarty. Id.
at 1210-11. The taxpayer claimed that the puppet helped to improve community relations while he
was on patrol and that his expenditures for the initiative campaign were ordinary and necessary
business expenditures in the form of advertising to educate the public about the puppet issue. Id.
at 1210.

683. I.R.C. § 162(e)(5)(A) (2001).
684. H.R. REP. 103-213 pt. 4, at 610 (1993).
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business and a client, and that the provision is not applicable to a
membership organization that serves the interests of all of its members
rather than one particular member, 85 Thus, the political expenditures of a
political organization, as well as contributions to the organization, are not
deductible.
Beyond section 162(e), current deduction of the political expenditures
of a political organization also should be limited by the capitalization
requirement.6' In general, expenditures that create a benefit that extends
beyond the current taxable year must be capitalized rather than currently
deducted.687 The general education program of social welfare organizations
and trade associations that are engaged in building political influence may
be characterized as creating benefits that extend over the life span of
favored legislation or the political careers of favored politicians. On the
other hand, treasury regulations explicitly provide for the current
deduction for goodwill advertising that keeps the taxpayer's name before
the public.688 The regulation requires that the expenditures be related to
"the patronage the taxpayer might reasonably expect in the future."68' 9 The
regulation adds that deductible expenditures may include expenditures for
advertising "which presents views on economic, financial, or social, or
other subjects of a general nature."6 9 However, this language appears to
encompass the requirement that the expenditure be related to expected
patronage. Thus, in ClevelandElectricIlluminatingCo. v. UnitedStates,691
advertising expenditures incurred to reduce public opposition to granting
a license to operate a nuclear power plant were required to be
capitalized. 692 The expenditure was not related to seeking patronage for the
taxpayer, but was incurred for the purpose of influencing the public in the
permit process. 693 Revenue Ruling 92-80, which holds that advertising
expenses are generally deductible even though the expense may create a
future benefit, adds that capitalization is required in the "unusual
circumstance where advertising is directed towards obtaining future
benefits significantly beyond those traditionally associated with ordinary
product advertising or with institutional or goodwill advertising. 694 In the
context of the educational program of a political organization, the
expenditures are incurred for the purpose of influencing political views
685.
686.
687.
688.
689.
690.
691.
692.
693.
694.

Id.
I.R.C. § 163 (2001).
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 87 (1992).
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(a)(2) (as amended in 1995).
Id.
Id.
7 CI. Ct. 220 (1985).
Id. at 233.
Id. at 232.
Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57, 57.
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and are not directed towards the identification of a particular taxpayer's
business. The generalized benefit from political persuasion, once created,
has an indefinite, or at least immeasurable, lifetime. For tax purposes the
consequence should be the denial of current deductions and the absence of
capital recovery deductions that are available for capitalized expenses with
definite and limited useful lives.
The presence or absence of taxable income in a political organization
raises difficult technical questions. Most political advocacy organizations
avoid the possibility of income taxation by virtue of exemption under
section 501. The tax exemption permits the creation of a political
organization to take advantage ofthe collective benefit ofpooled resources
for the creation of political influence free of concern over the
organization's potential liability for tax on its activities. Thus, even if one
were to question the presence of the subsidy described in Regan,69 tax
,exemption remains as an important governmentally provided benefit to
many political advocacy organizations.
Tax exemption is justified when the purpose for which an entity is
organized and operated advances public policy. Public policy here must,
in a pluralist sense, recognize the value ofencouraging diverse approaches
and viewpoints on controversial social and political issues. On the other
hand, unrestricted payments received by the organization to advance a
political agenda should not necessarily enjoy exemption from tax where
the tax subsidy contradicts governmental policy. Avoidance of
governmental subsidy to advocates in the election process on a content
neutral, nonpartisan basis may be viewed as a governmental policy that
suggests the elimination of exemptions from tax.
B. Tax Benefits andPolicy
This author once wrote,
[e]xpenditure of governmental resources in terms of foregone
revenue should be limited to items which reduce or mitigate
governmental costs. Thus tax expenditures might be limited
to activities that benefit the common good, as opposed to
enhancing return on private investment, in those areas that are
unable to independently attract capital because of the absence
of profit potential.696

695. Regan, 461 U.S. at 544-45.
696. Daniel L. Simmons, The Tax Reform Act of1986: An Overview, 1987 BYU L. REV. 151,
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The deduction for charitable contributions and the accompanying tax
exemption for charitable organizations have been justified in similar
terms.69 7 The contribution and exemption relieve the government of
burdens that are assumed by charitable organizations. This tax benefit,
born out of public policy, should not be available to organizations that
operate in a manner that defeats governmental policy.6 98 Thus, the courts
have recognized a range of congressional latitude in granting or denying
tax subsidies to particular activities.
The Court in Cammaranov. United States6 9"9 expressed an important
policy goal in terms of governmental participation in campaign finance
when it recognized that a tax benefit to one party in a political contest
because of that party's ability to fund election advocacy with tax-free
money provides an unfair advantage in terms of competing interests in the
political process that are not so favored.7"' Indeed, there is a suggestion in

697. Daniel Shaviro, Assessing the "Contract Failure" Explanation for Nonprofit
Organizationsand Their Tax-Exempt Status, 41 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 1001, 1007 (1997).
I believe that fundamentally the case for tax exemption, as well as other special
tax and non-tax benefits for nonprofit organizations, must rest squarely, and more
or less exclusively, on the view that the activities these organizations engage in
merit public support.... First the organizations are providing public goods or
engaging in activities that have positive externalities. And second, in areas where
the organizations are active, decentralized private provision is either preferable-at
least in part-to direct government provision, or necessary in practice to
compensate for government's failure to do all that it should.
Id.; see alsoChristian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 853-54 (10th Cir.
1972).
The exemption to corporations organized and operated exclusively for charitable,
religious, educational or other purposes carried on for charity is granted because
of the benefit the public obtains from their activities and is based on the theory
that: ".... the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief
from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations
from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general
welfare."
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 18-60 at 19 (1939). There are, of course, multiple alternative theoretical
justifications for the tax exemption to charities. For a discussion of various theories, see Nina J.
Crimm, An Explanationof the FederalIncome Tax Exemptionfor CharitableOrganizations:A
Theory of Risk Compensation,50 FLA. L. REv. 419 (1998).
698. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602, 605 (1983), which denied a
free-exercise challenge to revocation of 501(c)(3) status to a religious organization on the grounds
of its racial discrimination. Exemption as a charitable organization violated a public policy against
racial discrimination. Id. at 605.
699. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
700. Id. at 513.
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Cammarano that the advantage of tax subsidy to one side, of a political
issue may suffer some constitutional infirmity under the First
Amendment.01 Congress adopted a similar posture with its enactment of
limitations on deduction of lobbying and political campaign expenses as
a trade or business expense. 0 2 Congress also provided benefits to
campaign finance in the form of tax exemption for political organizations
that collect contributions for expenditure on the election of individuals to
political office.70 3 Possibly that legislation is limited to election campaigns
because organizations formed for the purpose of influencing legislation,
including organizations that participate in grassroots initiative campaigns,
are exempt from tax as social welfare organizations or trade
associations.70 4 In any event, creation of the section 527 political
organization reflects a congressional attempt to channel campaign activity
into a single entity.
A second set of important congressional policy goals is reflected in the
campaign limitations of the FECA. Under the justification allowed to
Congress by the Supreme Court in Buckley, Congress limited campaign
contributions and expenditures to avoid corruption of elected officials. In
so doing Congress has attempted, albeit in a very limited fashion, to
regulate the flow of campaign finance.
Numerous political entities that advocate political causes operate
outside of the reporting and limitations regime of the FECA. Commonly
the tax-exempt political organization operates under the guise of providing
an education program that furthers the political interest of a candidate or
candidates. To the extent that these organizations operate with tax-favored
money, the United States Treasury is a partner in their political advocacy.
To the extent that these organizations operate outside ofthe purview of the
FECA's limitations and disclosure requirements, the federal subsidy
proceeds on a course contrary to congressional policy in campaign finance
regulation.
The obvious recommendation that follows from all of this is to
harmonize federal tax exemption policy with the policy of campaign
finance regulation. That means that the subsidy of tax exemption, and tax
deduction in the case of charitable organizations should be restricted to
campaign finance activity that is consistent with the limitations of the
FECA. In other words, the income tax benefits should be limited to FECA
regulated campaign activity.70 5 To the extent that a political organization

701. See id.at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring).
702. I.RC. § 162(e) (2001); see also supra text accompanying note 241.
703. I.R.C. § 527 (2001); see alsosupratext accompanying note 480.

704. I.R.C. § 501(c) (2001).
705. See Lieberman, supranote 295, at 8.
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broadens its advocacy beyond the FECA defined political contributions
and expenditures, the organization undertaking the activity should not be
eligible for tax exemption under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code. The technical problems of accomplishing that result are difficult, but
perhaps not insurmountable." 6
C. Optionsfor Tax Revision
1. Distinguish Campaigning From Education for
Social and Economic Change
The principal hurdle to limiting federal tax subsidies in the public arena
is in drawing the line between the educational activities of tax-exempt
organizations and political campaigning that is not subject to tax benefits.
The Internal Revenue Service's line drawing has to date left open a superhighway for tax-exempt campaign activity by charities and non-charities
alike. One improvement will lie in identifying permissible issue
advocacy/education in terms that are consistent both for purposes of tax
exemption and the FECA. The education program of tax-exempt
organizations clearly is the favored pathway to political advocacy.
Consistent definition of campaign communication for purposes of the
FECA disclosure and limitation rules and for purposes of identifying
intervention in political campaigns for purposes of tax exemption under
section 501(c) would promote the goals of both legislative schemes.
There potentially are three somewhat different approaches available
under the authorities for distinguishing campaign advocacy from issuerelated education. One possibility is to define election advocacy in terms
similar to those used in the definition of influencing legislation found in
section 4911 (d)(1)(A) of the Code. Under this approach, intervention in a
campaign would include (a) any attempt to influence the election of any
candidate for elected political office through an attempt to affect the
opinions of likely voters for the office. Section 4911 (d)(2)(A) contains an
important exception to the definition which excludes the communication

These provisions [referring to I.R.C. § 527] reflect Congress's judgment that
although taxpayers should subsidize the activities of groups working in the public
interest by granting them favored tax status, that subsidy should not extend to
organizations that focus primarily on political campaign work, unless those
organizations are willing to comply with the regulation of the election laws.
Id.
706. Whether there is the political will to limit federal subsidies to campaign organizations is
a separate issue beyond the scope of this Article. See Marshall, The Last Best Chancefor Campaign
FinanceReform, 94 NW. L. REV. 335, 339 et. seq. (2000); GOIDEL, supra note 10, at 169.
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of "nonpartisan analysis, study, or research. ' 70 7 This standard is somewhat
similar to the Internal Revenue Service standards in Revenue Ruling 78248,78 Revenue Ruling 80-282,709 and the ruling position reflected in
Revenue Procedure 86-43.710 But placing the definition in the statutory
requirements for tax-exempt status under section 501 could enhance
enforcement.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in FederalElection Commission
v. FurgatchT" suggested a subjective approach that would treat a
communication as express advocacy for a candidate if the communication
"when read as a whole, and with limited reference to external events, [is]
susceptible of no other reasonable interpretation but as an exhortation to
vote for or against a specific candidate. '1 Under the Furgatchstandard,
communications would represent express advocacy if the message is
unmistakable and unambiguous, it presents a clear plea for action, and it
is clear that the contemplated action is a vote for or against a candidate.
This standard is based on factual judgment as to what is unambiguous
advocacy for a particular candidate and may, therefore, face difficulty
under the Supreme Court's limited tolerance for vagueness as expressed
in Buckley. TM On the other hand, the standard is easier to avoid than the
existing standards under the Internal Revenue Service's ruling position
because of the requirement for unambiguous election advocacy. The
political methodologies of contemporary exempt-organizations
undoubtedly are more subtle than the speech contemplated in the Furgatch
approach.
A more objective definition of election advocacy is suggested by the
McCain-Finegold legislation. 7"5 The bill would define an independent
electioneering communication subject to disclosure under FECA as
including a communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for
federal office, is made sixty days before a general, special or runoff
707. I.R.C. § 4911(d)(2)(A) (2001).
708. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154.
709. Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178.
710. Rev. Proc. 86-43,1986-2 C.B. 729. Seesupratextaccompanyingnotes 397-404; see also
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-09-007 (Dec. 6, 1995), 1995 PRL Lexis 2000; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-36-002 (May 24,
1989), 1989 PRL LEXIS 1814.
711. 807 F.2d 857 (1986).
712. Id. at 864.
713. Id A similar concept was proposed in the Shays-Meehan Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 1998, H.R. 3526, 105th Cong. § 201(b) (1998), which would have defined express advocacy
in part as expressing unmistakable and unambiguous support for or opposition to one or more

clearly identified candidates when taken as a whole and with limited reference to external events,
such as proximity to an election.
714. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975).
715. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 2001 (adding 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)) (as passed by the Senate on Apr.

2, 2001).
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election, or thirty days before a primary election, and is made to an
audience that includes voters for the election.716
The first ofthese approaches focuses somewhat on the subjective intent
of an "attempt" to influence voters. The Furgatchstandard would treat a
communication as campaign advocacy if its unmistakable intent and/or
impact is to influence voters.717 The McCain-Feingold standard would
identify campaign participation by exempt organizations at the end of the
election cycle by categorizing all references to a candidate for election
within the time-frame of the electoral campaign as campaign advocacy.71
The McCain-Feingold definition, while valuable, would only limit election
activity of tax-exempt organizations in the periods immediately preceding
an election. Other uses of tax-exempt think tanks and other educational
organizations to further a politician's longevity in office would continue.
However, in combination, these definitions of campaign activity would
encompass a significant portion of the sphere of disguised election
advocacy. The combination would (1) treat as campaign advocacy all
attempts to influence the voter for or against an identified candidate, (2)
provide a device to recognize unmistakable campaign advocacy, and (3)
recognize as campaign advocacy all intervention by tax-exempt
organizations in the electoral process on the eve of an election.
Recognizing political advocacy disguised as education as campaign speech
and encompassing that activity within the tax-exempt organization would
permit policy-makers to determine which activity is appropriate for tax
benefited organizations.
There is an overbreadth problem in the proposed definition which
would sweep within the last part bona fide news reporting of a tax-exempt
organization that publishes news periodicals.719 The proposed McCain-

716. Id. The definition only applies to broadcast, cable, or satellite communications,
apparently not intending to include newspaper or other written communication. In case the
definition of electioneering communication proposed in the McCain-Feingold bill is rejected on
constitutional grounds, the legislation contains an alternative that would define electioneering
communication as,
any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication -which promotes or supports a
candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office
(regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or
against a candidate) and which also is suggestive of no plausible meaning other
than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate.
Id. § 2001.
717. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 864 (1986).
718. S.27, § 2001.
719. An example is TAX NOTES, which is published by Tax Analyst, an exempt section
501(c)(3) organization. Tax Analysts exemption letter may be found on the Web at
http://www.tax.org/About/990/Irs.pdf. Tax Notes is a weekly publication that often contains stories
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Feingold definition of electioneering communication would exclude a
communication appearing in a news story, commentary, or editorial
distributed through the facilities of any broaddasting station.72 Similarly,
a definition of political advocacy for tax-exempt organization purposes
may exclude non-partisan reporting of current events and analysis
contained in a periodical regularly published by a tax-exempt organization
that is distributed to a subscriber base that is not formed on the basis of
elections either geographically or temporally. 1 The provision also could
be drafted to exclude from campaign advocacy the nonpartisan
presentation of candidates' views in their own words in a written or
electronically communicated forum that included all of the major
candidates in a particular election. 2
2. Options to Revise the Tax Regime for Political Organizations
a. Tax Exempt Charities
Congress's expression of its policy choice is clear regarding campaign
activity by tax-exempt charitable organizations. Charitable organizations
that are exempt from tax under section 501(c)(3) are prohibited from
intervention in a political campaign.7 Yet the record is equally clear that
the muddled definition of educational advocacy on social issues versus
about federal office holders and tax legislation. For an interesting variation of this issue, however,
see Richard L. Hasen, CampaignFinanceLaws andthe RupertMurdochProblem,77 TEx. L. REv.
1627 (1999), which advocates the elimination of the FECA exemption for corporate limits on
campaign contributions that is available for news media.
720. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 201 (adding 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii)) (as passed by the Senate
Apr. 2, 2001). The exception would not be available in the case of a broadcast facility that is owned
by a political committee, political party, or a candidate. Under the bill, electioneering
communications also do not include independent expenditures, not coordinated with a candidate,
that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate. The legislation would impose an
independent disclosure requirement on these expenditures. Id.See Fred Stokeld, McCain Article
RaisesQuestionsofEO PoliticalParticipation,
86 TAXNOTES 1839 (2000), reporting on an article
severely criticizing Senator John McCain published in the newspaper of God's World Publications,
an exempt charity, WORLD, Feb. 19, 2000, published immediately before the South Carolina
Presidential primary.
721. SeeFred Stokeld, McCainArticleRaisesQuestions ofEOPoliticalParticipation,
86 TAX
NoTES 1839 (2000), reporting on an article severely criticizing Senator John McCain published in
the newspaper of God's World Publications, an exempt charity, WORLD, Feb. 19,2000, published
immediately before the South Carolina Presidential primary.
722. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73; Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ.
Fund, 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989). Note the study by Hasen, supranote 102, which found that only
a tiny fraction of so-called issue advertisements appearing on television in the thirty and sixty day
periods preceding congressional elections were "genuine" issue-oriented communications rather
than election advocacy.
723. See supra text accompanying notes 297-303.
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campaign advocacy for or against specific candidates has permitted
extensive political campaign activity by exempt charities.
Broadening and clarifying the definition of political intervention to
include all campaign advocacy, particularly advocacy that meets the
definition of an electioneering communication under the McCain-Feingold
standard, will help identify charitable organizations that attempt to
influence the outcome of elections. Further steps are required, however, to
prevent tax subsidies for otherwise tax-free money that flows through taxexempt charities. Revocation of the exempt status of a charitable
organization that is intervening in political campaigns will not prevent
abuse."2 The revocation process is long and difficult, revocation generally
would be initiated after tax-free money has already been expended in the
electoral process and after the charitable organization has attempted to
accomplish its political purpose, and the promoters of the charitable
organization are not restrained from the creation of a new organization to
carry on the political activities.72
Recognizing that contributions intended to effect political advocacy
may be includable as income to the charity operating as a political
organization, and that deduction of the expense of earning that income
potentially is limited, the subsidy to a charitable organization's political
advocacy may be removed by taxing the organization on its receipts that
are directed to campaign advocacy at the highest tax rates imposed either
on corporations or trusts, as would be appropriate to the characterization
of the organization.726 To avoid questions involving whether contributions
can be treated as income under section 61, a meaningful tax on political
advocacy could be structured as an increase in the excise tax of section
4955 of the Code." The excise is imposed on the use of a tax-exempt
charitable organization for political advocacy. Basing the rate on the
highest income tax rates, rather than the ten percent rate currently applied
by section 4955, would remove the subsidy of tax exemption.

724. See Sheppard, supranote 659, at 13, which states that "investigations of violations only
come after the election. Potential disqualification of a purportedly exempt organization is no
barrier; by the time it happens, the money has been spent, the organization has been dissolved, and
everyone has moved on to the next election." Id.
725. For example, see the procedural history of BranchMinistries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137,
140-41 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See also supra note 327.
726. The corporate rate would be directed to incorporated organizations, the trust rate imposed
on unincorporated organizations that may be characterized as trusts formed for the purpose of
pooling property for nonprofit purposes. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(a) (as amended in 1996).
The highest rate for trusts, the same as the individual rate, could be imposed on a partnership if the
joint production of political influence in the electoral process can be recognized as a joint profit
motive. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 633 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1980).
727. See supra text accompanying notes 349-58.
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Taxing a tax-exempt charity at income tax rates on its political
advocacy expenditures would only eliminate one of the two subsidies
described in Regan v. Taxationwith Representation.78 Contributors to the
organization would still be permitted a deduction for their charitable
contributions. In order to eliminate this subsidy, the concepts of sections
162(e)(3) and 170(f)(9) might be expanded to require a charitable
organization to notify each of its contributors of any expenditures for
political advocacy and indicate the proportion of its total expenditures that
are represented by political advocacy. Contributors would thereafter be
required to include in gross income the amount of any deductions claimed
for charitable contributions to organizations with political expenditures. 7 9
Although such a reporting requirement would be burdensome to a
charitable organization, as recognized in Regan,73 0 the organization may
avoid both the reporting requirements and the potential tax liabilities by
directing its political advocacy, including both the receipt of contributions
and its expenditures, through an organization that does not avail itself of
governmental subsidies. That is precisely the goal that this proposed
scheme is intended to accomplish.
b. Tax Exempt Social Welfare and Other Non-Charitable
Tax Exempt Organizations
The registration -and disclosure requirements of section 527(i) and
section 527(j)' that are imposed on organizations designated as political
organizations will lead many political entrepreneurs to increase their use
of tax-exempt social welfare organizations for campaign advocacy. In
addition, the ability to use a section 501(c)(4) organization to avoid the
FECA limitation on corporate contributions under Federal Election
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.732 puts additional
pressure on the use of the social welfare organization for political
advocacy. 3 The fact that political advocacy through a social welfare
organization may shield contributors from disclosure and in general

728. 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983).
729. This proposal is framed in terms ofan inclusion in gross income in order to capture only
the tax benefit to the contributor of deducted expenses. Thus, non-itemizers who claim no
deductions for charitable contributions would not be affected.
730. Regan, 461 U.S. at 544, 544 n.6.
731. See supranote 545.
732. 479 U.S. 238, 241 (1986).
733. The McCain-Fiengold bill exacerbates the problem by specifically excluding
communications by a § 501(c)(4) organization supported by contributions from individuals who
are U.S. citizens from the definition of electioneering communication that is subject to disclosure
under the FECA. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 203(b) (adding 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c)(2)) (as passed by the
Senate Apr. 2, 2001).
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provide a way to avoid the FECA provisions warrants an examination by
policy makers of whether political activity in this form should be
encouraged by the availability of a tax benefit.
The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that a certain amount of
campaign advocacy is consistent with the exempt function of social
welfare organizations and other forms of tax-exempt interest group
associations." Imposition of a prohibition on intervention in political
campaigns, such as is applied to charitable organizations under section
501(c)(3), may not be appropriate in the case of section 501(c)(4) and
other tax-exempt organizations.735 However, it may be desirable to
eliminate the subsidy for campaign activity. Contributions to a social
welfare organization that are intended by the contributor to provide
political influence by supporting candidates represent compensation to the
organization for developing and providing the political influence. That
compensation may be deemed income that appropriately is the subject of
the income tax. In addition, section 527(f) already withholds the subsidy
for investment income of a tax-exempt organization that is directed to
campaign advocacy by imposing a tax at the highest corporate rate on
campaign expenditures financed with investment income.7 36 Recognizing
the additional subsidy provided to the exempt organization, the tax on
exempt organizations that engage in campaign advocacy may be expanded
to include contribution income to the extent that contributions are
expended for campaign advocacy.737 Again, for this purpose, campaign
advocacy should be defined to include attempts to influence voters,
unmistakable exhortations to vote for or against identified candidates, and
election-eve communications that identify a candidate.73 As discussed in
the context of charitable organizations, issues of whether contributions
constitute gross income may be avoided by characterizing the tax as an
excise on the benefit of operating as a tax-exempt entity engaged in
campaign advocacy modeled on the lobbying excise tax of section 491 ."
The rate could reflect the benefit of tax exemption with a tax at the highest
corporate rate on campaign advocacy expenses of a tax exempt
organization.

734. Rev. Rule. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332.
735. See Coverdale,supranote445, proposingthattherestrictions on intervention in political
campaigns applicable to section 501(c)(3) organizations be extended to section 501(c)(4)
organizations. Id.at 176-77. The article also proposes disclosure requirements for contributions and
expenditures. Id.

736. I.R.C. § 527(f) (2001).
737. Section 527(i)(4) includes political contributions in the taxable income of a political
organization that fails to comply with the disclosure requirements of section 527(i). I.R.C.
§ 527(i)(4) (2001).
738. See supra text accompanying notes 708-23.
739. See supratext accompanying note 321.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss1/1

110

Simmons: An Essay on Federal Income Taxation and Campaign Finance Reform

FederalIncome Taxation and Campaign Finance Reform

The consequence ofthe proposed income or excise tax on the campaign
advocacy of a tax-exempt organization is that political entrepreneurs
would direct their activities towards the remaining tax exempt political
organization defined in section 527. The benefit of that result is that all
campaign activity would be conducted through a single form of entity.
Congress could then readily identify the types of campaign activity that it
would choose to benefit through the benefit of tax-exemption.
c. The Tax Exempt Political Organization
The Senate Finance Committee explanation of the original adoption of
section 527 of the Code expressed the legislative expectation that
a section 501(c) organization that is permitted to engage in
political activities would establish a separate organization that
would operate primarily as a political organization, and
directly receive and disburse ail funds related to nomination,
etc., activities. In this way, the campaign-type activities
would be taken entirely out of the section 501(c)
organization, to the benefit both of the organization and the
administration of the tax laws.74
In other words, Congress intended that the tax subsidies for campaign
advocacy be located in a single organizational format, the section 527
political organization. The Committee on Ways and Means hinted at the
advantage of this approach where it suggested that tax-exempt
organizations appropriately could avoid the disclosure requirements
proposed by the Committee in its version of H.R. 4762 by forming a
section 527 segregated fund.74 ' The proposals for the taxation of campaign
activity of charitable, social welfare, and other tax-exempt organizations
are intended to further this result by removing the tax subsidy for
campaign activity from any form of tax-exempt organization except for
political organizations qualified under section 527.
If Congress were to enact provisions designed to focus exempt
organization campaign advocacy into section 527 political organizations
and segregated funds, Congress must also consider the extent to which the
subsidy of tax exemption is to be available. Existing legislation attempts
to ensure that campaign money is subject to at least one level of tax with
attempts to limit deductions for contributions to political organizations and
to tax exempt organizations on investment income that is deflected into

740. S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 3 (1974), reprintedin 1975-1 C.B. 517, 534.
741. H. REP. No. 106-712, at 13 (2000). H.R. 4762 was folded into Pub. Law 106-230,
discussed supra,text accompanying notes 545-63.
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campaign advocacy.742 The 2000 addition of section 527(i) and section
5270) require disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures of a
section 527 organization that are outside of FECA mandated disclosure
rules.743 One may legitimately conclude that there are sufficient constraints
on the section 527 tax benefit. As reflected in the Internal Revenue
Service's ruling stance, however, there remains a disconnect between
campaign advocacy subject to the FECA regulatory scheme and the
advocacy qualified for tax exemption under section 527." There is an area
of campaign issue advocacy that is outside of the FECA regulatory scheme
that nonetheless qualifies for tax exemption as exempt function income
and expenditure under section 527. Thus, Congress's tax subsidy may
extend to activities that are structured to avoid Congress's regulatory
policy. The distinctions continue to encourage political entrepreneurs to
disguise campaign advocacy as issue advocacy.
The FECA and the tax benefits of section 527 could be harmonized by
including in the taxable income of a political organization its exempt
function income" to the extent that expenditures for candidates for federal
office746 are not treated as "expenditures" under the FECA regulatory
scheme.747 Thus, political organizations would become taxable with regard
to money devoted to campaign advocacy that is designed to avoid the
FECA regulatory scheme for federal elections. For this purpose campaign
advocacy within the concept of exempt function under section 527 should
include attempts to influence voters, as contemplated by the current
definition in section 527(e)(2), as well as both unmistakable advocacy for
or against identified candidates under the Furgatch definition,748 and
election-eve communications that feature a candidate's name or likeness
as proposed by the McCain-Feingold approach.749 As a consequence,

742. I.R.C. § 162(e) (2001). For a discussion of this section, see supra text accompanying
notes 241-53. See also id. § 527(b), (f). For a discussion of this section, see supra note 497. In
addition, theoretically no deductible contributions to tax-exempt charities under section 501 (c)(3)
may be directed to campaign advocacy, or at least campaign advocacy that is not effectively
disguised as education.
743. I.R.C. § 527(i), (j) (2001).
744. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026, 98-08-037, and 1999-25-051; see also supra text
accompanying notes 499-545.
745. I.R.C. § 527(c)(3) (2001). "Exempt function income" of a political organization is
defined in § 527(c)(3) to include contributions, membership dues, and the proceeds from political
fund-raising and entertainment events. Id.
746. 2 U.S.C. § 341(3) (2001). Candidates for federal office include those running for
President, Vice President, Senator, Member of the House of Representatives, or Delegate or
Resident Commissioner to the Congress. Id.
747. See id. § 431 (9)(A).
748. Federal Election Comm'n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857,864 (9th Cir. 1987); see also supra
text accompanying note 96.
749. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 201 (adding 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)) (as passed by the Senate Apr. 2,
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campaign advocacy will receive tax exemption only if channeled through
a section 527 political organization or segregated fund and, in the case of
federal elections, only if within the scope of advocacy subject to the
FECA.750
Federal tax benefits for campaign advocacy that violates state
campaign finance and disclosure laws also is an inappropriate subsidy that
Congress may attempt to limit. The problem is complicated because state
laws are variable in their approach to campaign finance regulation."5
Strengthening the definition of political advocacy by tax-exempt
organizations and directing that activity through section 527 organizations
will assist states that adopt disclosure laws as part of campaign finance
regulation because of the registration and disclosure requirements of
section 527(i) and section 527(j). Congress could go further by adopting
an approach similar to the option suggested in the preceding paragraph
with a provision analogous to the disallowance of illegal payments found
in section 162(c). 752 Taxable income of a political organization would
thereby include contributions that are expended in state or local election
contests if the expenditure is not reported or is in excess of contribution or
expenditure limits under validly enforced state and local campaign finance
regulatory scheme.

D. ConstitutionalRestrictions
The tax regime proposed in the preceding section involves differential
taxation of organizations that expend resources in campaign advocacy.
Buckley is clear regarding governmental restraint on the flow of campaign
money as a restriction on speech subject to strict scrutiny under the First
Amendment.7 3 The Court is equally clear, however, that Congress has
much broader discretion in enacting subsidies through the tax statute.5
The opinion in Regan, while pointing out that statutory classifications that
interfere with the exercise of fundamental rights are subject to strict
scrutiny, expressly states that legislatures have broad latitude in creating
2001).
750. Note that this suggestion does not limit exemptions to advocacy that is subject to
disclosure or limitation under the FECA. Reference to FECA defined campaign expenditure
includes advocacy that, while representing an expenditure as defined by the FECA, is advocacy that
cannot be limited by Congress under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975), and other authorities.
751. For an analysis of state campaign finance reform efforts and their effect, see MALBIN &
GAIS,supra note 1.

752. I.R.C. § 162(c) (2001). Section 162 disallows deductions as ordinary and necessary
business expenses payments to foreign government officials if the payment is an illegal bribe or
kickback, or is illegal under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, and illegal payments under
laws of the United States, or the law of any state provided that the law is generally enforced. Id.
753. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-59.
754. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983).
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classifications and distinctions in tax statutes.755 Thus, the Court allowed
Congress to withhold tax subsidies from charitable organizations that
engage in lobbying and political campaign advocacy-protected forms of
speech. The Court also has held that tax benefits cannot be denied as a
penalty for certain forms of speech. 5 6 Can Congress restrict the benefit of
tax exemption to organizations that do not engage in campaign advocacy
under these authorities?
Speiser v. Randall"7s held that the State of California could not
constitutionally condition the grant ofproperty tax exemptions to veterans
on signing a loyalty oath stating that the individual did not advocate the
overthrow of the United States or California governments by force or other
unlawful means, nor advocate support of a foreign government in the case
of hostilities against the United States." 8 The Court stated that, "[t]o deny
an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in
effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as
if the State were to fine them for this speech." 7 9 The Court assumed,
without actually deciding, that the state could deny tax exemptions to
persons who engage in proscribed speech for which they may be
criminally punished,76 ° and concluded that the California tax exemption
scheme did not afford due process in advance of denying the exemption to
hold an individual punishable for criminal conduct through a restriction on
speech.6 In distinguishing prior opinions upholding loyalty oaths in
certain employment situations, the Court indicated that the "congressional
purpose was to achieve an objective other than restraint on speech."762 The
concurring opinions in Speiser clarify the First Amendment infringement
by pointing out that "California, in effect, has imposed a tax on belief and
expression.,,16' The Court in Regan recognized this distinction and refused
to apply Speiser to void the section 501(c)(3) restraint on political
advocacy of charitable organizations noting that the organization is not
denied its right to lobby, nor its ability to receive non-deductible
contributions for its non-lobbying activity, stating "Congress has merely

755. Id. at 547.
756. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
757. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
758. Id. at 514, 528.
759. Id. at 518.
760. Id. at 519-20.
761. Id. at 528-29.
762. Id. at 527. Distinguishing Am. Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950),
the Court indicated that the referenced objective was to "minimize the danger of political strikes
disruptive of interstate commerce by discouraging labor unions from electing Communist Party
members to union office." Id.
763. Id. at 529 (Black, J., concurring).
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refused to pay for lobbying out of public moneys." 7 ' Under Regan,
Congress is not barred from choosing the kind of activity for which it is
willing to grant subsidies through tax benefits.76
Regan might be described as recognizing that the section 501(c)(3)
restrictions on political advocacy by a tax benefited organization is in fact
a restriction on a particular form of activity, albeit one that involves
speech, but not a restraint on the content of expression or the subject
matter of expression.766 Indeed, the Court permits differential taxation
among speakers where it finds that denying deductibility of contributions
to exempt section 501(c)(3) organizations that engage in lobbying, while
allowing deductible contributions to veterans organizations exempt under
section 501 (c)(1 9) that are permitted to lobby, was not a violation of equal
protection under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.767 The
Court in Leathers v. Medlock described Regan as standing "for the
proposition that atax scheme that discriminates among speakers does not
implicate the First Amendment unless it discriminates on the basis of
ideas. ,768
Restricting the availability of tax exemption to organizations that do
not engage in political advocacy does not restrain the content of advocacy
nor the vigor of the expression. To paraphrase the language of the Court
in Cammarano, political organizations are not being denied a tax benefit
"because they engage in constitutionally protected activities, but are
simply being required to pay for those activities entirely out of their own

764. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983).
765. Id. at550-51.
766. See alsoRust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). In Rust, the Court upheld prohibitions on
abortion counseling and referral services by family planning clinics that received federal funds. The
prohibitions included lobbying for legislation that would permit an increase in the availability of
abortion. The Court stated:
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a
program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest,
without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with
the problem in another way. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated
on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the
exclusion of the other.
Id. at 193.
767. Regan, 461 U.S. at 547.
768. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439,450 (1991). Leathersupholds a state receipts tax on
cable and wireless television distributors. Id. at 453. The Court states that "differential taxation of
First Amendment speakers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens to suppress the expression
of particular ideas or viewpoints." Id. at 447. But cf Minneapolis Star v. Minn. Comm'r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (holding that a state use tax which only applied to a few newspapers
violated First Amendment protections).
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pockets as everyone else engaging in similar activities is required to do
under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code."7'69 An income or
excise tax on campaign expenditures by organizations that receive the
benefit of tax exemption merely insures that exempt organizations do not
obtain an advantage in the political process over speakers whose advocacy
cannot be funneled through tax exempt organizations. In addition, as the
Court emphasized in Regan, directing campaign advocacy to a section 527
organization and away from other tax-exempt forms of organization does
not impermissibly bar electoral advocates from expressing their views
through other outlets.770 Limiting the subsidy to organizations that engage
in campaign advocacy does not prevent their creation of taxable entities to
engage in campaign speech.77 ' Campaign advocacy is not restrained by
removing the tax benefit from organizations that advocate the election or
defeat of candidates but the government is removed from the process of
funding the activity.
V. CONCLUSION

Money talks. Election to political office requires lots of talk and
therefore lots of money. Because the United States Supreme Court has so
closely associated campaign expenditure with speech that is protected by
the First Amendment, governmental regulation of campaign finance will
only have a marginal impact on the flow of money through the electoral
process.772 In addition, campaign professionals and political entrepreneurs
will continue to find new devices to navigate around whatever blockades
legislatures erect to restrict the flow of campaign money. Mandated
disclosure of the identity of major funders of candidates may be the limit
on effective governmental restraint on campaign expenditures.

769. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959).
770. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 550-5 1.
771. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir.
1972). In California, professional political organizations play amajor role in qualifying state ballot
initiatives. See Charlene Wear Simmons, California'sStatewide InitiativeProcess,Calif. Res. Bur.
97-006,9 (May 1997); see also Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, andDirectDemocracy,
77 TEx. L. REv. 1845, 1851 (1999).
772. See MALBIN & GAIS, supra note 1, at 162, which states:
No matter how well thought out the strategy, excessively ambitious goals will be
defeated by the First Amendment-and by human ingenuity. Organizations
affected by new laws will adapt and use constitutionally protected end runs to
pursue their own purposes, obeying the letter of the law but not
accepting-because they have no reason to accept-the reformers' goals as their
own.
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Congress and the Supreme Court have, on the other hand, recognized
that there is a valid public policy reason to limit the availability of
governmental subsidies to participants in election advocacy and lobbying.
The presence of tax benefits in the form of deductible contributions and
tax exemption for political organizations reduces the cost of campaign
advocacy for partisans who are able to take advantage of the tax savings.
Individuals and campaign advocates who operate outside of large
associations are disadvantaged in the competition with tax subsidized
campaign advocates. In its opinions in Cammarano and Regan, the
Supreme Court has permitted Congress a significant degree of latitude to
regulate tax subsidies to campaign activities through tax-exempt
organizations.773 While Congress is limited in its ability to regulate
election advocacy, Congress should exercise its control over the largesse
of governmental subsidy to limit the subsidy to campaign expenditures that
otherwise comply with its existing regulatory structure in the FECA. The
existing tax subsidy itself defeats congressional policy as reflected in the
FECA.774 To state the proposition in the converse, the subsidy of taxexemption should not be available to organizations that are formed or
availed of to skirt the campaign expenditure disclosure and limitation
provisions of the FECA.
The diverse and unregulated structure of campaign activities through
a variety of tax-exempt organizations suggests that tax-subsidized political
expenditure be directed through the political organizations and separate
segregated funds provided for in section 527 of the Code. This can be
accomplished by denying tax exemption to campaign expenditures of all
organizations that are exempt from tax under section 501(a) by virtue of
their identification in section 501(c). This will require a provision
including inclusion in an exempt organization's taxable income an amount
equivalent to the organization's expenditures for campaign advocacy.
Campaign advocacy for this purpose should be defined to include attempts
to influence voters to vote for or against an identified candidate,
unmistakable advocacy for a candidate, and any election-eve
communication to voters that includes the name or image of a candidate
for election. Tax exemption for contributions that are used for campaign
advocacy may be exempt from tax only if directed through a section 527
organization or separate segregated fund. In that fashion, tax subsidized
campaign advocacy is, at the very least, subject to the disclosure
requirements of section 5270). Section 5270) is itself consistent with the

773. Regan, 461 U.S. at 550-51; Cammarano,358 U.S. at 509-13.
774. See Chisolm, supranote 603, at 589, which states, "The legislative history of [FECA and
the Revenue Act of 1971] and the amendments that followed yields ample evidence that the reform
efforts were driven substantially by a desire to diminish the susceptibility of elected officials to
undue pressure by economic interest which have the enhanced leverage of aggregated wealth." Id.
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disclosure goals of the FECA, even though it is a separate regime
administered by the Internal Revenue Service. Finally, tax exemption
under section 527 should be limited to campaign contributions and
expenditures that are treated as contributions and expenditures under the
FECA. In this manner the tax subsidy would conform. to Congress's
enacted policy regarding the regulation of campaign finance.
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